of the Disciplinary Committee constituted under
the Solicitors Acts, 1932 to 1941, ordering that the
appellant be struck off the roll of solicitors of the
Supreme Court, to an order that he should be
suspended for two years.
The solicitor was found Guilty at Quarter Sessions
on two charges of assault and was sentenced to
three months, imprisonment. He did not appeal
against conviction. Before the Disciplinary Com
mittee it was alleged' that the solicitor having been
convicted and sentenced for certain criminal offences
had been guilty of conduct unbefitting a solicitor.
The committee found that he was guilty of such
conduct and ordered the solicitor to be struck off
the roll.
The solicitor appealed against the order
on the ground that the committee did not give due
weight to the mitigating circumstances and that
the order was too severe in view of the facts and the
mitigating circumstances, and
that
the penalty
should be reduced.
Per Lord Goddard, L.C.J. :—There is no appeal
in the present case against the finding of conduct
unbefitting a solicitor. The solicitor had been in
practice since 1932 and there had been no suggestion
until the present proceedings of misconduct either
inside or outside the profession.
This Court had always been very loth to interfere
with findings of the committee on questions of act
or on the penalties which they imposed.
If the
matter had been one of professional misconduct it
would have taken a very strong case for the Court
to interfere with the sentence of the committee.
There was no suggestion of professional misconduct
in the present case:
that being so, I think that
this Court was bound to consider, as they would
have
to do in the Court of Criminal Appeal,
whether or not the sentence was in proportion
or out of proportion with the misconduct proved.
Mr. Cumming-Bruce was right no doubt in saying
that in the present type of case the committee
acted for the honour of the profession and to
maintain the confidence of the public.
As lamentable as this lapse was (and it was not
suggested that it was more than an isolated occasion)
I do not think that the public confidence would
be affected.
The honour of the profession had
still to be protected, but the Court had to consider
whether the sentence was one which was in pro
portion.
The Court were quite satisfied that the
sentence was too severe for the offence proved.
It was a shocking offence, but in one sense it was
no worse in a solicitor than in any one else, and
no better.
In
re
a Solicitor (1956) i W.L.R. 1312.)
Auctioneers who as a result of innocent misrepresentation
have a contract for sale rescinded by
purchaser
are not entitled to commission from vender.
The vendor appointed the plaintiffs, a firm of
house and business transfer agents, her sole agents
to sell her garage business. She signed a commission
note under which she undertook not to consent
to her business being sold except to a person intro
duced by the plaintiffs and to pay to the plaintiffs
commission " upon (their) introducing a person
ready, willing and able to enter into a binding
contract to purchase " her business. A purchaser
signed a contract to purchase the business having
been induced to sign by an innocent misrepresenta
tion made to her by a representative of the plaintiffs
in the presence of and on the information supplied
by the vendor as to the effect of a town and country
planning scheme.
The purchaser, having subse
quently discovered that the scheme might result
almost in the abolition of the garage, sought to
rescind the contract on the grounds of misrepre
sentation and by agreement was released from the
bargain.
The plaintiffs claimed from the vendor
commission on the ground that they had introduced
a person who had entered into a binding contract
to purchase.
Held by t
he Court of Appeal (Singleton, Morris
and Romer,
L.JJ. affirming Lord Goddard, L.C.J.
that the con
tractsigned by the purchaser was not a
" binding contract" within the meaning of the
commission note because it was induced by an
innocent representation and could not be enforced
as against
the purchaser;
the plaintiffs were,
therefore, not entitled
to
recover commission.
Per Singleton, L.J. :—It seems to me to be highly
undesirable that parties should be asked to enter
into a contract of this kind without any advice.
The impression given is that the sole desire of the
agents'
representative was to obtain a signature
to the document in order to found a claim for
commission. When the matter came into the hands
of the solicitors, it was ascertained that the true
position was that the Berkshire County Council,
in their development plan, had a road-widening
scheme which, when work commenced on it, would
necessitate the compulsory purchase of the bulk of
the said property and would render it impossible
to continue the said business on what remained.
The said work is scheduled for completion by 1972.
" The purchaser is saying that it is not a binding
contract. I have to consider whether it was a binding
contract. As the parties have agreed that the pur
chaser was induced to sign the contract by the state
ment made by Mr. Wade, I am bound to hold that
79