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an industrial accident and became entitled to dis

ablement benefit under the National Insurance

(Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946. Under reg. 2 (5)

of

the National Insurance

(Industrial Injuries)

(Benefit) Regulations, 1948, his disablement was

to be assessed as if the injury to his right eye was

incurred as a result of losing the sight of his left

eye;

and, under Sch.

i

to the regulations, the

disablement for blindness in one remaining eye

was to be assessed in such circumstances at a

hundred per cent.

A medical appeal tribunal,

failing to apply reg. 2 (5), assessed the applicant's

disablement at twenty per cent.

The facts on

which the tribunal based their decision did not

appear on the face of their written adjudication,

but the adjudication contained an extract from

the report of a specialist who had examined the

applicant and had set out in his report the full

facts in regard to the previous injury and to the

injury in 1955.

Section 36 (3) of the Act of 1946

provides that any decision of a medical appeal

tribunal of a question arising under the Act " shall

be final."

On an application by the applicant

for an order of certiorari to remove the decision

of the medical appeal tribunal into the High Court

to be quashed, it was conceded that the decision

was erroneous in point of law.

HELD :

the order of certiorari would be granted

as

the court had jurisdiction for the following

reasons—

(i) the tribunal, by giving an extract from the

specialist's report, had made the report a

part of the record, and, as the tribunal came

to a conclusion which could not reasonably

have been entertained by them if they had

had proper regard to reg. 2 (5) of the Regu

lations of 1948, they had fallen into error in

point of law, which was thus apparent on

the face of the record.

(ii) the provision in s. 36 (3) of the Act of 1946

that the tribunal's decision should be " final "

merely meant that the decision should be

final on the facts and should not be the

subject of appeal, and the sub-section did

uot exclude jurisdiction by certiorari.

Per Denning, L.J. :—On looking again into the

old books I find it very well settled that the remedy

by certiorari is never to be taken away by any

statute except by the most clear and explicit words.

The word " final " is not enough. That only means

" without appeal."

It does not mean " without

recourse to certiorari."

It makes the decision

final on the facts, but not final on the law. Not

withstanding that the decision is by » statute made

" final," certiorari can still issue for excess of

jurisdiction or for error of law on the face of the

record.

I venture, therefore, to use in this case the words

which I used recently, in Taylor

v.

National Assist

ance Board (1957) i. All E.R. 183) with suitable

variations to certiorari:

" The remedy is not excluded by the fact

that the determination of the board is by statute

made ' final.'

Parliament gives the impress of

finality to the decisions of the board only on the

condition that they are reached in accordance

with the law. .

."

In my opinion, therefore, notwithstanding the

fact that the statute says that the decision of the

medical appeal tribunal is to be final, it is open to

this court to issue a certiorari to quash it for error

of law on the face of the record.

I am glad to

notice that modern statutes never take away in

express words

the right

to certiorari without

substituting an analogous remedy. This is probably

because the courts no longer use it to quash for

technical defects, but only use it in case of a sub

stantial miscarriage of justice. Parliament nowadays

more often uses the word " final," or " final and

conclusive" or some such words, which leave

intact the control of the courts by certiorari.

Romer, L.J. :

I agree. In my judgment, it would

be deplorable if we were constrained to hold that

the decision of a medical appeal tribunal however

wrong in law, and however obviously wrong,

was immune from review by Her Majesty's courts.

I cast no reflection whatever on tribunals such as

that in the present case, and they do their work

conscientiously and with efficiency.

In the nature

of things, however,

these and similar

inferior

tribunals (and there are many of them nowadays)

are bound to go wrong from time to time in matters

of law.

Their members consist, in the main, of

people who have devoted their lives to activities

far removed from the study and practice of the

law; and neither by training nor by experience

can they be expected to have that knowledge of

principles of construction which is so necessary

for the proper understanding and application of

the various statutes and regulations which often

come before them.

Injustice may well result, and

a sense of injustice is a grievous thing. I, therefore,

think (and I have said as much before) that it is

not in the public interest that inferior tribunals

of any kind should be ultimate arbiters on questions

of law. Parliament, of course, can make them so .

93