288 / 324
about eighteen pages, and, with the exception of the
disbursements, no separate charge is assigned to any
item in those pages. It is very difficult to follow the
description of the items in Part 2 of the bill. The
total sum of disbursements which appear in Part 2
amount to £9 195., but the unitemised charge is
£94 i os. Then comes Part 3, which is an itemised
bill amounting; in all to about £14. Thus the major
part of the bill as a whole is the lump sum bill."
It is plain from the words " whereas I should have
proceeded to tax " that the taxing master has not
proceeded to tax the bills of costs.
I object to that form of certificate for many reasons.
It is not, I understand, the practice for directions
of this sort to be put in writing, and I understind
that in this case the direction was not put in writing,
but the recital of the direction in the master's certifi
cate seems to leave out something which may or may
not be important, but which certainly occurs in his
own record of the occasion. It cannot be a con
venient practice that somebody should be entitled
to challenge a direction, and that the judge should
hen have to send for the taxing master to find out
what the direction was which was being challenged.
It is to be noted that the
taxing master has not
set out the whole of his direction in the certificate,
and I do not suggest that he purported to do so.
Therefore, I am in the position of hearing an appeal
concerning a direction and having no certain know
ledge what it was. That is my first objection to
this procedure.
The second is this. I do not know why the taxing
master should be allowed to form an opinion on the
point whether, if he taxes the bill, the questions
which will arise on that taxation will be questions
of principle. That is why I referred to the question
how far these matters are contentious. It may well
be that no question of principle arises. It depends
entirely on what these various items relate to, and
it is essentially his business
to make up his own
mind on these matte's. Then, if he likes to say what
his mind is, this court, under the Rules of the
Supreme Court to which I will refer in a moment,
can investigate the question whether he has rightly
appreciated the principles involved. I think that it
is his duty to give his decision on the point in the
certificate, and that it is his decision stated in the
certificate which would be the proper matter to come
before the court.
Thirdly, I think that the whole of this particular
process is at variance with the relevant rule, which
is R.S.C., Ord.
(>•),
r. 27.
That presupposes that the taxing officer has gone
through the bill and indicated, before drawing up
any certificate, that he is going to allow or disallow
particular items, in whole or in part—it must be an
allowance or disallowance " in any bill of costs . . .
of the whole or any part of any items " :
if he does
that, then, as I understand, it is his duty to listen
to the objections. The parties may then apply to
the taxing officer " to review the taxation in respect
of the same."
Then there is a provision that, pending the con
sideration of the objections, the taxing master may
issue a certificate on other items, but that does not
affect the present case.
Then comes R.S.C., Ord. 65, r. 27 (40), which
reads :
" Upon such application the taxing officer
shall reconsider and review his taxation upon
such objections ..."
Let it be noted that it is " his taxation ", and the
taxing officer agrees that he has not proceeded to
taxation in this case. Rule 27 (40) continues :
"... and he may, if he shall think fit, receive
further evidence in respect thereof, and, if so
required by either party, he shall state either in
his certificate of taxation or allocator, or by
reference to such objection, the grounds and
reasons of his decision thereon, and any special
facts or circumstances relating thereto ..."
That makes it quite plain that it is the taxing officer,
and not the judge, who has to reach a decision.
R.S.C., Ord. 65, r. 27 (41), reads :
" Any party who may be dissatisfied with the
certificate or allocatur of the taxing officer, as
to any item or part of an item which may have
been objected to as aforesaid, may .
.
. apply to
a judge at chambers for an order to review the
taxation as to the same item or part of an
item ..."
Again, that seems to me to make it quite plain that
the duty of the taxing master is to make up his mind,
stating his conclusions in the certificate and giving
his reasons, as provided for in R.S.C., Ord. 65, r. 27
(40), and then the judge has a limited jurisdiction
to upset his decision. I would point out that it is
a limited jurisdiction, not a complete jurisidc<ion
such as exists, for instance, between a Chancery
judge and a Chancery Master. It is by no means a
complete jurisdiction.
It seems to me that the certificate in the present
case is not such a certificate as is contemplated by the
rules, and it is not a certificate on which any party
can apply to the court for the reasons which I have
given.
The objection, however, is not to the preliminary
taxation. There is no such thing. The objection is
to the taxing master's direction that the first de
fendant should file what he calls a proper bill of
costs. That direction, however, is not a " prelimi
nary taxation ". By no manner of means can it be
81