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KaVe come to" any other conclusion but that it was

signed, he would have no case. Now it is not

suggested that any intimation was conveyed to

him at the time -when the certificate was taken

out and it is a curious feature of the case that no

demand was made for payment of the costs until

January, 1952..

The plaintiff himself swears that

he did not know the certificate was signed and

I do not see any reason to disbelieve him.

It seems to me in any event in all the circum

stances that the plaintiff's attitude was excusable,

and that he was genuinely taken by surprise when

the demand for costs was actually made.

Apart from the explanations put forward to

excuse the plaintiff's delay I have, however, also

to be satisfied that the plaintiff genuinely intended

to appeal and held to that intention all along.

The fact that Counsel was retained to argue the

case before the Taxing Master shows that the

Plaintiff had serious intentions in contesting the

point.

This motion was brought within a reasonable

time after the refusal of the defendants to extend

the time and the position is that if I refuse to

extend the time for a review of taxation the result

may be that the plaintiffs will have to pay to the

defendants a substantial sum in respect of a portion

of the costs in respect of which he may be shown

to have no legal liability to pay. On the other

hand if I do extend the time it will enable the

is>,ue to be determined according to law and no

real hardship will be done to the defendants in

that they will only suffer a delay. The defendants

can scarcely suggest that there is any gre?* urgency

about the matter since they allowed six months

to elapse before applying for the costs.

While it was objected before me that the proper

evidence necessary to make the correct calculations

was not adduced by the plaintiff, it was not at

any time suggested that the case before the Taxing

Master had proceeded on any other basis but that

the solicitor conducting the proceedings on behalf

of the Corporation was remunerated by way of

salary and this appears to have been accepted

as common case.

Party and party costs are of course given in

the character of an indemnity but are not a complete

indemnity.

If the costs awarded in an action are

to be taxed however on a solicitor and client basis

they obviously come closer to that position.

If

the fact that an agreement exists between the

successful litigant in an action and his solicitor

affects the amount of the party and party costs

ultimately payable by the unsuccessful party, there

does not seem to be any reason why the fact that

such costs are to be taxed on a solicitor and client

basis should lead to any different result.

I feel it right to say that I have some difficulty

in seeing why it is for the party objecting to the

allowance of the usual costs to show that the

allowance will give more than an

indemnity.

Section

5

of the Solicitors Act, 1870 provided,

as I have indicated above, that a client who has

entered into such an agreement shall not be entitled

to recover from any other person more than the

amount payable by the client to his own attorney

under the agreement. It would seem to me and

I think I need put it no further than this, that the

section is, at least, open to the interpretation that

the onus lies upon the party seeking to recover

costs, in such circumstances, to show that the

costs claimed are not more than the amount payable

by the client to his own attorney and that accordingly

it is not for the party objecting to the allowance

of the usual costs, to have to prove that the allowance

will give more than an indemnity.

It would

certainly seem more reasonable to ask the party

who has all the facts, figures and materials at his

disposal

to provide

the necessary

information

(White

v.

Dublin Corporation (1955) 89 I.L.T.R.

144).

NOTE : The above mentioned case although heard

by Mr. Justice Budd in 1952 was not reported

until 1955, and there does not appear to be any

subsequent report of the substantive point involved,

viz. :

the onus of proof where a client a successful

litigant who employs a salaried solicitor claims

full party and party costs. If this point is brought

before the courts for a decision, Section 59 of

the Solicitors Act, 1954, and regulation 7

(b)

of the

Solicitors Act, 1954, Professional Practice, Conduct

and Discipline Regulations, 1955, will be relevant.

This regulation provides that a solicitor shall

not agree to share with any person not being

either a solicitor qualified to practise or a duly

qualified legal agent in another country his profit

costs in respect of any business either contentious

or non-contentious but goes on to say that a solicitor

who is employed full time in consideration of

a salary to do the legal work exclusively of an

employer who is not a solicitor may agree with

such employer to set off profit costs received in

respect of contentious business from the opponents

of such employer the costs paid to him as the

solicitor for such employer by

third parties in

respect of non-contentious business against (i)

the salary so paid or payable to him and (2) the

reasonable office expenses incurred by such employer

in connection with such solicitor (and to the extent

of such salary and expenses).

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