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DECISIONS

OF

PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

Is a document which is dictated, checked, and then amended

in writing by a witness made or produced by him

with

his own hand, for the purpose of evidence

?

Yes.

Ij a

solicitor who prepares

the will of a

testator,

dictates a note to his typist in which he sets out

the

surrounding circumstances which when

type

written, was checked and amended, but not initialled

by the solicitor, is such a note admissible in evidence

?

Yes, because a solicitor was not a

" person

interested" within the meaning of the English

Evidence Act, 1938 and there was no likelihood

that his conduct at the time might subsequently

be questioned.

Per Sachs, J. :—" My own view is that a document

which is dictated, checked and then amended in

writing by a witness, certainly comes within the

ambit of S. i (4) of the Evidence Act, 1938, as being

a document that was made or produced by that

witness with his own hand.

It does not matter

if in fact he secured the intervention of someone

else to do the actual typewriting provided that he

himself sees it, checks it, and writes on it.

It is axiomatic that in almost every case a solicitor

keeps a record of an important conversation in case

there is any dispute. I do not think, however, that

in the present case at the time the document was

made on June 18, 1952, there was anything which

could be said to fall within sub-s.(3) so as to make

it a time when " proceedings were .

. .anticipated."

The next point argued was whether the witness

was a " person interested" within the meaning

of sub-s.(3). Counsel for the plaintiff put forward

the fact that the witness had at any rate a reasonable

chance of acting for the bank as constituting an

" interest." I do not think that a contingent prospect

of that sort can be an " interest" in the sense that

this sub-section contemplates.

I would add that

otherwise every solicitor acting in any matter in

which there could be any dispute, and in which

accordingly there was at any rate a chance he might

be employed, would never be able to make a record

which could be evidence in a court of law. It might

be said to be against a solicitor's reputation if a will

which he is charged with preparing and seeing

executed turns out not to be properly made.

One notes that if the risk that a solicitor's conduct

might

later be called,

into question were an

" interest" within the meaning of sub-s.(3), then

all records of solicitors on such matters would tend

to be excluded. That seems to me not only contrary

to commonsense but also contrary to the law

implicit, I think in many decisions concerned with

the records of deceased solicitors. These records

have regularly been admitted, when the solicitor

has died, under the rule that a statement made in

the course of his duty by a deceased person is

admissible providing he had, to use the words of

Phipson On Evidence

(gth Edn.), at p. 301, no " motive

to misrepresent " the facts related in the document."

(Re Pau'e Deed.

(1955), 3

All. E.K.

448.)

Indictment

founded

on

matters

disclosed

in

con

sequence of compulsory process of lam.

The accused, a solicitor, was the executor and

trustee of his deceased mother's estate. As a result

of proceedings instituted in the Chancery Division

by his brother, a beneficiary under the mother's

will, an order was made requiring him to lodge

certain accounts and a statement of outstanding or

undisposed of property. On failure to comply

therewith he was adjudged in contempt of court

and a writ of attachment was issued against him.

Having been subsequently released and re-arrested,

with the object of securing his release from prison,

the accused swore an affidavit in which he confessed

to converting the bulk of the assets of the estate

to his own use. This was the first disclosure of the

defalcations on which the indictment, containing

three counts of fraudulent conversion, was framed.

Before the accused's plea was taken counsel for the

accused moved to quash the indictment under the

provisions of section 43 (2) of the Larceny Act, 1916.

Held by Sellers J. (i) that should the application

to quash the indictment be successful, the court

would have no jurisdiction to try the offences

alleged in the indictment, and therefore it was

appropriate to consider the application before taking

the plea;

(2) that on the facts, as revealed in the

depositions, the offences were first disclosed on

oath in Court in consequence of a compulsory

process

bona fide

instituted by a person aggrieved

and accordingly section 43 (2) applied. The accused

was discharged.

(R. /'.

Maywhort

1955. i

W.L.R.,

848.)

County Registrar must give reasons on Taxation.

In an application for a review of the taxation of

costs by the Bournemouth District Registrar in an

undefended divorce suit, in which the registrar said

that he had had regard to all relevant circumstances,

and had reduced counsel's fee from 7 guineas to 5

guineas.

Sachs J., in granting the application, held that it

was perfectly obvious that a taxing officer was not

entitled to take cover under such an omnibus

statement, which tended to oust the jurisdiction of

the court. It was to be emphasised that the duty of

taxing officers when answering an objection was to