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(4) but a division of opinion arose as regards the

propriety of allowing the solicitor's costs and the

ad valorem stamp duty in connection with

the

second purchase. Lord Justice Evershed took the

view that the purchaser obtained what he agreed

to buy and that he had been compensated for the

loss in value of the house purchased by reason of the

vendor's failure to give vacant possession.

The

second purchase was wholly distinct from the first

and the solicitor's costs and ad valorem stamp duty

in respect of that purchase could not be held to

be a loss or damage flowing from the vendor's

breach of the terms of the first contract, or if they

could were too remote. Lord Justice Tucker and

Lord Justice Somervell disagreed with Lord Justice

Evershed on this point. They held that as

the

result of the vendor's breach of contract the pur

chaser had to find somewhere else to live, and was

compelled to purchase another house. He must be

assumed to have received full value for the price

which he paid for the second house, but the stamp

duty and legal costs were not part of the purchase

price. They were no doubt items which were

necessarily payable on the purchase, and might thus

be described as part of the costs of the purchase

but they were outgoings necessitated by the vendor's

breach for which the purchaser had received no

countervailing

benefit.

In

the

result

the

full

amount was allowed as part of the damages.

The Lord Chief Justice, in the Northern Ireland

High Court last week, commented strongly against

the common practice in the making of affidavits of

inserting at the end of the affidavit, a paragraph

in the terms that " save where otherwise appears,

I am aware of the above facts of my own know

ledge," when, he said, " It was quite apparent that

matters in the affidavit could not possibly be within

the deponent's personal knowledge, and yet,

it

was not stated that such matters were deposed to on

information and belief."

His Lordship said that he had spoken on previous

occasions about the laxity in the drawing of affidavits.

He was determined to put a stop to it, for, strictly

speaking, it involved the deponent in the com

mission of perjury.

In the case before him, the Lord Chief Justice,

in refusing a motion to remit an action, costs of the

motion to be costs in the cause, gave a special

direction that no costs whatever should be allowed

in respect of the affidavit referred to.

The Disciplinary Committee recently pronounced

their Findings and Order in a case which may be of

general interest.

The respondent was charged with professional

misconduct in that he had, notwithstanding the

provisions of Rule 2 of the Solicitors' Practice Rules,

1936—

(a)

held himself out as being prepared to do

professional business in a non-contentious

matter, namely,

the sale of (Blackacre),

at less than the scale of charges prevailing

in the district in which he practised; and

(b)

allowed himself to be held out as being

prepared to do professional business in the

said non-contentious matter at l&ss than the

scale of charges prevailing in the district

in which he practised.

The respondent was a member of a local Law

Society which had passed a resolution stating that

the scale of charges prevailing in the district of that

Society for conveyances of property payable by

both vendor and purchaser, whether separately

represented or not, was the scale prescribed by the

Solicitors' Remuneration Order, 1936, without any

percentage additions allowed by subsequent Orders.

The respondent was instructed by the purchaser

of Blackacre. The house agent concerned told the

respondent that the vendor would probably instruct

him also but asked what, in that event, would be

the cost to the vendor. The respondent replied

that his fee to the vendor would be between £17 and

£20. The vendor (unknown to the respondent)

had already asked another firm of solicitors what

their charges would be for acting for him on the

sale and they had quoted £28 135. 4d,, being the

appropriate fee according to the resolution of the

local Law Society mentioned above. On learning

the respondent's quotation the vendor took the

deeds away from the other solicitors, whom he had

already instructed, and instructed the respondent

in their place.

Subsequently the vendor withdrew

the respondent's retainer and the sale was completed

by the other solicitors. The respondent completed

the matter for the purchaser alone, to whom he

charged the full scale fee approved by the local

Law Society.

At the hearing before

the Committee the re

spondent admitted the above facts and did not seek

to deny that he had committed an offence under

Rule 2 of the Practice Rules. He stated, however,

that at the material times he had neither known nor

suspected that the vendor had already instructed

other solicitors and that when quoting the reduced

fee he had been under the impression that the vendor

would instruct him in any case. The respondent

further stated that he had had it in mind that, acting

for both parties, he would not have to do so much

work for both clients as would substantially justify

him in charging two scale fees, even at the reduced

rate approved by the local Law Society. He had,

therefore, thought it proper at the time to give in

advance an estimate

less

than the scale fee so