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GAZETTE

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988

remainders over. It was held that

the " d i spos i t i on" " u n d e r" which

B became entitled on A 's death

was not the original settlement but

the resettlement.

To answer (B) is less difficult.

Once the " d i spos i t i on" " u n d e r"

(or " i n consequence o f " ) wh i ch

the property became subject to the

trust has been identified, the

" d i s p o n e r" in relation to that

" d i spos i t i on" is usually not hard to

find.

In Example (1), for instance, the

" d i spos i t i on" " u n d e r" wh i ch the

property became subject to the

trust was undeniably the trust in-

strument itself, in relation to which

A and not B was the " d i s pone r ".

In Example (2) the " d i spos i t i on"

" u n d e r " wh i ch the property (the

policy) became subject to the trust

was the assignment. The person

who " p r ov i ded" the policy " f or the

purposes" of this assignment was

H and not C.

In Example (3), on the other

hand, the " d i spos i t i on" " u n d e r"

w h i c h t he p r ope r ty (i.e. t he

£ 3 0 , 0 00 settled on discretionary

trusts for the benefit of Mrs. D and

her children) became subject to the

trust was the deed of family

arrangement. One could argue, as

the court in fact decided, that the

tons et origo

of the trust property

was Mrs. D's claim and it was

therefore she and not A who " p r o-

v i ded" the property " f o r the pur-

poses o f " the disposition. On the

other hand one could argue equal-

ly well, on the authority of

A. G-v-

Biggs

[ 1907] 2 IR 400, that B "pro-

v i ded" the property, whatever his

motives may have been for enter-

ing into the deed, or even that A

" p r o v i d e d" the property as the in-

testate out of whose estate the

settlement was made.

In Example (4) the " d i s pone r"

could be B or A, depending on

w h e t h e r

t he

" d i s p o s i t i o n"

" u n d e r " wh i ch the property (the

100 shares of £1 in the company

hiring out A ' s services to the film

studio) was the trust instrument

itself or the " a r r angemen t" of

wh i ch the trust was a constituent

part.

In

A. G -v- F/oyer

9 HLC 477 Lord

Cranworth suggested (489) that

w h e n

a s c e r t a i n i ng

t he

" p r edecesso r" for the purposes of

the former succession duty one

should inquire " w h o is the convey-

ing party out of whose estate the

interest in question has been deriv-

ed?" It is submitted that this test

is as good as any when determin-

ing who " p r o v i d e d" the property

" f o r t he pu r po s es o f " t he

" d i spos i t i on ".

More than one "d i sponer"

S.2(1) CATA 1976 provides that

" wh e re more than one person pro-

vided the property each shall be

deemed to be a disponer to the ex-

tent that he so provided the proper-

t y " . This corresponds to s. 13 SDA

1853 in the former succession du-

ty legislation, except that the

disponers are treated as being such

to the extent that each provides

the property comprised in the joint

disposition instead of " i n equal pro-

po r t i ons ".

The combined effect of s. 106(1)

FA 1984, s. 103(1) FA 1986 and

the definition of " d i s pone r" in

S.2(1) CATA 1976 wou ld thus

appear to be such that the dis-

cretionary trust in question is

notionally divided into t wo or more

trusts, the property subject to each

having a different " d i s pone r ". It is

difficult to see how effect can be

given otherwise to the words refer-

red to above in the definition of

" d i s pone r" in s.2(1) CATA 1976.

Example (7)

Property is held upon trust for A,

contingently on his surviving to a

specified date, and if he does not

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survive until that date, upon trust

for B. A and B jointly settle the pro-

perty upon discretionary trusts. A

and B are both " d i spone r s" in rela-

tion to the property subject to the

discretionary trust, proportionate-

ly to the values of their respective

interests under the original settle-

ment, calculated on an actuarial

basis:

in re Drake's

Settlement

Trusts

[ 1938] Ch. 133.

"Proper t y"

"Pr ope r t y ", as used in the CATA

1976, is defined in s.2(1) CATA

1976 to " i n c l u d e" " r i g h t s" and

" i n t e r e s t s" " o f any description"

but is otherwise undefined. Use of

the wo rd " i n c l ude s" in the defini-

tion suggests that its purpose is to

expand the meaning of the wo rd

beyond its " n a t u r al i mp o r t ":

Di/worth -v-CofS[

1889] AC 99,

105 per Lord Watson. The "natural

i mpo r t" of the wo rd " p r o p e r t y" is

" t h a t wh i ch belongs to a person

exclusive of others and wh i ch can

be the subject of a bargain and sale

to ano t he r ":

Potter -v- IRC

10 Ex.

147, 156 per Pollock CB.

As used in s. 106(1) FA 1984

and s. 103(1) FA 1986 the wo rd

" p r o p e r t y" is subject to a further

restriction in t hat neither (a)

"interests in expec t anc y" nor (b)

"interests in a policy of assurance

upon human l i f e" are to be treated

as such: s. 106(3) FA 1984 and

s. 103(1) FA 1986: "Interests in

expec t anc y" are defined in s.2(1)

CATA 1 9 76 to " i n c l u d e" an

" es t a te in remainder or reversion

and every other future interest,

whether vested or con t i ngen t ".

Wi de t h o u gh t he

d e f i n i t i on

undoubtedly is, it does not extend

to interests wh i ch are vested in

po s s e s s i on

but

s u b j e ct

t o

defeasance. " A distinction has to

be drawn between the exercise of

a power to terminate a present

right to present enjoyment and the

e x e r c i se of a p o w e r w h i ch

prevents a present right of present

enjoyment arising":

Pearson -v-

IRC

[ 1980] STC 318, 325 per

Viscount Dilhorne. An interest in

p r ope r ty w h i c h is v e s t ed in

po s s e s s i on

but

s u b j e ct

to

defeasance is therefore " p r ope r t y"

for the purposes of s. 106(1) FA

1984 and s. 103( 1) FA 1986:

in re

Kit pat rick's Po/cies Trusts

[ 1966]

Ch.730. An interest in property

w h i c h is c o n t i n g e nt on t he

attainment of a specified age, on

6