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GAZETTE

JUNE 1988

The Date of Discoverability

Rule and S.11 of the 1957

Statute of Limitations

Martin Hayden

by

Ma r t in Hayden

Barr ister-at- Law

" T i me is a test of trouble but not a remedy", wr o te Emily

Dickinson. Lawyers can go further, " T ime can extinguish the

remedy". S.11 (2)(b) of the Statute of Limitations, 1957,

provides as f o l l ows:

An ac t i on c l a imi ng damages for negligence, nuisance or

breach of duty . . . where the damages claimed by the plaintiff

for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or

include damages in respect of personal injuries to any person,

shall not be brought after the expiration of three years f r om

the date on wh i ch the cause of ac t i on accrued."

The problem with this section

stems from the various inter-

pretations given to the date " on

wh i ch the cause of ac t i on

accrued". Various traditional inter-

pretations have arrived at different

conclusions and the present article

attempts to review the state of the

law as it stands today and makes

reference also to the Law Reform

Commi s s i on 's Report on the

Statute of Limitations,

Claims in

Respect of Latent Personal Injuries

LRC 21 of 1987, and also refers to

the recent private member's Bill on

the Statute of Limitations intro-

duced by Mr. George Birmingham.

It is the writer's view that the only

constitutionally valid interpretation

of S.11 must be one which includes

a date of discoverability rule.

There are at present what would

appear to be t wo conflicting High

Court decisions on the matter.

Morgan -v- Park

Developments

[1983] ILRM 156 and

Anna Hegarty

-v- Francis O'Loughran and Gerald

£. Edwards

[1987] ILRM 603.

The facts of Morgan are quite

s t r a i gh t f o rwa r d. The Plaintiffs

purchased the house from the

Defendant building contractor in

1962. Shortly after moving in

cracks appeared wh i ch were

notified to the Defendants. The

Defendants repaired these. A

further larger crack appeared sub-

sequently and the Defendants

repaired this in 1965. About this

time, the Plaintiffs were told by the

Defendant's agent that the cracks

were merely as a result of the

house settling and that this would

take some years. In 1975 the

Plaintiffs had an extension built. At

t h is

stage, t he

con t r ac t or

attempted unsuccessfully to repair

the crack. In 1979, the Plaintiffs

consulted an architect who told

them that the house had a major

s t r uc t u r al f au lt in t hat t he

foundations were insufficient.

Remedial work was necessitated;

underpinning of the foundations

had to be carried out. Proceedings

were issued in 1980. The statute

was pleaded against the Plaintiff.

For the Plaintiff, it was submitted

that the date of accrual was when

the damage was discovered and

that this was postponed by reason

of t he De f endan t 's agen t 's

representations.

Carroll J. held that the date of

accrual was when the remedial

work was completed in 1965. In

other words, she applied a date of

discoverability rule. In coming to

this conclusion, Carroll J. examined

a number of English cases and

specifically followed the approach

of the Court of Appeal in

Sparham-

Souter -v- Town and

County

Developments

(Essex) Ltd. and

Another

[1976] 2 W.L.R. 493. An

interesting point about this is that

Sparham was overruled by a

reluctant House of Lords in

Pirelli

General Cable Works Ltd. -v- Oscar

Faber and Partners

[1983] 2 W.L.R.

6, a case which will be dealt with

later. Sparham itself involved an

action against a public authority for

negligence and breach of duty in

failing to ensure that the plans and

foundations complied with the

relevant bye-laws. Cracks had

appeared in the brickwork. The

authority claimed,

inter alia

, that

the cause of action was statute

barred.

Lord Denning in that case stated

at p.497 that "A cause of action

accrues not at the date of the

negligent act or omission but at the

date of damage sustained by the

Plaintiff". He went on to quote

Vaughan Williams L. J. in

Thompson -v- Lord

Clanmorris

[1900] 1 Ch. 718, where the latter

stated "A statute of limitations

cannot begin to run unless there

are t wo things present — a party

capable of suing and a party

capable of being sued". Carroll J.

expressly referred to this statement

in Morgan and in fact she stated

that there cannot be a party

capable of suing unless he knows

or should know that he has

suffered damage. Denning M. R.

went on to state that " I t would be

most unjust that time should run

against the Plaintiff when there is

no possibility of bringing an action

to enforce it". Lord Roskill agreed

with Denning M. R.'s approach con-

cerning the existence of a person

capable of suing and another

person capable of being sued. In

fact he quoted from Halsbury's

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