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GAZETTE

OCTOBER

1988

Recent

I r ish

Cases

Edited by

Gary Byrne

DAMAGES

Tort and Constitution — Children of an

i n j u r ed person are not e n t i t l ed to

damages, either at Common Law or

under the Constitution, against the

wrong-doer w h o caused the injuries, for

damage to their relationship w i t h their

injured parent.

Eugene Hosford, father of the present

Plaintiffs, suffered a severe electrical shock

whilst working for the Defendants in their

factory. The accident was caused by

negligence on the part of the Defendants,

his employers, and resulted in Mr. Hosford

sustaining irreversible brain damage. As a

result of the accident, he was permanently

h o s p i t a l i s ed

and

w as

u n a b le

to

communicate. He was made a Ward of Court

and proceedings were taken on his behalf

against the Defendants. The proceedings

were settled w i th the approval of the

President of the High Court for £ 4 2 0 , 0 0 0.

The Plaintiffs are the five children of Mr.

Hosford, whose ages at the date of the

accident ranged from four to 12 years. Each

of the Plaintiffs, it was claimed, was a

member of a family unit of wh i ch Mr.

Hosford was father and head, and each was

entitled to the benefits of a moral,

intellectual, religious and educational nature,

being the benefits which flow from the love

and affection, the guidance and example

wh i ch the father of a family bestows on his

children. The Plaintiffs claimed that they

were deprived of these benefits as a result

of the injuries their father had sustained.

The Plaintiffs made their claim firstly in

tort, alleging that the Defendants owed a

duty of care not only to Mr. Hosford but also

tc his children, and secondly under the

Constitution, claiming that the negligence

of the Defendants amounted to an infringe-

ment of the rights conferred by Article 41

and Article 4 2 of the Constitution.

Held: as to the claim in tort, that the harm

wh i ch the Plaintiffs allege they suffered is

not of a kind for which compensation will

be awarded. Although damages for nervous

shock are recoverable at Common Law,

damages for grief and sorrow are not, and

thus damages for the type of harm claimed

by the plaintiffs are also irrecoverable. It

w o u l d require an e n a c t me nt of the

legislature to permit damages to be

recovered by the members of the family of

an injured person " i n respect of damage to

the continuity, stability and quality of the

relationship w i th the injured person".

H e l d : as to the claim for alleged

infringement of the Plaintiffs' rights under

the Constitution, Articles 41 and 42 impose

duties on the State vis-a-vis the family, but

in this case the alleged infringer is not the

State, but a private company. The rights

conferred are: —

(a) the right to protection from legislation

wh i ch attacks or impairs the Cons-

titution or authority of the family, and

(b) the right to p r o t e c t i on f r om the

deliberate acts of State officials wh i ch

attack or impair the Constitution or

authority of the family. A private person

(or company) whose negligent acts

injure the head of a family does not

infringe any constitutional right enjoyed

by members of the affected family.

Accordingly, the Defendants were not guilty

of any breach of a constitutional duty

imposed on them. No duty of care was owed

by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs by virtue

of the Constitution.

Philip Hosford and Others -v- John

Murphy

and Sons Ltd. — High Court (per Costello J.)

— 24 July 1987 —

unreported.

Karl Hayes

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

N e ed f or

Animus

Poaaidendi

G r a z i ng

of Cattle held sufficient use to support

adverse possession.

The Defendant had leased t wo fields,

together w i th some other lands from his

sister for the purpose of grazing cattle for

a number of years up to 1971. In that year

she sold the t wo fields. The purchaser, w ho

was the plaintiff's predecessor in title

purchased the fields w i th the intention of

building t wo factories on them. A factory

was built on the larger field but nothing was

ever built on the smaller field. Notwith-

standing the sale the Defendant continued

to use the smaller field as before. In addition

he created a post and wire fence over portion

of the boundary fence between the t wo

fields where such was necessary to prevent

his cattle from straying onto the factory

premises.

The Plaintiffs on purchasing the property

instituted ejectment proceedings against the

Defendant w ho raised the defence that the

Plaintiffs claim was statute barred by reason

of the adverse possession of the Defendant

of the smaller field since 1971. The Plaintiff

claimed t h at the possession by the

Defendant was not adverse possession for

the purpose of the Statute of Limitations

because it was not inconsistent w i th the

purpose for which the owner of the land

intended to use it.

The Plaintiff relied on

Leigh -v- Jack

5 Ex.

D.264 where Cockburn L. C. said " I do not

think that any of the Defendant's acts were

done with the view of defeating the purpose

of the parties to the conveyances; his acts

were those of a man who did not intend to

be a trespasser, or to infringe upon another's

right. The Defendant simply used the land

until the time should come for carrying out

the object originally contemplated. If a man

does not use his land, either by himself or

by some person claiming through him, he

does not necessarily discontinue his

possession of it. I think that the title of the

Plaintiff is not barred by the Statute of

Limitations."

Bramwell L. J. said: " I n order to defeat a

title by dispossessing the former owner, acts

must be done which are inconsistent w i th

his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes

for which he intended to use it."

The Court noted that in

Leigh -v- Jack

it

was common case that the land concerned

was intended for a street and that until such

use was made of it it would remain idle.

Having referred to

Littledale

-v-

Liverpool

College

11901 ] Ch.190 and

Convey -v- Regan

[1952] I.R. 56 the Court noted that the

decision of Black J. in

Convey -v- Regan

was

based not upon non-interference w i th the

purposes to which the owner intended to put

the lands but on the absence of

animus

possidendi.

The Court referred then to the recent Irish

case of

Cork Corporation -v- Lynch

(26 July

1985, unreported) in which Egan J. had cited

w i th approval a passage from

Wa/lis's

Cay ton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd. -v- Shell Mex

& BP Ltd.,

[1974] 3 All E.R. 575, where

Denning M. R. had said " Wh e re the true

owner of land intends to use it for a

particular purpose in the future, but

meanwhile has no immediate use for it, and

so leaves it unoccupied, he does not lose his

title to it simply because some other person

enters on it and uses it for some temporary

purpose, like stacking materials". The Court

also referred to

Murphy -v- Murphy

[1980]

I.R. 183 where Kenny J. had made the point

that the question of adverse possession was

a question of fact in each case.

The Court took the view that adverse

possession depended on the existence of

animus possidendi

and it is the presence or

absence of this state of mind which must

be determined. Where no use was being

made of the land and the claimant knows

that the owner intends to use it for a specific

purpose in future, this was a fact to be taken

into account. The principle has relevance

only in so far as when that factor was

present it was easier to hold an absence of

animus possidendi.

The Court noted that it

could find nothing in the facts to show that

the Defendant intended to use the land upon

a temporary basis merely to prevent it lying

idle until the owner was in a position to use

it for a purpose of which he was aware. The

Defendant had made full use of the land to

graze cattle which supported the necessary

adverse possession.

Seamus

Durack

Manufacturing

Ltd. -v-

Considine — High Court (per Barron J.) —

27 May 1987 -

unreported.

J o hn F. Buckley

EMPLOYMENT

M i n i m um N o t i ce e nd Terms of

Employment Act 1973 complied w i th

p r o v i d ed t he m i n i m um p e r i od of

stetutory notice is included in notice of

termination — Notice may be renewed.

In 1984, Bolands Limited was in financial

difficulties; a Receiver was appointed w ho

decided to continue trading in the hope he

could sell the business as a going concern.

Having informed the unions, he served

notice on 3 80 employees; notice was given

i