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GAZETTE

OCTOBER 1988

on 10 August 1984. Notice was given in

writing to each employee w i th their employ-

ment terminating on a specific date. Section

4 of the Act provides that every employee

w h o has been in the continuous service of

an employer for a period of 13 weeks or more

is entitled to a m i n i mum period of notice

varying from one to eight weeks according

to the length of service. Accordingly,

employees' notice of termination expired on

different dates. This notice was extended,

in writing, each week up to and including 4

October 1984. There were full consultations

w i th the unions at all times; the unions

accepted such extensions. The Receiver did

not find a buyer and the company closed on

12 October 1984.

Subsequent to dismissal, the employees

maintained that they did not receive the

requisite notice because they considered

that prior to termination they received only

one week's notice of the specific termination

date of employment. The employees referred

their complaint of inadequate notice to the

Employment Appeals Tribunal under the Act.

The Tribunal held, (by majority), that each

employee received only one week's notice

and thus was entitled to compensation for

the balance weeks of their statutory notice

entitlement. The Tribunal's reasoning was

that notice of termination must have a

specific termination date; in this case the

notice given by the Receiver had expired

w h en the employees' employment did not

terminate as originally notified.

This determination was appealed by the

Receiver to the High Court on point of law

under section 11(2) of the Act. The High

Court dismissed the appeal. The Receiver

then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Receiver maintained that such

extensions were for the benefit of the

company and also to save employment.

The respondents, whilst accepting that

the Receiver acted in good faith, argued that

notice of termination to satisfy the Act must

be specific. They conceded that the first

notice issued on 10 August did comply w i th

the Act. If the Receiver had acted on such

notice he would not have been in breach of

the Act. Further, the Receiver should not be

able to rely on the cumulative periods

created by the extensions of the original

notices, and that he should have served a

fresh full length notice instead of each

extended notice.

H e l d: The Receiver complied w i th the

M i n i mum Notice and Terms of Employment

Act, 1973 as the notices satisfied the

requirements of the Act, and none of the

respondents were entitled to compensation.

The reasoning is as follows:

The Act is silent as to the form of notice

of termination i.e. it does not have to be in

writing. The Act is concerned only w i th the

period referred to in the notice. If the notice

is actually given — whether orally or in

writing, in one document or in a number of

documents — and conveys to the employee

that at the end of the period expressly or

impliedly referred to in the notice or notices,

it is proposed to terminate his or her employ-

ment, the only question normally arising

under the Act would be whether the period

of notice is less than the statutory minimum.

From the time the first notice was given,

the employees knew that they were under

notice and that they were benefitting from

repeated extensions of the period of notice.

There was no degree of uncertainty.

Each employee was advised by skilled and

experienced union officials, and they signed

a form acknowledging that the dismissals

were valid and there was no money due in

lieu of notice.

However, the legal position would be

different if a number of notices were issued

to mislead an employee or to subvert the

proper operation of the Act.

Bolands

Limited

(in receivership)

-v-

Josephine

Ward and Ors. — Supreme

Court

(per McCarthy J., nem. diss.) — 30 October

1987 —

unreported.

Frances Meenan

EMPLOYMENT

Whether power to suspend can be

d e l e g a t ed — Wh e t h er s u s p e n s i on

became invalid because of failure to act

within a reasonable time.

The Plaintiff was a postman. He was initially

employed by the Department of Posts and

Telegraphs. Under the terms of the Postal

and Telecommunications Act, 1983, he

transferred into the employment of An Post.

Section 4 5 of the Act guaranteed that his

conditions of service w i th An Post would be

no less beneficial than those he had enjoyed

prior to the transfer. Under his previous

conditions of service, he was liable to

suspension by a Suspending Officer in

circumstances specified in S.13 of the Civil

Service Regulation Act, 1956. In January

1984, the Chief Executive of An Post

p u r p o r t ed to give similar p o w e rs of

suspension

TO

holders of certain designated

offices. One of the principal matters argued

by the Plaintiff was that this delegation of

the power of suspension was

ultra vires.

On 9 May 1984 the Plaintiff was sus-

pended w i t h o ut pay for alleged disTionesty.

A n investigation into the allegation was

commenced. The Plaintiff's solicitor de-

manded his reinstatement on the basis that

the suspension was

ultra vires.

A High Court

action challenging the suspension on this

and other grounds was commenced.

Soon afterwards, A n Post's solicitor in-

dicated that the disciplinary proceedings

would not be taken pending the outcome of

criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff. In

November 1985, the Plaintiff was tried on

indictment and was acquitted on all counts.

An Post continued to refuse to reinstate the

Plaintiff, however, and this refusal was

supported by the Supreme Court (Henchy J.

w i th Hederman J. concurring) w h i ch con-

sidered that:

" T h e disposition of the charges against

the Plaintiff by findings of not guilty did

not preempt or otherwise trench on the

due exercise by A n Post of its statutory

right to suspend or dismiss in respect of

the same conduct w h en treated as

breaches of discipline."

An Post decided not to proceed w i th the

prospective dismissal of the Plaintiff until his

High Court proceedings were concluded. In

July 1986 the High Court denied the Plaintiff

the reliefs he sought and dismissed his claim.

He appealed to the Supreme Court on three

main grounds:

(1) That the suspension was void

ah initio

because there was no jurisdiction vested

in either the Board or the Chief Executive

of an Post to delegate the power of sus-

pension.

The Supreme Court dismissed this ground

of appeal on the basis that the transfer

effected by the 1983 Act subject to the

same conditions of employment as pre-

viously applied carried w i th it by necessary

implication the then existing rights of

suspension,

mutatis

mutandis.

(2) The second main ground of appeal was

that the suspension was void

ah initio

because the Plaintiff was not informed

adequately of the reasons for his sus-

pension.

On this point, the Supreme Court accepted

that the Plaintiff was entitled to an adequate

statement of the reasons for suspension but

it pojnted out that the High Court had found

as a fact that the Plaintiff had been made

aware of w hy he was being suspended. The

Supreme Court could not disturb that finding

of fact.

(3) The third main ground of appeal was that

the suspension was invalid because A n

Post failed to act within a reasonable time

on foot of it.

The Supreme Court accepted that " t h e

fundamental requirements of justice meant

that the uncertainty and the hardship of

suspension w i t h o ut pay be brought to a

conclusion one way or the other as soon as

was reasonably practicable."

In assessing w h en it was "reasonably

practicable" to do so, the Court considered

that the claims of both parties had to be

assessed. The complicated series of the

legal proceedings wh i ch surrounded the

suspension made the question of whether

A n Post should have proceeded w i th the

internal inquiry a difficult one. The Court

noted that if the internal inquiry had gone

ahead and led to the conclusion that the

Plaintiff should be dismissed, the exercise

of that power would have been impractical

given the High Court proceedings. Further-

more, the Court took the view that to hold

the inquiry would have been undesirable as

the issues wh i ch would have necessarily

arisen could not have been segregated from

the issues raised in the High Co u rt

proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court con-

c l u d ed by a m a j o r i ty ( M c C a r t hy J.

dissenting) that it was reasonable and proper

to postpone the inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

Stephen Flynn -v- An Post — Supreme

Court

(Henchy J.) — 3 April 1987 —

unreported.

Declan Madden

EMPLOYMENT

Emp l o yme nt Equality Act 1977 —

d i s c r i m i n a t i on

— Wh e t h er

t he

imposition of an age limit was indirectly

discriminatory against married women

— Nature and processing of appeals.

The Plaintiff worked for the Sligo County

Council as a Clerical Officer for 12 years up

to December 1967 w h en she was married.

Under the then existing regulations, she had

to resign on marriage. In 1980, the North

Western Health Board advertised a vacancy

for a Grade IV clerical position w h i ch

provided

inter alia

that candidates " m u st not

be more than 27 years of age on 1 July,

1 9 8 0 ". The Plaintiff's application for the

position was refused on the grounds that

she was more than 27 years of age on the

relevant date. She contended that the age

ii