The Gazette 1974

'[ff than by the Corporation, Mr. Justice Henchy said

toe function of the inspector holding the inquiry was

make a fair and accurate report of what took place.

was for the Minister to reach his own decision

unfettered by any conclusion the inspector might have

ome to, but on the basis of the same evidential mate-

al as was before the inspector.

Inspector's advice not to confirm order rejected by

Minister

It had been contended on behalf of Mr. Murphy that

toe Minister would not have confirmed the compulsory

Purchase order if he had followed the inspector's con-

clusion of fact. The inspector recommended that the

Minister be not advised to confirm the compulsory pur-

chase order because the Corporation had failed to prove

mat their acquisition was essential to, or even the most

pedient way of securing the speedy erection of new

Nouses. The gist of counsel's argument for Mr. Murphy

that the Minister had obviously rejected this finding

Ny the inspector; that he had done so without evidence

a n

d in the teeth of the evidence given at the inquiry,

>d that, therefore, the Minister's confirmation of the

der should be invalidated.

Mr. Justice Henchy said that in his opinion this argu-

ment failed because it was based on a false premise.

. ' had assumed that the Minister had rejected the

Mspector's finding that the compulsory acquisition was

Not essential to, or the most expedient way of securing

toe speedy erection of new houses. But the fact that the

Minister confirmed the compulsory purchase order did

N°t mean that he disagreed with that finding. Even if

agreed fully with it, he would still have been entitled

t o

confirm the order because since the land was being

tompulsorily acquired, all he had to be satisfied of was

Nat it was being acquired for the purpose of the Act

a n

d that the provisions in the third schedule to the

j t had been complied with. To be satisfied on either

m those counts it was not necessary for him to be satis-

d that the land was wanted for, or would lead to the

peedy erection of new houses was envisaged as a hous-

ing purpose in certain cases—to eliminate overcrowding

—the Act enabled housing authorities to take a longer

view.

Apart from acquiring compulsorily land to be immedi-

ately used for the purposes of the Act they were em-

powered to acquire compulsorily land not so required

"provided that the Minister is of opinion that there is

reasonable expectation that the land will be required

by the housing authority in the future in order to attain

any of the objectives to which they are required by

Subsection (3) of Section 55 of this Act to have regard

in preparing a building programme".

Fallacious to treat inquiry as contest between Corpora-

tion and Plaintiff

The Judge added that as pointed out by the Presi-

dent of the High Court it was fallacious to treat the

public inquiry as a contest between the Corporation

and the plaintiff as to which would be allowed to build

houses on the plaintiff's land, with victory to be accor-

ded by the Minister to whichever of them could do so

more speedily. Once there was either (a) evidence that

the land was required by the Corporation immediately

for the purposes of the Act or (b) evidence enabling the

Minister to form the opinion that there was a reason-

able expectation that the Corporation would require it

in the future in order to attain any of the objectives set

out in Section 55 (3), the Minister was entitled to con-

firm the compulsory purchase order. Neither in the

High Court, nor on the appeal, had it been suggested

that such evidence was wanting. While the criticism

could be made—and was made—that the land was not

required for the immediate building of houses on it,

there was undisputed evidence that the Corporation

would use it in the future for the "provision of ade-

quate housing accommodation to meet needs arising

from the obsolescence of dwellings or the prospective

increase in the population", which was one of the objec-

tives of the Act.

[Murphy v. Dublin Corporation (No. 2); Full Sup-

reme Court; per Henchy J.; unreported; 5 April 1974.]

DISALLOWANCE OF COUNSEL S FEES ON TAXATION

RESTORED — PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE STATED

BY MR. JUSTICE GANNON

In this action the plaintiff claimed damages for per-

sonal injuries which he sustained in an accident in 1968

0 r

which the defendant accepted liability and the only

tesue for determination in the action was the nature of

toe plaintiff's injuries and the amount of damages

hich should be awarded.

Before the conclusion of the evidence on the second

V of the hearing the parties reached a compromise. A

Judgment was entered by consent before Mr. Justice

Murnaghan for a sum of £16,000 with costs to be

toxed. The taxation of costs proceeded before the Tax-

tog Master in due course and as a consequence of a

number of disallowances objections were lodged on

behalf of the solicitor for the plaintiff on the 24th

March 1972. The objections related only to a number

of items in respect of the disallowance of disbursements

made by the solicitor for the plaintiff in respect of fees

to counsel. These items are numbered 39, 67, 70, 73,

75, 77, 83, 86 and 89 on the plaintiff's solicitor's bill

of costs and relate to such disbursements. The grounds

of objection to the disallowances were stated in very

wide and vague terms.

Mr. Mackey submitted that

in determining

whether

allowances were proper or not and in the determina-

100