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rules to be found in the judgment of Kenny J. in
Davan v. Walshe
(Number 2), 1967, I.R. 129. Accord-
ln
gly, as Kenny J. did in that case, I propose in this
matter before me to reconsider the matter of these dis-
allowances on the taxation before the Taxing Master, all
which are concerned only with disbursements of fees
to counsel. In doing so I have regard to the fact that the
Taxing Master is very experienced in this work and
Particularly qualified by his previous practice as a soli-
ctor for that function. I appreciate therefore the con-
siderable assistance I have received from counsel for
both parties on this motion and the care taken to put
before me by way of evidence matters pertinent to my
consideration which had not been so fully presented to
fhe Taxing Master. On the matter of the depreciation
•n the value of money insofar as it may be considered a
Pertinent factor I have had some evidence which was
JJ°t before the Taxing
Master. The
evidence
before me has clearly demonstrated that the
continuing
and accelerating depreciation in the value of money is
a
matter of real significance to the solicitor in practice
today in every aspect of his work.
I am satisfied that
'He practising solicitor in contemplating the "hypothe-
hcal counsel" with a view to assessing the reasonable
fee which he would be content to take would have
regard instinctively if not deliberately to the depreci-
ation in the value of money. As correctly pointed out
by Mr. O'Shaughnessy this is not a factor which can or
should be measured by any purported scale of percen-
'
a
ges taken from statistics, nor is it capable of measure-
ment with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, it is
Part of the reality of the daily life of the reasonable
s
°licitor in his everyday practice. I accept as correct
'He submission by Mr. Mackey that the Taxing Master
may not only be guided by his own previous experience
a s
a solicitor but must also keep himself informed of
'he practices of solicitors in up to date circumstances as
t o
what is reasonable and that he should have regard
the practices of barristers in marking fees insofar as
ac
cepted by solicitors in practice. Although Mr. Mackey
has suggested that for the purpose of so keeping himself
mformed the Taxing Master should have reference to
'he scales of fees adopted by the bar in general meeting
f
°r High Court and Circuit Court work and to the
Sc
ale of allowances in respect of counsels' fees in the
refes of the Circuit Court and also to the fees paid to
bis own counsel by the solicitor opposing the costs on
'
a
xation, I do not think it necessary or appropriate that
1 should outline or limit in any way the manner in
^hich the Taxing Master should keep himself informed
U
P to date of the standards of solicitors in practice.
It is
^ential, however, to bear in mind that the Taxing
Master adopts the standard of the practising solicitor
^ho is reasonably careful and reasonably prudent rather
'Han that he purport himself to prescribe the standards
*hich he requires solicitors to adopt.
I will now endeavour myself to apply this standard to
'be consideration of the items on the bill of costs before
ree in relation to which the disallowances of the Taxing
Master are challenged. The first item is Number 39
being a disbursement of 12 guineas to senior counsel
°
r
advices of proofs. Although the bill of costs appears
show a disallowance of 2 guineas, which in the
Phrase used in
Robb v. Connor
, I.R. 9 Eq. 373, would
be "clipping" or "shaving" fees, it appears from the
report of the Taxing Master that at each stage of the
'
a
xation he considered 12 guineas a reasonable disburse-
ment under this heading. Accordingly it suffices to point
out in respect of this item that an error was made on
the bill of costs at this item and that the full 12 guineas
claimed by the solicitor was intended by the Taxing
Master to be allowed.
In regard to the items Numbers 75 and 77 on the
bill of costs which are concerned with the disallowances
of disbursements for fees to counsel for a consultation
held prior to the advising of proofs it appears to me
that Mr. Mackey is correct in his contention that the
Taxing Master misunderstood the nature of the matter
and the purpose of this consultation and appeared to
determined the allowances by rule of thumb. Reference
to pages 15 to 18 of the bill of costs shows that there
were special considerations and unusual circumstances
relating them to the matter of the plaintiffs' own plead-
ings and not merely to a consideration of the defence de-
livered with a lodgment. It is evident that the plaintiff's
own circumstances had changed in a serious manner by
reason of his injuries and the nature of the matter to
be stated in the pleadings was a matter of technical
nature which required special consideration in relation
to which assistance of medical experts was required and
obtained. In these circumstances it appears to me that
the Taxing Master was in error in disallowing the
amounts of such disbursements to the extent to which he
did so. Accordingly in respect of item 75 I would con-
sider the appropriate disallowance in respect of this
item should be £4.20 and in respect of item 77 the
correct disallowance should be £2.10.
The remaining items relate to the disbursements of
fees for briefs for counsel and of fees for refreshers. In
reference to these the Taxing Master in his report says :
"In measuring these fees at the taxation I had special
regard to the nature of the case, the pleadings, the
directions of learned senior counsel in his advice on
proofs, the duration of the case, the size, extent and the
value of the damages awarded by the Court to the
plaintiff, the importance of the subject matter of the
action for the parties concerned and in particular for
the plaintiff. I took the view that it was a case where it
was reasonable for the solicitor to have briefed two
senior counsel and that the brief fee of £52.50 allowed
to each of them and the refresher fee of £21 allowed
to each of them was fair and reasonable.
"I noted that the cause of action arose on or about
7 July 1968, that the originating plenary summons was
issued on 3 April 1969 and that the action was disposed
of by the Honourable Court in November 1971.
"On the hearing of the objections it was argued on
behalf of the plaintiff that while the trial of the action
was confined to the issue of damages only that the
plaintiff's injuries were of a serious nature and that
apart from the other witnesses hereinbefore mentioned
counsel had to concern themselves with the evidence of
two surgeons, an eye specialist and a dentist who dealt
with the different aspects of the injuries from which the
plaintiff was alleged to have been suffering. I noted,
however, that the dentist did not attend Court as a
witness. On reconsidering the entire circumstances of
the case I felt that the fee on brief to each of the senior
counsel should be increased to 60 guineas with an
appropriate fee for junior counsel and I so ruled. I took
the view that the refreshers should also be increased and
having regard to what was urged in this regard and
taking all the circumstances of the case into considera-
tion that the refreshers to each of the two senior counsel
should be increased to 30 guineas and with an appro-
priate increase to junior counsel and I so ruled."
100