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^arda sergeant wrong to remove bar customer—illegal

act.

A Garda Sergeant has no authority to remove cus-

to

mers from a bar after hours. And even if he puts his

'and on them and gently ushers them out he can be

^

Ullt

y of assault, Limerick Circuit Court decided yester-

day.

'

The decision followed a submission to Judge

/jehvood that Garda Sergeant Farrell had acted

[regally when he tried to remove Mr. Anthony

alpin from a public house at Hospital, Co. Limerick,

a,t

er time had been called.

The Judge withdrew charges alleging that Mr.

H

alpi

n

,

a

43-year-old salesman, of

Knockainey,

w

°unded Sergeant Farrell with intent to do him

^•evious harm and also of maliciously wounding him.

Halpin was also found not guilty of assaulting

®

se

rgeant '

n

' h

e

course of his duty on February 13

The court was told that Sergeant Farrell was check-

ln

g that all the public houses in Hospital were closed

at

11.10. He went into Morrissey's licensed premises

Main Street at 11.20 and found three customers

there.

Two left when asked, but Mr. Halpin remained,

"e sergeant tried to remove Mr. Halpin who struck

ltn

twice. There was a scuffle and Mr. Halpin fell

°

Ver

some stools. He was alleged to have called the

ser

geant's wife 'a tinker.

Sergeant Farrell said that while Mr. Halpin was not

r

"nk in the accepted social sense, he considered that

would be unfit to drive under the terms of the

K

°ad Traffic Act.

s

While the publican, Mrs. Morrissey was giving the

er

geant first aid, he heard a vehicle starting and rushed

o

ut

°n to the street.

Sergeant Farrell said that he tried to pull Mr. Hal-

from his van to prevent him from driving. There

,

a s

another scuffle and the sergeant was struck in the

.Ffe fell and struck his head on the pavement. Mr.

aipin then drove away.

Mr. Gerald Goldberg, defending, submitted that it

a s

a case of illegal apprehension and Mr. Halpin was

'thin the law to resist,

j, The sergeant had no right to attempt to drag Mr.

alpin from his van without having first used the

°rds "you are my prisoner" or "I arrest you

1

".

r

Mr. Goldberg added that it was improper and out-

(

a

geous that Mr. Halpin should have called the ser-

vant's wife a tinker. The sergeant could not be blamed

r

'he attack he made on Mr. Halpin.

t

,

D r

- Michael Clery said that he was still treating

,

e

sergeant for injuries he received. These included a

°ken nose and a skull wound.

.[Attorney-General v. Halpin; Judge Wellwood; Lim-

r,(

T Circuit Court.]

refer restraining picketing discharged.

a reserved judgment in the High Court, Dublin,

an r J

u s t i c e

O'Higgins dismissed with costs an

Ppucation by the proprietors of a Co. Cork ladies'

^ ' h i n g manufacturing company for a permanent in-

"ction restraining five employees from picketing their

factory at Kinsale and branches in Fermoy, Ban-

° T u

a n d

Newmarket.

(r

' h e court also discharged a temporary injunction

Wanted last February to the company, Kire Manu-

facturing Co. Ltd., Kinsale, restraining picketing of

their premises. The injunction had restrained Finbar

O'Leary and others.

In a long judgment, Mr. Justice O'Higgins referred

to decisions in other cases of picketing and said it was

important to appreciate that these decisions had been

relied on as authorities for the proposition that a threat

by a group of men to leave their employment in order to

induce their employer or some other person to break a

contract of employment was not protected by Section

3 of the Trade Disputes' Act, because it was a threat

to use unlawful means to bring about a desired result.

In

Cooper v. Millea

(1938) I.R.,

Riordan v. Butler

(1940) I.R., and

Rookes v. Barnard

(1964) A.C., a threat

had been made by defendants to cease work if plaintiff's

employment of contract. By reason of this threat to

break a contract, it was held that Section 3 of the Trade

Disputes Act 1906 did not protect.

Mr. Justice O'Higgins said that in the present case,

however, there was no threat. Here there was a dis-

missal, a consequent and instantaneous trade dispute

and a walkout in almost complete silence by the

workers concerned. On these facts he could not see

that Section 3 had any application.

"In this case there was, in my view, a trade dispute.

In furtherance of this dispute there was picketing by

the defendants. Section 2 expressly provides that it shall

be lawful in such circumstances to picket. Because

those picketing are doing so, having broken their own

contract of employment, would appear to me to be

wholly irrelevant once they are doing so in furtherance

of a trade dispute and once the fact of picketing is the

only complaint made against them", the judge com-

mented.

The picketing arose out of a dispute in relation to the

operation of an incentive payment scheme involved

with which were new methods in working.

Mr. Justice O'Higgins said : "It is a matter of regret

that a good industry, enjoying good management/staff

relations should have had this experience. I feel keenly

the damage that has been done and may still be done.

Be that as it may, the fact is that the dispute which

drove a cleavage into harmonious co-operation between

management and staff still continues".

[Kire Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. O'Leary and others;

O'Higgins J.; unreported; 29 April 1974.]

Premises are fully rent-controlled, even if part of the

premises are used for business.

The question is whether the premises concerned are

controlled business premises. These were licensed prem-

ises downstairs, with living accommodation upstairs.

The contention that because the premises are partly

used for business, they constitute "business premises"

cannot be sustained. The premises are rent controlled,

and under S. 4 of the Rent Act, 1946, the application

of the Act to a dwelling house shall not be excluded by

reason of the fact that part of the premises was used

for business. Section 54 (1) of the Rent Restrictions

Act 1960 refers to controlled business premises, but does

not apply to this case where the Rent Act protection

of the private premises is continued by the 1960 Act.

[Mullane v. Brosnan; Supreme Court (Fitzgeral,

C.J., Henchy and Griffin J.J.), per Henchy J.; unre-

ported; 11 March 1974.]

163