makes provision for ten new Rules to the Fourth Sche-
dule, numbered 7 to 16. In many considered English
decisions, it has already been established that the value
must be the value to the owner, from whom the lands
are being taken, and not to the purchaser by whom
they are being taken. In the absence of Irish authorities,
the same English principles must be applied here. As
against the local authorities contention, in many parts
of the country, houses are built without the benefit of
main drainage or water supply; it is not essential for the
development of land that a local authority should be
involved in supplying such services. The Legislature has
failed to state in the Act that the value of the land was
to be confined to its value as used on the date of the
Notice to Treat. The purpose of Rule 13 was to ensure
that a claimant would not attain an enhanced price for
the land, because either (1) the Local Authority might
propose to expend public money in developing the land
in the neighbourhood, or (2) that the Local Authority
might include such land in a scheme of development.
Pringle J. accordingly held on 16 July 1971 that the
arbitrator had applied the correct principles in assessing
the value of the land at £450,000. The Co. Council
appealed to the Supreme Court. The judgment of the
Supreme Court (Budd, FitzGerald and McLoughlin
JJ.) which unanimously dismissed the appeal, was
. delivered by Budd J. on 17 July 1972. The following
facts emerged from the judgment:
(1) On 6 March 1968 the claimants entered into a
contract with Michael Downey for the purchase of the
lands of Deansrath, Clondalkin, Go. Dublin, containing
280 acres for £200,000.
(2) Proceedings for Specific Performance of the Con-
tract resulted in a negotiated settlement awarding an
additional £22,000 to Michael Downey.
(3) As a result of prolonged and desultory negotia-
tions, a Compulsory Purchase Order was made, in
respect of 232 acres of these lands, by the acquiring
authority on 30 August 1968.
(4) The purchase of the lands of Deansrath was
completed on 31 January 1969.
(5) A Notice to Treat was served by the acquiring
authority on the claimants on 16 April 1970.
(6) As drainage and water services were not available
in respect of these lands, and would not be available
for years, the Go. Council would not grant permission
for the erection of dwellings thereon.
(7) In April 1970 these lands were zoned for agri-
cultural purposes in the Go. Dublin Draft Development
Plan.
The question of law previously referred to is then
dealt with, and Section 2 of the 1919 Act, as well as
Section 69 of the 1963 Act, are once more quoted in
full. In the absence of Irish authorities, English deci-
sions on similar lines should
prima facie
be applied to
this case. From these cases, it is clear that the value to
the owner before the date of the taking, and not the
value to the taker, is to be taken into consideration.
The value to the owner is consequently to be the market
value or full price of the lands. Rule 13 is a restriction
of Basic Rule 2 that, in assessing compensation to be
paid in respect of land to be acquired compulsorily, the
value shall be taken as the open market value of the
land. It was therefore quite open to the arbitrator to
take into consideration the potential development value
of the lands by any person other than a local authority.
Rule 13 is not a method of preventing the claimant
from obtaining the market value of his lands, but rather
a method of preventing him from getting mote than th
e
market value. During the waiting period, before erect-
ing buildings, the owner of the land was entitled to use
the land in a profitable fashion. The appeal is accord-
ingly dismissed.
[In re Dublin Co. Council Compulsory Purchase
Housing Act 1966 No. 1 Order 1968 and in re Deans-
rath Investment Co. Ltd.; Supreme Court; unreported;
17 July 1972.]
Murder appeal allowed, and new trial ordered, after
jury were accidentally given documents after^ com-
pletion of Judge's charge, which might prejudice
the trial.
f
The accused was on 7 February 1974 convicted ot
the murder of Joseph Spratt on 13 May 1973; Spratt
was found dead in his own room in a derelict house.
The statements of a witness purported to establish that
the accused was present and took part in the fatal
assault on the deceased. At the conclusion of the
Judge's charge the jury were accidentally given some ox
the exhibits referred to at the trial, including two
depositions of witnesses, and the statements above
referred to. The statements were in the hands of the
jury a relatively short time, and the Judg^ then directed
they should be returned to the Registrar. Although h
is unlikely that the jury read these statements, never-
theless the possibility must be considered that they had,
and in that event that their contents did constitute
evidence at the trial. Upon the return of the documents,
the Judge directed the jury to disregard the contents ox
these statements, and further reminded them that the
witness had stated in evidence that the contents of the
statement had been invented by him. There was abun-
dant evidence from which the jury could arrive at the
verdict without reference to the contents of these state-
ments. Nevertheless, the Court will allow this appeal,
and order a retrial because it cannot say that the deter-
mination of the jury on the assessment of that evidence
may not have been affected by the contents of these
statements in a manner prejudicial to a fair trial.
[The People (A.-G.) v Nolan; Court of Criminal
Appeal (Griffin, Murnaghan and Gannon JJ., per Gan-
non J.); unreported; 27 June 1974.]
Murder appeal allowed and new trial ordered when
accused's wife was treated as a hostile witness
without the proper procedure being followed.
The applicant was found guilty of the murder ot
Harold Dawes on 19 July 1972 before Pringle J. in the
Central Criminal Court on 14 December 1972. The
incident took place in a laneway in Limerick because
the accused had become enamoured of Mrs. Dawes-
The question of provocation was raised at the tria'-
It had to be determined whether the death was a result
of a carefully premeditated murder, for which the
weapon had previously been bought in Liverpool, °
r
whether the circumstances leading up to the death were
largely unforeseen, and that the weapon used was one
found at the moment in circumstances amounting
t 0
provocation. At first Mrs. Dawes, the mistress of the
accused, had stated that the stabbing had been done
with a knife, but at the trial she stated it was done with
a scissors. On
this evidence, the trial Judg
e
allowed her to be treated as a hostile witness. Mrs-
Dawes was never asked in cross-examination which
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