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her statements relating to the weapon was true.
The proper procedure if it is desired to have a wit-
ness treated as hostile is to make an application to the
Judge and put before him the material upon which it
is sought to have the witness declared to be a hostile
witness. This should be done in the absence of the jury
and if the Judge rules that witness may be treated as
hostile the witness may be cross-examined. If the wit-
ness denies the statement, it would be necessary that the
person who took the statement should testify to that
effect. This procedure bears no resemblance and is
quite distinct from the rules and procedure which
govern the admissibility of written statements in cross-
examination. The prosecution, to prove provocation
had not established the necessary basis for introducing
the written statement made to the Gardai and that
being so, the statement should not have been received
'n evidence.
The conviction was accordingly quashed and a new
trial ordered.
[The People (A.-G.) v Derek Taylor; Court of Crim-
inal Appeal (Walsh, Murnaghan and Gannon JJ., per
Walsh J.); unreported; 30 July 1973.]
Validity of adoption order upheld—no undue influence
on the mother by social workers
In a reserved judgment delivered in the High Court in
Dublin on 25 October 1974, Mr. Justice Butler dis-
missed an action brought by a young couple who had
sought an order giving them the custody of a four-year-
old boy who was born to them before they were married
and given for adoption.
They had brought their action against the Adoption
Board and the Attorney-General, challenging the vali-
dity of the adoption order, and they sought a declara-
tion that Section 29 of the Adoption Act, 1952, was
Unconstitutional.
When the action was tried last week, Mr. Justice
Butler directed that the names of the plaintiffs should
not be published. The baby was born on 15 May 1970
and the couple were married in June 1972. They now
live in Ghana.
In a very comprehensive judgment, Mr. Justice But-
ler dealt at considerable length with a review of the
evidence in the case and, having done so, he said that
the validity of the adoption order had been attacked by
counsel for the plaintiff's on a number of grounds : (1)
TTiat there was no valid consent to adoption by the
mother; (2) That the Board in making the order did
Uot take any adequate steps to satisfy itself that the
mother understood the nature and effect of the consent
given and of the adoption order; (3) That the Board
did not perform its duties with due regard to consti-
tutional justice; (4) That the subsequent marriage of
toe parents invalidated the adoption order and that, in
®o far as. the Adoption Act provided that the Legitimacy
Vet, 1931, should not apply to an illegitimate child in
respect of which an adoption order had been made, it
^as unconstitutional; (5) That the powers and func-
tions of the Board to make an adoption order were
Unconstitutional because they were judicial powers and
functions.
Vlleged consent obtained by undue influence
The first ground of attack was based on the sub-
mission that the consent to adoption was obtained by
andue influence first by two social workers (one a nun)
in the period up to and immediately following the
birth of the baby, the suggestion being that they con-
tinually advised the mother that the only choice open
to her in the circumstances was to have the baby
adopted in the interest of the baby and herself; and
secondly by a priest and the same nun in an interview
which they had with the mother.
In this it was alleged they obtained her agreement to
sign her consent against her will and by insisting that
it would be wrong to remove the child from the adop-
tion, and, thirdly, by a letter of 8 June 1971 from the
adoption society which was in effect an ultimatum that
if she did not sign the consent she would be exposed as
the mother of an illegitimate by having the child deliv-
ered to her home in a little over 24 hours.
Mr. Justice Butler said that for the purposes of this
case he accepted the definition of undue influence sub-
mitted by counsel for the plaintiffs, namely, influence
which overbore the will of the mother so as to make her
act in a manner in which she would not have acted had
she been a free agent.
He rejected any suggestion that either of the two
social workers told the mother during the pregnancy or
after the birth that she had no choice but to have the
baby adopted. He was satisfied that they were scrupu-
lous in trying to avoid persuading the mother towards
any particular choice and on the contrary at all stages
advised her on the several alternatives that were open
to her without bias.
He was satisfied that at quite an early stage the
mother herself fully understood and considered all the
options and, given her unwillingness to adopt any of
the others, was driven by the logic of the circumstances
to realise that she would have to have the baby adopted.
He thought she had reached this conclusion perhaps
without consciously admitting it long before she com-
municated it to anyone and while she continued to say
that she had not yet made any decision in relation to
marriage or adoption.
As to the interview of July 7th, he accepted the evid-
ence of the priest and the nun that the mother did not
in fact agree to execute the consent. He thought the
explanation of that interview was that for the first time
the mother was faced with the necessity of deciding
cither to commit herself in writing to adoption or to be
faced with an immediate alternative decision. She re-
mained uncommitted but he thought her attitude con-
tinued to be that referred to by her mother, that she
was willing to have the baby adopted but not to sign
a consent.
Priest and nun were doing their duty
He was satisfied that beyond pressing the obvious
necessity for her to decide, neither the priest nor the nun
forced her to decide in any particular way, and he was
further satisfied that the nun again fully explained the
other options and was willing to give advice and assis-
tance on any of these options had the mother been
inclined to adopt them. Being faced with facts was not
being unduly influenced if the facts were truly stated.
One of the facts was the position of the child, and in
stressing, as he was sure they did, that he should not be
likely taken from the adopters, the priest and nun were
doing no more than their duty.
He was satisfied that had the mother expressed a
fixed resolve not to have the child adopted as distinct
from an unwillingness to sign the consent, both would
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