269 / 300
lo the Labourers Act 1903. From 25 September 1964
the plaintiff had vested in her the cottage in fee simple
subject to statutory conditions. Amongst these condi-
tions was one prohibiting alienation, save by operation
of law or by sale with the consent of the Board of
Health; this condition was according to the Supreme
Court Decision in
McGeough v. Louth C.C.,
107 ILTR
13, subject to the consent not being unreasonably with-
held. There was also a prohibition against sub-division.
Section 98 of the Housing Act 1966 enacted that
such a cottage, could be, and was always capable of
being sub-divided, but consent to alienation could be
refused if the acquiror was a person not in need of
housing, or if such alienation would cause the acquiror
to be a person without adequate means.
By an agreement of April, 1969, the plaintiff agreed
to sell to a third party, acquiring for £590 a portion
of the land pertaining to the cottage with no building
attached; the assignment to the purchaser had to be
sanctioned by the County Council, which would only
grant permission in respect of a quarter of an acre,
l'he purchaser's purpose in acquiring this property was
to build a house for himself, but the County Council
insisted upon receiving the £590 themselves before
granting permission. Mandamus proceedings were
brought, and O'Keeffe P., having deemed that the Co.
Council had taken into consideration irrelevant matters,
granted the application, on the ground that the Council
had followed a ministerial circular letter in disregard of
Section 99 of the Act; there was no appeal. The Council
were then ordered to consider the matter anew.
In July 1971 plaintiff's solicitor wrote to the Co.
Council asking for a revised redemption figure of the
apportioned annuity in respect of the premises; the Co.
Council fixed the redemption price at £443.33; this
was the redemption price for an annuity of £1 with
3 years to run. The plaintiff refused to accept this and
brought the present proceedings; it was contended that
this sum of £443.33 was in the nature of a penalty,
and unenforceable; it was also contended that the con-
sent of the Council was being unreasonably withheld.
In the High Court, Murnaghan J. dismissed the plain-
tiff's application.
It was contended in the High Court that S. 98 (5)
of the Housing Act 1966 enabled the Council to law-
fully charge a premium for their consent because a
privilege was granted by allowing the plot to be sub-
divided, but Murnaghan J. refused to follow O'Keeffe
P. S. 98 (5) and 99 of the Housing Act 1966 are then
quoted in full. The net question is whether S. 98 en-
ables a demand for payment in respect of a sum of
money where there is no annuity to be redeemed. The
Court answered this in the negative. The whole tenor
and structure of Sections 98, 99, and 100 indicates that
the State is specifically dealing with the redemption of
annuity; consequently no payment can be required
where there is no question of redemption. In this case
the County Council misconstrued S. 98. The Council
should not take irrelevant matters into consideration,
hut is only entitled to claim such amount as could be
reasonably regarded, having regard to the present value
of money, as an appropriate amount for the redemp-
tion outstanding. Consequently a declaration will be
granted that the amount demanded is unenforceable
at law. There will also b a declaration that the plain-
tiff is entitled to receive the consent of the Council to
the proposed sale, upon tendering to them the capital-
ised value of the annuity outstanding applicable to the
portion of the plot to be alienated. The appeal was
accordingly allowed by Walsh J. (FitzGerald C.J. and
Budd J., agreeing).
Henchy J. in a concurring judgment said : "If the
£443.33 had been approved solely for the purpose of
S. 98 (5) I would agree with Murnaghan J. in support-
ing it. If it had purported merely to be a redemption
of the apportioned annuity under S. 99, I would agree
with O'Keeffe P. in condemning it. But the Minister
order is neither one thing or another. It purports to
approve the payment of £443.33 pursuant to S. 98
(5), and then, in the same sentence, to say it is to be
in redemption of the annuity, under S. 100. There is
thus an error of law apparent on the face of the order,
in that the Minister approved one sum instead of two
separate ones. He was given no power to do so. It was
mandatory on him to approve one sum under S. 98 (5)
and another under S. 99". Appeal allowed and Mur-
naghan J. reversed.
[Meade v. Cork Co. Council; Full Supreme Court;
Separate judgments by Walsh, Henchy and Griffin
J J .;
unreported; 31 July 1974.]
Perpetual injunction granted to plaintiff squatter, as
the defendants, by taking a transfer of the free-
hold, cannot give to themselves any better right to
possession than they had before that.
The following is the title to the premises :
(1) The plaintiff was the purchaser of a plot of ground
at Kennelsfort Road, Palmerstown, Dublin, held
under a Lease by Clontarf Estates Ltd. and the
plaintiff holds under a Sub-Lease.
(2) Three members of the Bruton family (hereinafter
called Brutons) were registered as owners in fee
simple of the lands comprised in Folio 539, Co.
Dublin.
(3) By lease of November, 1947, the Brutons leased
the lands now in dispute to Clontarf Estates Ltd.
for a term of 999 years from 27 September 1947,
at the yearly rent of £236, and subject to cove-
nants and conditions therein contained.
(4) Clontarf Estates erected certain buildings on the
lands and ultimately by Assignment of July 1950,
they assigned the lands to the Irish Life Assurance
Co. (hereinafter called Irish Life).
(5) By Assignments of July, 1961 and May 1963, part
of these lands were assigned by Irish Life to Schus-
ter who built some houses upon them.
(6) When the plaintiff's house was built, there was a
roadway at the rear giving access to the garage.
Beside this roadway was a plot of ground which
was not built on. Ultimately from December,
1955 the plaintiff has used what he regarded as his
part of this plot without paying any rent, and has
thus acquired a statutory title against Irish Life.
(7) In October, 1970, Irish Life assigned to the de-
fendants, Woodfarm Homes, this vacant plot of
ground, subject primarily to a rent of £48 per
annum.
(8) By transfer of November, 1970, Brutons transferred
to the defendants in fee simple the plot of ground
previously assigned in October 1970. This transfer
was duly registered on 17 December 1970.
(9) As a result of correspondence between the respec-
tive solicitors, it was established that the defendants
proposed to enter this plot held by the plaintiff on
7 December 1970, although they had no title to the
lands then. They were the successors in title of Irish
266