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munity rule but from the very nature of the aims and
objects of the Community.
The Costa Case (1964) CMLR 425
This has been realised from the beginning in the
now famous passage of the judgment of the Court in
Costa
v.
EN EL.
I make no apology for citing it again:
"The executive force of Community law cannot
vary from one State to another in deference to sub-
sequent domestic legislation without endangering
the attainment of the aims of the Treaty; . . . the
obligations assumed under the Treaty establishing
the Community would not be unconditional, but
merely presumptive, if they could be affected by
subsequent legislative acts of the signatories; . . . the
law stemming from the Treaty, an autonomous
source of law, could not, by virtue of its specific
original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however framed, without disregard for its
character as Community law and without the legal
basis of the Community itself being called into ques-
tion; the transfer by the States from their domestic
legal order to the Community legal order of the
rights and obligations arising under the Treaty
carries with it a clear limitation of their sovereign
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral law in-
compatible with the Community cannot prevail . . .".
This reasoning has been the basis of many subsequent
decisions of the Court of Justice, although there may be,
as some writers have suggested, a variety of emphasis.
As broad a formulation as any is to be found in
Inter-
nationale Handelsgesellschaft
v.
EVST,
already men-
tioned, where the Court in its judgment emphasised
that :
"The law created by the Treaty, the issue of an
autonomous source, could not by its very nature have
the courts opposing to it rules of national law of any
nature whatever without losing its Community
character and without the legal basis of the Com-
munity itself being put in question."
Increasingly this viewpoint has been understood and
accepted by the judges of the courts of the original
member states.
Much has depended upon the particular constitution
of the Member State. For example, Article 66 of the
Netherlands Constitution provides :
"Legislation enforced within the Kingdom shall not
apply, if this application would be incompatible with
provisions of agreements which are binding upon
anyone and which have been entered into force be-
fore or after the enactment of such legislation."
A similar attitude is adopted in Luxembourg. It has
thus been comparatively easy for the judges of these
countries to accept the necessary primacy of Com-
munity law. As regards Germany, the position is more
complex and I cannot do better than quote my col-
league Dr. Hans Kutscher.
"The German Federal Constitutional Court has,
however, recognised in its decisions the precedence
of Community law—including secondary Community
law—over earlier or later laws, and has also re-
cognised the independence and the direct effect of
Community law. This question has thus been settled ,
in a binding manner for all German courts. What
has not yet been fully clarified by the decisions, on
the other hand, is the relationship of Community
law to the German Constitution, and in particular to
its provisions dealing with basic rights.'
In Belgium, on the other hand, the Cour de Cassa-
tion in its judgment in
Minister for Economic
Affairs
v.
S. A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'Le Ski'
has fullv
accepted the primacy and direct effect of Community
law. In France Article 55 of the Constitution provides
that :
"Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved
shall, upon their publication, have an authority
superior to that of laws subject, for each agreement
or treaty, to its application by the other party"
and opinion appears divided whether or not this
article can be invoked as regards Community law.
Moreover opinion appears to vary between the Conseil
d'Etat (in the well known
Semoules
case) and the
Cour de Cassation.
The position of Italy, Ireland and Britain
In Italy the position has been greatly clarified by the
recent decision of the Constitutional Court on refer-
ences made to it by the Tribunals of Turin and
Genoa.
Italy has always had a dualist conception of inter-
national obligation, that is to say that they could only
become part of domestic law through domestic legisla-
tion. This was exemplified by the Italian law of 1957
giving executory effect to Article 189 of the EEC
Treaty. The question raised before the Constitutional
Court was the compatibility of that law with the
Italian Constitution. The Constitution Court, in a
judgment of great lucidity and force, held that it was
so compatible and, moreover, affirmed that regulations
made under Article 189 were indeed directly applicable
"that is to say immediately beinding upon both the
Member States and their citizens without the necessity
of any internal rule of adaptation or reception".
As regards the new Member States, all three of which
have been strongly dualist, Denmark in its Act of
Accession adopted purely Community terminology :
Section 3 of this Act provides that the provisions of
the treaties shall take effect in Denmark to the extent
that they are directly applicable in Denmark under
Cominuniy law.
Ireland has altered its Constitution to provide that :
"No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the
Communities, or institutions thereof, from having
the force of law in the State."
The United Kingdom, which has no written con-
stitution and is traditionally dualist in its approach to
obligations incurred by treaty, passed the European
Communities Act 1972, which by section 2 provides :
"All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and
restrictions from time to time created or arising by
or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or
under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Trea-
ties are without further enactment to be given legal
effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be
recognized and available in law, and enforced,
allowed and followed accordingly."
The only judicial comment which I have so far dis-
covered on the relationship between Community law
and national law comes from Mr. Justice Graham,
who has said in
Aero Zipp Fasteners
v.
Y.K.K.
Fas-
teners (U.K.) Ltd. :
"This Act . . . to put it very shortly, enacted
271