69 / 300
not to say that the personnel sitting on the Minister's
tribunals are invariably partial as in many instances,
they are not. However, the system does leave itself open
to criticism on many grounds, not the least feeing that
justice may not appear to be done. In that regard, an
Appellant may find himself dealing with an invisible
"prosecutor" whose case is never really heard but the
existence of which certainly discloses itself from confi-
dential papers held in the case by the Officer in whose
hands the decision lies. This is an unsatisfactory ac-
cepted situation within the system.
By reason of these matters, many persons resorting by
way of Appeal to an Administrative Tribunal approach
the matter with some scepticism. It is often thought
that the only right of Appeal is to another person
within the system, but it should be fully understood
that on a question of law at least, there is a right to
Appeal to the High Court under Section 45 of the
Social Welfare Act of 1952 in the case of unsatisfactory
decisions by an Appeals Officer or a Chief Appeals
Officer under the Social Welfare Acts. This matter is of
some consequence and may assist in remedying a situa-
tion which might otherwise go unaffected. (See
McLoughlin
v. Minister
of Social
Welfare
—(1958)
IR 1.)
Section 45 came to the aid of John Joseph Wrynn,
a Plaintiff in High Court proceedings issued against the
Minister for Social Welfare by a Special Summons
dated 29 May 1973. John Joseph Wrynn was employed
by an Ecclesiastical Supplier on certain days of the
week in respect of the period from 2 November 1970
to 29 November 1970. Four Social Welfare Insurance
Stamps were affixed to his Insurance Card in respect
of that period. At all events, Mr. Wrynn ultimately
received a notification that it had been decided by a
minor civil servant called a deciding officer (appointed
under Section 41 of the Act) that the employment was
not insurable. At that stage, he appealed to a higher
civil servant called an Appeals Officer appointed under
Section 43 of the Act. This Appeals Officer, after an
oral hearing in which he heard Mr. Wrynn himself
and in which he also heard the Employer who was
summoned as a witness by the Minister, decided to
uphold the decision of the Deciding Officer, as usual,
without giving valid reasons. At the hearing of that
appeal, all of the evidence established that Mr. Wrynn
was genuinely employed in employment under a Con-
tract of Service such as would fall to be considered as
Insurable employment under the Act. The
d e c i s i on
of
the Appeals Officer was most extraordinary as not being
in accordance with legal principles by reason of this>
it was pointed out to the Department that the decision
was not supported by proper evidence and that, there*
fore, an Appeal to the Chief Appeals Officer was
sought. The then Chief Appeals Officer, lacking the
requisite legal knowledge, in turn, indicated that he sa^
no reason for altering the decision of the Appeals
Officer.
Thereafter, the matter was pursued on the basis that
proceedings would be issued in the High Court having
regard to the fact that the decision of the Appeals
Officer was not supported on the evidence. Applicat on
was made for a copy of the note of the evidence taken
by the Appeals Officer, but, of course, this was illegally
with-held notwithstanding that several requests were
made for it and further notwithstanding that these
requests were based upon the most learned decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of
Murphy
v. Dublin
Corporation
(1972) IR 215. Consequently no copy of
the note was furnished. Ultimately the proceeding
5
issued were based simply upon the contention that upon
all of the evidence furnished at the Hearing, none of
it justified the view taken by the Appeals Officer and
that, therefore, he had arrived at a decision which wa
5
not supported by evidence as a matter of Law.
Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory stand taken ear-
lier, the State was ultimately compelled to indicate that
the Chief Appeals Officer was prepared to alter hi
5
decision ! There was then the very neat question as to
whether the Chief Appeals Officer could do this or not,
in view of the fact that he had already given his de-
cision, and the point might be taken that his decision
could not be altered and that he could not in
e f f e c t,
reverse himself. Ultimately, at all events, Mr. Wrynn
was happy to have a new Chief Appeals Officer find
in his favour and the State, of course, submitted to the
costs of the proceedings in an Order ultimately made
by Mr. Justice Kenny by consent on 21 December 1973-
This particular case, is therefore of importance to
show that in any case where the evidence tends to
support the applicant the Appeals Officer is not
e n t i t l ed
in those circumstances in his decision to adopt a con-
trary view because as a matter of law, he is not
e n t i t l ed
to do so, if the evidence does not support it.
SOLICITORS WANT SUITORS
1
FUND TO
PREVENT INJUSTICE
The establishment of a public fund to save litigants
having to pay Appeal Court costs from their own
pockets because of mistakes by judges or uncertainties
in the law is urged today by the Law Society.
In a memorandum to Lord Hailsham, Lord Chan-
cellor, the Society, which is the solicitors' governing
body, backs a proposal made four years ago by Justice,
the all-party law reform group, for the establishment
of a suitors' fund.
The need for such a fund arises from the injustice
that can follow the general rule in civil litigation that
the eventual loser is ordered to pay the costs of the
winner, including his own.
This means that although a plaintiff can succeed
at the trial and be awarded costs, if the defendant
then appeals and wins, the plaintiff can be faced with a
much larger bill for costs because of the wrong decision
of the trial judge.
Aggravated further
The situation can be aggravated still further, if, far
example, there is a second appeal from the Court of
Appeal to the House of Lords. Under the proposals far
100