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who had the advantage o f seeing and heating the
witnesses.
They suggested that your Lordships
should hesitate long before overruling his decision.
My Lords, this is an argument o f great weight if
the credibility o f witnesses has come in question;
but in the present case it would appear that the
learned judge did not doubt the credibility o f any
witness, and formed his view by inference from the
evidence as a whole. The Court o f Appeal formed
the opposite view by the same method and I agree
with that court.” (Benmax
v.
Austin Motor Co.
Ltd. (1955) 1. All E. R. 326).
Undue influence—Voluntary settlement containing a power
of revocation exercisable only at the discretion of the trustee.
The day after attaining her majority a spinster,
at the request o f her father and advised only by him
and his solicitor, made a voluntary settlement
containing a power o f revocation exercisable only
at the discretion of the trustee. The property was
settled on her for life, then for her children or
remoter issue as she would by will or codicil
appoint, subject to a power to appoint a life interest
to a surviving husband and subject thereto on
protective trusts for her father and brother. On
becoming aware, nine years later, that the validity
o f the deed might be questionable, the settlor
endeavoured to persuade the trustee to revoke
the trusts. This proving unsuccessful after a further
three and a half years she commenced proceedings
for a declaration that the deed was void. Could
she succeed ?
Yes, said Vaisey, J. Undue influence was not
confined to cases in which influence was exerted
to secure a benefit for the person exerting it, but
extended to cases in which a person o f imperfect
judgment was placed under the direction of one
possessing not only greater experience but also
such force as that inherent in such a relation as that
between a father and his own child. The settler
ought to have been advised carefully, deliberately,
separately and independently, which she was not.
His lordship also decided, though with some
hesitation, that she had not been guilty o f laches.
He also expressed the view that any trustee, when
taking over the property o f a young girl just of age
would be well advised to make quite sure that the
trusts have been constituted in circumstances which
leave no doubt as to their full validity. (Bullock
v.
Lloyds Bank Ltd. (1954) 3 All E. R. 726).
Costs—Taxation—Review by court—Objection as to
quantum.
The plaintiff, a Cypriot, brought an action in the
High Court against his brother alleging a partnership
in two restaurants in Margate. Both parties were
granted certificates o f civil aid under the Legal
Aid and Advice Act, 1949. The action was heard
before Roxburgh J. in April, 1953 and it was
adjourned over with liberty to apply to restore
it (
see
(1953) 2 A ll E . R. 52). On June 23, 1953,
terms of settlement were approved by the judge
under which the plaintiff accepted, in full satis
faction, the sum o f £500, and an order was made
for the taxation o f the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
costs.
The case was a complicated and difficult one and
involved, among other things, the examination o f a
witness on commission. The defendant’s country
solicitor attended at this examination, and attended
also consultations and a conference in London and
at the trial there. After the case had been before
the court on four days it was adjourned, and it
then became necessary for the defendant’s solicitor
to prepare supplemental instructions to counsel.
Terms of settlement having been agreed between
the parties and approved by the judge, an order
was made in the action for the taxation o f the
defendant’s costs. On taxation the taxing master
disallowed or reduced among other items—
(a)
fees
and expenses for the attendance of the country
solicitor at the examination o f the witness on
commission including the solicitor’s travelling
expenses to London;
(b)
a fee o f £3 3s. for in
structions to counsel on the examination o f the
witness on commission; (
c
) fees for attendances
o f the country solicitor at conferences and consulta
tions and at court in London;
(d)
a fee o f £630
for instructions for the main brief to counsel; and
(e)
a fee of £52 10s. for drawing up the supplemental
instructions to counsel.
The fees mentioned at (a) above were reduced and
journey expenses were disallowed on the ground
that the attendance of the country solicitor at the
examination o f the witness on commission was not
necessary. The fee at
(b)
above was disallowed,
the work being taken into consideration in the
amount allowed for instructions for brief. The
fees at (
c
) above were reduced and, having allowed
them at the R.S.C. Appendix N amounts, the taxing
master added £ 2 1 to the amount allowed (£210) for
instructions for the main brief. In allowing £210
for the instructions for the main brief the taxing
master took into consideration in addition to the
instructions for the examination o f the witness on
commission, the supplemental instructions. On a
summons to review the taxation,
Held by Harman J. (i) In the circumstances the
country solicitor’s attendance at the examination of
a witness on commission was justified and as the
question whether or not the fees and expenses should
be allowed was one of principle, the court had
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