50 / 266
o f the High Court and his jurisdiction in this respect
has not been affected by the Circuit Court Rules,
195°.
The difference between taxation as between
solicitor and client and solicitor and own client is
not always understood. The latter term refers only
to costs due by this client personally to his solicitor,
either in or out o f Court, and taxed on a requisition
signed by the client. The term solicitor and client
is used in a limited and a wide sense. In the limited
sense it is used to indicate costs awarded in an
action to one party against another to be taxed as
between solicitor and client. In the wide sense it is
often used where the term “ solicitor and own
client ” would be strictly appropriate.
The question remains as to -the effect on the
taxation o f solicitor and own client costs o f the
absence o f a scale off costs for this purpose. A
case was recently submitted to learned Counsel who
advised drat having regard to Order 58, Rule 13
o f the Circuit Court Rules, 1950, the right o f a
solicitor to charge costs as between solicitor and
own client for work done or professional services
rendered cannot be defeated by the omission o f
the rules o f any scale o f costs as between solicitor
and own client. In, the Bank o f Ireland to Merrick,
1937
) I- R ->
389
at Page 4*4, Fitzgibbon J. said—
“ For over a century orders have been in force by
which a Master has been authorised to tax costs
between attorney or solicitor and client without
any rule or order for the purpose, upon the applica
tion o f the client and upon the written undertaking
to be lodged with the Master to pay any balance
which the Master shall certify.” In Counsel’s
opinion this is clear authority for the jurisdiction
o f the Taxing Master to tax costs as between solicitor
and own client in connection with Circuit Court
proceedings upon the requisition o f die client.
In the course o f his judgement in Quin and White
v. Stokes and Quirke, 1930, I.R ., 182, at Page 186,
Sullivan P. said that in the absence o f any scale o f
costs the Taxing Master must only tax reasonably.
On appeal the Supreme Court varied the order of
the High Court but did not disagree with the
President’s statement that in the absence o f a scale
o f costs the Taxing Master must tax reasonably.
Counsel also held that the Taxing Master in a solicitor
and own client taxation is not bound by the party
and party schedule o f costs or fees set out in the
Circuit Court Rules, 1950, and referred to the
judgement, in Ryan v. Dolan (1872, I.R. 7 E.Q.,
92) o f Warren J . who said—“ In my opinion the
schedule may guide but does not control the dis
cretion o f the officer when taxing costs as between
solicitor and client.” The question remains as
to the considerations by which the Taxing Master
should be guided in taxing a solicitor and own
client bill in the absence o f a prescribed scale o f
costs, having regard to his duty to tax reasonably.
The Master will no doubt consider the scale o f
costs for proceedings in the High Court on taxations
between solicitor and own client and between
party and party, and the party and party scales o f
Circuit Court costs including the provision in
Section B o f the 3rd Schedule o f costs that where
the amount recovered, or in the case o f a dismiss
the amount sued for, exceeds £ 100 the costs shall
be taxed on the scale obtaining in the High Court
on 1st January, 1932, less one-fifth. Counsel was
o f the opinion that the Taxing Master would be
acting reasonably if he adopted for the purpose o f
solicitor and own client taxations the scale laid
down in Section B o f the third Schedule to the
Circuit Court Rules, 1950, namely High Court,
1932, less one-fifth. It. is understood that the
present practice in the Taxing Masters’ Office on
solicitor and own client taxations is to adopt the
last mentioned scale for work done in court in all
cases including malicious injury cases. For work
done outside court prior to action the costs are
taxed on the full High Court scale.
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST.
The plaintiff claimed damages from the defendants
,
fo r personal injuries and his solicitors wrote to the defendants
insurers offering terms o f settlement. A w rit was
subsequently issued and in the defence it was pleaded that
the terms o f settlement offered by the plaintiff’s solicitors
bad been accepted and that the claim had been compromised
hy way o f accord and satisfaction. This was denied by
the plaintiff who pleaded that i f any such agreement had
been made his solicitors had no authority to make it. The
defendants administered interrogatorys asking whether the
plaintiff had not authorised his solicitors to negotiate the
settlement or to hold themselves out as having authority
to do so. Was the p la in tiff entitled to refuse to answer
the interrogatorys on the ground that the enquiries related
to conpdential communications between solicitor and client
which were protected by the client’s privilege
?
No. The Court held that the protection o f
privilege did not extend to communications between
a client and his solicitor which the solicitor was
instructed to communicate to the other side, and
that if a solicitor acting on his client’s instructions
tells the solicitor acting for the defendant “ I have
my client’s instruction to accept £1,000 and costs,”
and as a result o f that an agreement is reached
between the two solicitors in complete accord and
satisfaction o f the claim, the plaintiff cannot claim