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Chemical Technology • March 2015
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considerations because there is no interface to the SRP/CS. A
simpler way todistinguishbetween ‘safety functions’ and ‘func-
tional safety’ is to view the idea visually, as shown in Figure2. In
essence, all functional safety concerns are related to a safety
function, but not all safety functions require functional safety.
Why apply functional safety?
Safety technology continues to advance beyond simple
electrical and electromechanical components toward more
complex electrical systems using transistors, integrated
circuits and software-based components (eg, microproces-
sors). Withmore basic elements, their behaviour in the event
of a component failure can be determined to a high degree
of certainty because each component can be completely
defined. The failure modes of more complex systems, on the
other hand, are more difficult to define and in some cases
can only be estimated.
Many industrial controls engineers were just beginning to
grasp the idea of circuit architecture, whether it was referred
to as “Control Reliable,” according to OSHA and older ANSI
standards, or “Categories,” under the EN 954-1 standard
fromEurope. The introduction of functional safety does not di-
minish the importance of the circuit design, but rather builds
on the concept to account for the greater number of possible
failure modes inherent with more complex control systems.
Essentially, the benefit of functional safety is to provide a
means to ‘give credit’, eg, oversizing contactors, selecting
more robust and reliable components for use in the circuit,
providing higher levels of diagnostics, or addressing com-
mon cause failures through the process or implementation.
The same reliability concerns exist when designing and
evaluating SRP/CS – whether the control system is associ-
ated with simpler components or more complex elements. In
order to consistently determine the overall reliability of these
systems, various safety standards have been developed to
outline the key elements. These elementsmust be considered
to determine the overall reliability of the safety-critical control
functions. Standards that address these elements include:
• ISO 13849-1 – Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts
of control systems
• IEC 62061 – Safety of machinery – Functional safety of
safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable
electronic control systems
• IEC 61508 – Functional safety of electrical/electronic/
programmable electronic safety-related systems
• IEC 61511 – Functional safety – Safety instrumented
systems for the process industry sector
• ANSI B11.26 – Functional Safety for Equipment (Electrical/
Fluid Power Control Systems) – Application of ISO 13849 –
General Principles for Design
The primary principle behind these standards is that the
overall reliability of a safety function can be qualitatively
estimated. In terms of safety, the most important concern
is to determine the probability that the system will fail to a
dangerous condition. In terms of the standards, the reliability
of the SRP/CS is estimated as the probability of a dangerous
failure per hour (PFHd).
Thereare currently twoprimarymethodologies todetermine
the likelihood of a dangerous failure; “Performance Level” (PL)
as outlined in ISO13849-1 and “Safety Integrity Level” (SIL) as
addressed in IEC62061. Figure 3 illustrates thesemethodolo-
gies in terms of probability to a dangerous condition.
What are the elements of functional safety?
The SRP/CS is the part of a control system that responds
to safety-related input signals and generates safety-related
output signals. These are parts of machinery control systems
that are assigned to provide safety functions. The combined
elements start at the point where the safety-related input
signals are initiated (for example, obstruction of an optical
beam of the safety light curtain) and end at the output of the
power control elements (for example, the main contacts of a
contactor), as shown in Figure 4.
In some cases, the final element (such as the motor)
is not included. It is also important to note that individual
components of the safety system may play a role in multiple
safety functions, with each safety function possibly requir-
ing different levels of functional safety – again emphasizing
the importance of precisely describing each safety function.
Primary considerations of functional safety
The central pillars supporting the functional safety concept
are exhaustively outlined in a number of sources, including
the standards listed previously. As an overview, the primary
considerations for determining the Performance Level for a
sub-system are outlined below.
1. Structure and behaviour of the safety function under fault
conditions (category)
This is the same circuit architecture
concerns addressed previously in EN 954-1, utilising the
same category ratings (B, 1, 2, 3 and 4).
2. Reliability of individual components defined by mean time to a
dangerous failure (MTTFd) values
This value represents a
theoretical parameter expressing the probability of a
Figure 3: Scale of functional safety levels
Figure 4: Basic elements of SRP/CS