GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER 1985
success has been achieved, for example under Articles 12-
17, 30-36 and 95-99 of the EEC Treaty in breaking down
regulatory barriers to free trade within the Community.
In the competition policy sphere too, Article 37 (State
monopolies of a commercial character) has played and
will continue to play a vital role in this respect.
Competition policy cannot succeed if the Member States
distort competition t h r ough their legislative,
administrative and regulatory activities. Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty obliges the Member States to "facilitate the
achievements of the Community's tasks" and to "abstain
from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty". The Member States may
not endanger the full and uniform application of the
principles of competition policy enshrined in Articles 3(0,
85 and 86. This has been confirmed recently by the Court
of Justice in a case concerning French resale price
maintenance in the book trade
31
.
Under Article 37, the Commission will monitor and
examine critically the conduct of all subsisting state
monopolies and, where necessary, will not hesitate to call
for changes. New or developing sectors of the economy
will receive particularly close attention and telecommuni-
cations provide a good example of this.
In the air transport sector, the Commission has made
limited and moderate proposals to the Council
32
and we
await developments. Meanwhile, the Commission has
other legal powers at its disposal to bring about an
opening up of the Community air transport market
should the Council fail to adopt the necessary legislation.
In the area of sea transport too, the Commission has
presented a memorandum to the Council outlining
detailed proposals including and implementing Regulation
and a group exemptions under Article 85(3).
Deregulation in telecommunications is largely a
national issue within the bounds set by Community Law,
but in which competition policy can help to break down
certain impediments to trade between the Member States.
The Commission has begun to act in this area under
Article 86, taking the view that national posts and tele-
communications authorities (PTT's in the Brussels
jargon) are undertakings within the meaning of Articles
86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty and that, for example,
discriminatory practices and attempts to extend a
statutory monopoly to other markets can constitute
unlawful abusive behaviour. The Commission's decision
against
British Telecommunications
which had sought to
prevent telex forwarding agencies in Britain from relaying
messages received from other Member States to final
destinations elsewhere was upheld recently by the Court
of Justice
33
. This case was unusual in that the appeal
against the Commission's decision against BT was
brought by the Italian Government, while the British
Government intervened as an
amicus curiae
in support of
our decision. The fact that the Court of Justice has upheld
our view of the law is, of course, crucial for our future
policy planning. More recently, the Commission
intervened to oppose plans by the
Bundespost
(the
German PTT) to extend its monopoly to courier services
carrying express mail. The Bundespost agreed to accept
competition from private couriers and gave assurances
that it would not charge below cost for its own express
delivery services
34
. In another case, the Commission
intervened under Article 37 to ensure that the
Bundespost
did not extend its monopoly to cordless telephones
34
A.
These cases do not amount to a deregulation policy, but
they illustrate in a particular industry — and an extremely
important one — how the competition rules can be
applied to prevent abusive behaviour in intra-
Community trade. The battle for a competitive, open
common market is waged on a number of fronts —
legislative, deregulatory, sometimes even regulatory. In
all these endeavours, the Community's competition
policy is there to remind the Member States of their
obligations and to promote competitive conditions from
which all stand to benefit. If a regulated industry can
provide scope for competition, I shall not oppose it on
grounds of dogma. My task, as I see it, is to make sure that
scope for competition exists and is maintained and that
actual infringements of the law do not go undetected or
unpunished.
Industrial Property
35
This area of Community policy has seen important
developments recently with the adoption of the
Commission's long-awaited block exemption Regulation
on patent licensing agreements
36
. We are confident that
the right balance has been struck between the need to
encourage and facilitate technology transfers and the
requirements of the common market. We shall now set
about applying the Regulation in practice and the
opposition procedure, by virtue of which many
agreements notified to the Commission under the
Regulation, even though they are not automatically
exempt from the provisions of Article 85(1), will obtain
the benefit of the Regulation unless opposed by the
Commission within six months of notification, should
ensure that many more agreements will be dealt with
quickly and will give us the opportunity to resolve
problems raised by border-line cases.
There remain several other industrial property issues to
be dealt with and we are looking in particular at know-
how licensing at present. Goods and technology should
move freely in the common market: these are our goals.
We recognise that they are sometimes difficult to
reconcile and are prepared, as the patent licensing
Regulation shows, to be flexible to ensure that the proper
incentives are provided for the dissemination of
technology.
Mergers
37
No competition policy worthy of the name can ignore
mergers. In other areas of its activities, the Commission
and other Community institutions have often had to
grapple with the consequences of mergers for social, fiscal
and company law and policy. Yet the Community's
competition policy on mergers is hamstrung. Despite the
Commission's proposals and subsequent efforts, the
support of the Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee and a widespread consensus that action is
urgently required, the Council has still not adopted a
merger control Regulation. The time will come soon
when, if no Regulation has been adopted, the
Commission will have to carry out its duties under the
EEC Treaty by falling back on the provisions contained in
that Treaty, in particular Articles 85, 86 and 90.
Mergers are not automatically good or bad. The
Commission simply needs to be able to separate the
beneficial from the dangerous as it goes about its task of
instituting and maintaining "a system ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted"
(Article 3(0 of the EEC Treaty).
273