394 / 406
GAZETTE
JULY/AUGUST 1985
the 1970 Act and the High Court upheld
his contention and dismissed the
Plaintiffs claim. On appeal to the
Supreme Court it was HELD:—
1. Under the Rules of construction,
Statutes ought to be construed so as
to carry out the object sought to be
accomplished by them and a
reasonable construction of a Statute
should, if possible, prevail. Thus,
whilst there is no definition of the
word "provide" in the 1970 Health
Act, the object of the Health Act
section 6 is to make further and
better provision in relation to the
health of the people and this object
would certainly not be achieved if
the constructions contended by the
Plaintiff prevailed. The word
"provide" should be given its wider
meaning of supplying, not only a
structure, but also all the services
normally catered for in a hospital
and furthermore, the phrase
"provide and maintain" applies to
hospitals and institutions erected
prior to the passing of the Act of
1970 as well as subsequent to it.
2. The correct interpretation of Section
38(2) of the Health Act, 1970
empowered the Minister to require
the Board to provide or to maintain
existing premises or services but
does not empower the Minister to
direct the Board to discontinue
existing services. Accordingly the
Plaintiffs second contention must
succeed and the appeal be allowed.
Margaret Rose McMeel and Others -v-
The Minister for Health and the North
Eastern Health Board — Supreme Court
(per O'Higgins C.J., Hederman J.
concurring and Griffin J.), 19 December,
1984 — unreported.
Eugene O'Sullivan
ARBITRATION
Case stated by Arbitrator arising out of a
Compulsory Purchase Order — whether
arbitrator entitled to value lands on the
valuation date, 11 March, 1977 on the
assumption that parts II and IV of the Rent
Restrictions Act 1960 as amended were
invalid.
Limerick Co r p o r a t i on made a
Compulsory Purchase Order (The
Thomondgate No. 1 Area C.P.O., 1975)
which was confirmed on 21 December,
1975. A claim for compensation was
made by Ellen Read in respect of her fee
simple interest in nine separate plots the
subject matter of the C.P.O. Notice to
Treat was served on 11 March, 1977 and
the date of the Arbitration hearing was 9
March, 1982. At the date of the Notice to
Treat the premises on five of the plots
were held from the claimant on tenancies
controlled under part II and part IV of
the Rent Restrictions Acts 1960 to 1967 as
amended. It was admitted as a fact at the
Arbitration that on 11 March, 1977,
(being the valuation date for the purpose
of valuing the premises acquired under
the C.P.O. having regard to sections 79
and 84 of the Housing Act 1966) it was
not generally known or appreciated by
Auctioneers, Valuers or the general
public that the constitutionality of parts
II and IV of the Rent Restrictions Act
1960 as amended was likely to be called in
question and that sales and purchases as
of that time would have been conducted
on the assumption that the entire of the
Rent Acts were valid and operative.
The Arbitrator determined that if the
claimant's interest in the five premises
referred to on the valuation date was to be
valued as though parts II and IV of the
Rent Act 1960 were valid and in force as
of that date, the total valuation of the five
premises would have been £7,250.00. The
Arbitrator also determined that if he was
to value the same premises on the
assumption that the premises were not
subject to parts II and IV of the Rent
Restrictions Act 1960 as amended they
would have an additional total value of
£10,250.00.
On these findings the precise question
raised for determination by the High
Court was as follows:—
"Whether in respect of the relevant
premises I ought to value the
claimant's interest therein on the
valuation date as though parts II and
IV of the Rent Restrictions Act 1960 as
amended, were valid and in force at
that date."
The assessment of compensation in the
case fell to be decided in accordance with
the rules contained in section 2 of the
Acquisition of Land Assessment of
Compensation Act 1919. It was agreed by
Counsel that the only relevant or
applicable rule on the facts of the case was
rule (2) which is as follows:—
"The value of land shall subject as
hereinafter provided be taken to be the
amount which the land if sold in the
open market by a willing seller might
be expected to realise. Provided
always that the Arbitrator shall be
entitled to consider all returns and
assessments of capital value for
taxation made or acquiesced in by the
claimant."
It was submitted on behalf of the
acquiring authority that the sole function
of the Arbitrator having regard to the
provisions of the Act of 1919 was to
ascertain as a matter of fact what price
these lands would fetch if placed on an
open market by a willing seller on 11
March, 1977. The determination of that
fact, it was contended, would depend on
many factors, the demand for land in the
particular area, beliefs or speculations
in the minds of prospective purchasers as
to the future value of the land having
regard to development or expansions of
agriculture or building requirements and
xxiii
the common conception of people as to
legal restrictions or qualifications which
applied to the ownership of the land.
Having regard to that function it would,
it was submitted, be wholly artificial for
the Arbitrator to assume that prospective
purchasers would have foreseen in 1977
the eventual decision of the Supreme
Court that parts II and IV of the Rent
Restrictions Act 1960 were unconstitu-
tional. To do so, it was urged, would be to
value the land not as was provided by the
statutory provision as of 11 March, 1977,
but rather as of and in the conditions
prevailing at the date of the hearing of the
Ar b i t r a t i o n. In support of this
submission reliance was placed on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in
Re:
Murphy
[1977] I.R. 243 where Henchy J.,
at page 249 stated (
inter alia):
"The date on which compensation is
to be assessed for land compulsorily
acquired under the Housing Act 1966
is the date of the service of the Notice
to Treat, under section 84(1) of that
Act."
Reliance was also placed on the
decision of Kenny J. in
Dolan
-v-
Neligan
[1967] I.R. 247 where at page 260 he
stated
inter alia,
"In the
Kiriri Cotton
case
Lord Denning who gave the advice of the
Privy Council said at page 246 of the
report, 'It is not correct to say that
everyone is presumed to know the law.
The true proposition is that no man can
excuse himself from doing his duty by
saying he did not know the law on the
matter.
Ignorantia juris neminem
excusat."
This statement of the law in the instant
case was accepted as being correct and in
the context of the issues before the Court
indicated that for the Arbitrator to value
the lands as of 11 March, 1977 without
regard to the fact as conceded at the
Arbitration that all material people then
believed the Rent Act of 1960 to be
operative and valid would be to presume
a knowledge of the law in general which is
inconsistent with this principle.
The submissions on behalf of the
claimant relied on the case of
Blake and
Ors.
-v-
Madigan and Ors.
[1982] I.R. 117,
in which the Supreme Court held that the
entire of parts II and IV of the Rent
Restrictions Act 1960 were invalid as
being repugnant to the Constitution. It
was further submitted that in the
reference of the Housing (Private Rented
Dwellings) Bill, 1981, reported in [1981]
I.L.R.M. at page 246 judgment of the
Court delivered by the Chief Justice
referring to the decision in
Blake and Ors.
-v-
Madigan and Ors.
at page 252 of the
report expressly states that it was a
finding that parts II and IV of the Rent
Restrictions Act 1960 were void
ab initio.
The argument continued that in the
decision of the majority of the Court on
the second issue arising in
Murphy
-v-
The
Attorney General
[1982], I.R. page 241, it
was clearly held that the finding of
invalidity in regard to a statute held by