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GAZETTE
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1978
disturbed (even if the Court does not
agree with them, for we are not re-
trying the case) unless they are such
that a reasonable Commissioner
could not draw them or they are
based on a mistaken view of the
law". The criterion should be
whether or not his conclusions are
such "that he must be assumed to
have misdirected himself as to the law
or made a mistake in reasoning." The
observations of Viscount Simonds
and Lord Radcliffe to that effect in
Edwards
v.
Bairstow
[1956] A.C.
14, 36 T.C. 220, approved.
Mara v. Hummingbird Limited. —
The High Court — McWilliam J. —
unreported — 7 March 1977. The
Supreme Court (per Kenny, J. with
Henchy and Parke JJ.) — unreported
— 6 December, 1977.
SALI OF LAND
Option to purchase and whether
"month" means "lunar" or
"calendar" month. Rule of common
law that "month" meant a lunar
month applied.
The Defendant held premises in
Anglesea Street, Dublin from 16
August, 1971, for a term of ten
years. The lease contained a
provision "and provided always that
the tenants shall at the end of each
five year period have the option to
purchase the entire of the premises
. . . The tenant shall give notice of his
intention to exercise such options six
months before expiration of any of
the relevant five year periods (sic)".
On 16 February, 1976, the
Plaintiff's Solicitor wrote to the
Defendant's Solicitors "Our Clients
. . . have instructed us to formally
notify you of their intention to
exercise the option contained in the
lease to purchase the premises...".
This letter was received by the
Defendant's Solicitors before lunch-
time on 17th February, 1976, and
they acknowl edged r ece i pt
immediately and advised the
Plaintiff's Solicitors that they had
sent a copy to the Defendant for his
instructions. The Defendant received
the copy on 18 February, 1976, and
on 19 Feb r ua r y, 1976, the
Defendant's Solicitors wrote to
Plaintiff's Solicitors: "Our Client
points out that the purported exercise
of the option is late". It was agreed
by both parties that the five year
period referred to in the option clause
would have expired at midnight on
16 August, 1976.
Held:
(Costello J.) applying
United
Dominions Trust (Commercial)
Limited v. Eagle Aircraft Services
Limited
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 74, and
United Scientific Holdings Limited v.
Burnley Borough Council
[1977] 2
W.L.R. 806, that the terms of the
option clause must be strictly
construed and that the notice of
intention to exercise the option
should have been given six months
before midnight on 16 August, 1976.
The Court then considered whether
six "lunar" or six "calendar" months
was the correct period. Having
reviewed
Bruner v. Moore
[1905] 1
Ch. 305,
Schiller
v.
Petersen and
Company Limited
[1924] 1 Ch. 394,
and
P. Phipps and Company v.
Rodgers{
1925] 1 K.B. 14, the Court
held (1) that the common law rule,
subject to a number of well-
established exceptions, was that
priniafacie
the word "month" meant
a lunar month when used in a legal
instrument; (2) that the relationship
of landlord and tenant was not one of
the established exceptions to the
common-law rule; and, (3) that the
context of a document and the
surrounding circumstances at the
time it was executed may be
examined for the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the
parties as to the construction of the
word "month". The Court held that
there was nothing in the agreement
that would justify it in construing the
option clause otherwise than in
accordance with the first general
common-law rule, namely, that the
word meant "lunar" month.
Vone Securities
v.
Gerard Cooke
— High Court — Costello J.
— unreported — 7 December, 1977.
An appeal is pending in the
Supreme Court.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The expression "Northern Ireland"
applies to the Six Counties of Ireland
comprised in the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The Prosecutor, i.e. the accused, had
been returned for trial to the Circuit
Court on eight charges under
S.33(4)
of the Larceny Act, 1916. In four of
these he was charged with having in
his possession without lawful excuse
a motor car "knowing the said
property to have been stolen in
Northern Ireland".
Proceedings were subsequently
brought in the High Court for the
purpose of quashing on Certiorari the
order of the District Court returning
him for trial on those charges. He
was allowed a conditional order of
Certiorari, but, on application to
have the conditional order of
Certiorari made absolute, Gannon J.
allowed the cause shown by the
District Justice and discharged the
conditional order.
The Plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court on the sole ground
"that there is no such geographical
area known to the law of this State as
Northern Ireland".
Held:
(Henchy J.) in rejecting this
contention that although it was
undoubtedly true that, since 1937,
there was no general statutory
interpretation or adaptation of the
expression "Northern Ireland", that
(1) the frequency with which it
occurred in our Statutes, (2) the
unambiguous way in which it had
been so used to identify the six
Counties over which this State does
not exercise jurisdiction, and (3) the
clearly displayed intention of the
Legislature in such use that the
Courts of this State should give
judicial recognition to the identity of
the territory comprised in that
expression, would make it impossible
for our Courts to say that "Northern
Ireland" was other than an officially
recognised and clear appellation for
the part of this island which has
remained within the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
In view of the fact that in England
and Wales the Theft Act, 1968, had
now replaced the Larceny Act, 1916,
it would only be possible to bring
proceedings under S.33(4) of the
Larceny Act, 1916, if the property
were stolen in Northern Ireland, as
the definitions in the Theft Act are
much wider than under the Larceny
Act.
Kenny J. (in a separate concurring
judgment) said that the contention
put forward by the applicant
offended against the common usage
of speech in this State and was
contrary to many provisions of the
Acts of the Oireachtas. "This Court
would make itself ridiculous . . . if it
decided that it did not know what the
expression 'Northern Ireland' meant
Section 1(2) of the Tr ea ty
(Conf i rma t i on of Amending
Agreement) Act, 1925, provided that