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GAZETTE

APRIL 1978

RECENT IRISH CASES

COMPULSORY ACQU I S I T I ON

Grounds for compulsory acquisition

by the Land Commission where land

required Tor relief of congestion

contrasted with when required for

resale to classcs of persons specified

in Section 31 of the Land Act 1923

(as extended).

Under the Land Acts the Land

Commission

are

entitled

to

compulsorily acquire property for the '

purpose of either (a) relieving

congestion

in

the

immediate

neighbourhood, or, (b) for resale to

the persons or bodies mentioned in

Section 31 of the Land Act 1923 as

extended by Section 30 of the Land

Act 1950. These classes of persons

include (inter alia) a person being the

tenant or the proprietor of a holding

which in the opinion of the Land

Commission is not. an economic

holding or a person who has entered

into an agreement with the Land

Commission for the exchange of his

holding.

The right of the Land Commission

to acquire property for each of the

above grounds differed considerably

and in this regard the Supreme Court

considered the case of Roundtrce,

Cassclls v. Irish Land Commission

119761 I.R. 382 and distinguished it

from the case of Clarke v. Irish Land

C o mm i s s i on [ 1 9 7 6 ] I . R . 3 75

Cassell's and Clarke's cases cach

dealt with acquisition for relief of

congestion

in

the

immediate

neighbourhood while the present case

related to lands acquired for the

purpose of resale to persons or bodies

of persons permitted by statute.

Where acquisition is for the

purpose of resale a valid objection

can be lodged on the basis that, (a)

the property has not been offered for

sale within a year of the date of the

publication of the Commissioners'

Certificate that the lands are required

for resale; (b) it is part of a residential

holding; and , (c) it produces an

adequate amount of agricultural

products and provides an adequate

amount of employment. Acquisition

for relief of congestion cannot be

resisted on these grounds. The only

defence available to the objector is to

show that there is no congestion in

the

immediate

neighbourhood.

' Regardless of the fact that he may

live on the land and regardless of how

well lie may be working the land (in

terms of employment given and

agricultural products produced) the

statutory scheme docs not rccognise

the objectors as having any right to

defeat the acquisition if the position is

that the Lands are required for relief

of congestion. The onus is on the

Land Commission to prove that the

lands are so required. It is up to the

objcctor to establish by cross

examination or otherwise that such is

not the case.

The protection against compulsory

acquisition given by the Land Acts is

much greater when the lands are

required for resale to classes of

persons mentioned in Section 31 of

the Land Act 1923 than it is when

the lands are being compulsorily

acquired for relief of congestion in

the immediate neighbourhood.

Held: (1) (per Henchy, J.) Where

the

Land

Commission

acquire

property for the purpose of resale to

classes of persons or bodies permitted

by statute, it is not necessary for the

Land Commission before instigating

acquisition proceedings to opt for

some one permitted person or body

to whom the lands are to be resold.

Such a pre-condition would offend

against the spirit if not the letter of

the Land Acts. (2) (per Kenny, J.)

Judicial remarks which relate to

compulsory acquisition for relief of

congestion have no relevance when

the declared purpose of compulsory

acquisition is resale to classes of

persons mentioned in Section 31 of

the Land Act 1923.

Estate of A. J. Hirschberg, Ulster

Bank Limited & Ors. v. Irish Land

Commission — Supreme Cou rt

(Henchy J., Kenny, J. and Parke, J.)

— unreported — 16 December, 1977.

CONST I TUT IONAL LAW

Se c t i on 2 21 of the F i s he r i es

( C o n s o l i d a t i o n ) A c t

1 9 5 9

Un c o n s t i t u t i o n a l—O f f e n ce

not

minor offcnce and therefore not

triable summarily in the District

Court.

The Plaintiff sought and was

granted a declaration that Scction

2 2 1 ( 2 ) o f t h e

F i s h e r i e s

( Co n s o l i d a t i o n) Act 1959 was

repugnant to the provisions of the

Constitution, invalid and of no effect

in law on the grounds that the penalty

provided for therein was so great that

the offence could not be a minor

offence within the meaning of Articlc

38 of the Constitution, and therefore

could not be. tried in a summary

manner in the District Court.

The Plaintiff, the Master of the

Bulgarian Fishing Vessel "Aurelia"

was convicted summarily of the

offence under the above section and

fined the maximum fine of £100 and

the District Justice, in accordance

with the mandatory provisions of the

section, ordered the forfeiture of the

fish and fishing gear estimated to be

worth £102,040.

Held: (per McWilliam, J.)

1. Following

Melling — v. — 0*Mathghamhna

(19601 I.R. 1, and Re Haughey

[ 19711 I . R. 2 4 7, the mo st

i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i on in

determing whether or not an

offence was a minor offence was

the severity of the punishment;

2. Punishment involving the loss of

property to the value of £100,000

was severe;

3. The only issue thus to be decided

was wh e t h er the f o r f e i t u re

provided for in Section 221 was a

primary punishment or a more

r emo te c o n s e q u e n ce of t he

conviction;

4. Considering

Conroy—v.—The

Attorney General & Keavcney

[19651 Í.R. 411, and in particular

the observations of Walsh J. (at

p 4 4 l ) , the forfeiture required

under Section 221 was intended

to be a penalty and was a direct

consequence of a conviction

underthe Section;

5. Accordingly, the offence was not

a minor offence.

Jordan Kostan —v .— Ireland and

the Attorney General—The High

Court (per McWilliam J . ) - 10 Feb.

1978—Unreported.

NEGLIGENCE

A skilled employee is responsible for

his own ii\)uries when he- uses a

ladder, supplied by his employer and

which he, the employee, has erccted

with the inner legs on a flower bed

and the outer ones on a grass lawn

and is ii\jurcd in falling from the

ladder when it slips.

The Plaintiff was a carpentcr by

trade and, according to evidence, was

a skilled and experienced workman.

The Defendant had previously hired

the Plaintiff and now wanted him to

do some work, which included

cutting or lopping trees, growing in

the defendant's garden. The plaintiff

arrived at the defendant's premises

on a very dry day with an electric

saw for the purpose of cutting and

lopping the trees. To undergo this

1