GAZETTE
1
MAY 1978
Buckley v. National Employers
Mutual
General
Insurance
Association
Ltd..
Federated
Employers Insurance Association
and the Norwich Union Fire
Insurance Society Limited
—
Supreme Court (per O'Higgins, C. J.
with Kenny and Parke, J. J.) —
unreported - 6 October, 1977.
LABOUR LAW
A decision of the Redundancy
Appeals Tribunal granting compen-
sation to an employee whose dis-
missal was not in accordance with
the provisions of the Minimum
Notiece and Terms of Employment
Act, 1972, cannot be upset because
the question as to whether the refusal
to obey an order is a ground for
summary dismissal — such as to dis-
entitle an employee to the notice for
which the Act provides — is a
question of fact to be determined con-
clusively by the Tribunal.
In July, 1976, the first-name
respondent was dismissed by the
Appellant without notice but sub-
sequently he received one week's
compensation for the failure of the
appellant to give him the prescribed
notice as required by section 4 of the
Minimum Notice and Terms of
Employment Act, 1973, which in his
ease, having regard to the period of
his employment by the appellant,
amounted to eight weeks.
Section 8 of the Act provides that
"Nothing in this Act shall affect the
right of any employer or employee to
terminate a contract of employment
without notice because of mis-
conduct by the other party." The
appellant claimed that the first-named
respondent disentitled himself to the
presscribed notice by virtue of his
failure to comply with a lawful and
reasonable order of the appellant.
The Re d u n d a n cy Appe a ls
Tribunal decided that the first-named
respondent was entitled to com-
pensation and held that the refusal to
carry out the order "fell short of mis-
conduct as envisaged by the Act".
The decision of the Tribunal, by
section 11 (2), is final and con-
clusive, and a right of appeal to the
High Court only exists in respect of
questions of -Jaw. The appellant
appealed against the decision on the
ground that the Tribunal misdirected
itself in law in holding that the refusal
to obey the order fell short of mis-
conduct as envisated by the Act.
Held (per Hamilton J.): the
question as to whether the order
given by the appellant to the first-
named respondent was, having
regard to the terms of his employ-
ment, a lawful and reasonable order
is a quéstion of fact to be determined
by the Tribunal and that this deter-
mination is final and conclusive if
there is evidence to justify it.
Hamilton J., having satisfied himself
that there was such evidence, dis-
missed the appeal.
Anne Moen Brewster v. Thomas
Burke and the Minister of Labour —
The High Court (Hamilton J.) —
unreported — 8 February, 1978.
NEGLIGENCE
Employers Liability. Where
a
risk or
danger in system of work becomes
manifest and simple means of
avoiding it is known to the Employer,
the Employer is negligent if he
permitted the risk of or danger to
continue.
This was an Appeal to the
Supreme Court from an Order of Mr.
Justice McMahon in the High Court
withdrawing the case from the Jury
on the basis - that there was no
evidence of negligence.
The Plaintiff claimed damages in
respect of personal injuries suffered
by him when he fell from a lorry
while assisting in the loading of same
at the Defendant's premises in Cork.
The Plaintiff had been employed by
the Defendant since 1951 as a lorry
driver until seven months prior to his
accident And in the Mill up to the
time of his accident. There was
evidence that lorries were loaded with
bags of meal by parking same under
a chute at the Mill. It was normal
practice to load the lorries from the
front to the rear; further that those
engaged in such loading found it
desirable to have a strip of timber
nailed across the rear of the lorry.
This strip of timber was intended to
act as a footguide to the loader. The
reason for this appeared to be that
the loader generally would be looking
up towards the chute while placing or
about to place a bag on his shoulder
and as he came to the end of the
platform his foot might go over the
edge bccausc he would not be looking
down.
The Plaintiff's evidence was to the
effcct that on the day of the accidcnt
he was asked to assist in completing
the loading of a lorry already
partially loaded by its driver. To do
so he moved the lorry into a position
in which the rear of the lorry was
under the chute and he then
proceeded to start loading. There
were three or four bags in the chute
held in position by a piece of timber
at the end of the chute. The Plaintiff
did not look at the end of the lorry to
see whether there was a strip or not.
He was accustomed to having a strip.
He started to take the first bag and
then proceeded to place his feet in
position and suddenly went over the
edge and fell. There was no lorry in
question.
Held: (per O'Higgins (J.) that
1. The Defendants, as the Plaintiffs
employers, were under a duty so
to carry out their operations as
not to expose him and other
employees to unnecessary risks.
2. While an employer cannot be
liable when injuiy or damage is
suffered from one of the in-built
risks of the employment in the
absence of negligence, when a risk
or danger becomes manifest and a
simple means of avoiding or
overcoming it is to hand and is
known to the employer, then it
would be negligence on the
employer's part if the permitted
the risk of danger to continue.
3. In this case, the risk of a loader on
the platform missing the end of
the platform of a lorry by looking
p towards the chute and bracing
himself to receive the weight of a
bag or sack was known for many
years to all those engaged in this
form of loading. To minimise this
risk these wooden strips at the end
of the lorries were asked for by
the workers and provided by the
D e f e n d a n t s .
In
s u ch
circumstances, for the employers
to allow a lorry without a strip to
be used by a loader accustomed
to having one might well be
r e g a r d ed as c o n s t i t u t i ng
negligence.
4. On the evidence a Jury could find
that the employers ought to have
provided a strip and could
accordingly be regarded as having
been at fault.
The Appeal was allowed and the
Action sent back for Re-trial.
Thomas Fortune v. P. E.
Jacob &
Co. Ltd.—Supreme Court (per
O'Higgins, J. with Kenny, J. and
Parke, J. J.—unreported-22 June
1977.
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