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GAZETTE

APRIL 1978

that the statutory preconditions

as to notice had been complied

with.

(lv)In relation to argument by

Counsel for the Defendant that

the appropriation as sought

would not implement the

testator's primary intention, it

was held that as the Plaintiff's

half share, being a legal right,

t a k es p r i o r i ty over t he

Defendant's half share which

derived from the will that the

intention of the testator could

have no part in the operation of

section 55 in the circumstances

of this case,

(v) Having set out in full the require-

ments of section 55, contained in

that section, for its operation —

from the particular facts of this

case the proposed apportion-

ment of the dwelling house and

52 acres would be a valid

exercise of the discretion invested

in the personal representative by

section 55.

The Appeal was dismissed.

CecUa

Hannon

v.

Dcrmot

G.

ODonovan, Joseph Hannon and

Lawrence Hauion

— The Supreme

Court (per Henchy J., with Griffin and

Parke J.J.)—unreported — 26 April,

1978.

NEGLIGENCE

Mea sure of Dama g es —

Interpretation of Restitution In

Integrum Ride.

The Plaintiff bought freehold

premises at No. 66 Aungier Street,

Dublin in 1972 and carried on his

business as an auctioneer on the

ground floor and let the remainder of

the building in eight residential

lettings which brought in a gross

income of about £3,250 a year. The

adjoining premises No. 67 had been

demolished before 1972 and support

had been given to No. 66 by flying

shores erected across the site of 67

and built into the side wall of 68.

The second named Defendants as

contractors to the first named

Defendants began work in September

1975 on the foundations of a new

building to be erected on the site of

67. While doing this they removed

the supports for the side wall of 66

which collapsed in part. The building

could not be repaired and the

r ema i nder of 66 had to be

demolished. The Defendants were

negligent but were not guilty of

intentional default.

The central question in the case

was whether the Plaintiffs damages

was to be the cost of reinstatement of

the premises or the amount by which

the property had been diminished in

value. The pre-damage value of the

premises was £35,000 and there was

evidence that such sum would

purchase similar premises on the

South side of Dublin. The cost of

reinstatement would be £65,000 plus

professional fees and the premises

when reconstructed would have a

letting value of between £2,000 and

£2,500 a year over and above that of

the old premises and would have a

capital value, put by one witness, at

over £100,000.

Held:

(Supreme Court, per Kenny

J.): When a house has to be pulled

down as a result of the Defendants

wrongful a c t . . . the owner is entitled

to restitutio in integrum which means

that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover

such sum as will replace him, so far

as can be done by compensation in

money, in the same position as if the

loss had not been inflicted on him,

subject to the rules of law as to

remoteness of damage.

(British

Westing

House Electric

v.

Underground Electric Railway of

London

(1912) A.C. 689). The

principle of restitutio in integrum

does not involve the subsidiary rule

that in every case where property is

destroyed or demolished the owner is

entitled to recover the cost of

restoration as damages

(Hutchison

v.

Davidson

(1945) S.Cas. 395). There

may be some cases in which damages

equal to the cost of restoration are

the only way to put the Plaintiff back

into the same position as he was

before the accident but these are

special cases and the onus lies on the

Plaintiff to establish that his is one.

The Plaintiff had been carrying on

business in 66 Aungier Street for

about two years only and so cannot

have built up an extensive goodwill

arising from the situation of the

premises. The Plaintiff has totally

failed to establish that his is an

exceptional case and that he should

be awarded the cost of restoration.

Per Henchy J. — The Plaintiff will

have to spend the diminished value of

the premises, £35,000, in acquiring

premises somewhere in the South side

ofthe City and not in Aungier Street or

its immediate vicinity. That might be

unfair or unreasonable if his

circumstances were different but prior

to 1972 he had carried on his

auctioneering business in Rathmines

for six years and there is no suggestion

that it suffered by being transferred to

Aungier Street in 1972.Andthereisno

evidence that it will suffer to any

appreciable extent if it is now

ransferred to another premises in the

South side of the City. It would be a

different stroy ifthe Plaintiffhad a well

established business in Aungier Street

such as that ofa publican, a grocer or a

bookmaker which depended on the

immediate locality for its custom. But

the Plaintiff is an auctioneer and as the

evidence shows he draws his clients

from all parts of the Dublin area.

Reinstatement damages of

£65,000 would not be justified. That

measure of damages would

excessively and unnecessarily enrich

the Plaintiff and unreasonably mulct

the Defendants. For damages

measured at £35,000, the diminished

value of the premises, the Plaintiff

can get premises no less suitable for

his business purposes and with a

similar income potential from

lettings. Such damages will be both

compensatory and reasonable

whereas reinstatement damages of

£65,000 would unjustifiably profit

the Plaintiff and unfairly penalise the

Defendants for their negligence.

Michael Munnelly

v.

Calon Limited

ft Ors

.-Supreme Court (per Kenny

and Henchy JJ . with Parke J.) 5 May,

1978 — unreported.

PATENTS

Patent Act 1964 — Interpretation

Section 65 (1) — Reflisal to convert

convention application to application

under Section 6 (1) alter sealing and

granting of Patent*

The Plaintiff sought an order

pursuant to Section 65 of the Patent

Act 1964 directing the Controller to

make certain amendments to the

Register of Patents. The Plaintiff had

made two Convention Applications

within the meaning of Section 6 of

the Act numbered 33511 and 33574.

Such an application entitled the

Plaintiff to priority as on the date of

application for the patent in the

convention country, in this case the

United Kingdom. The patent in

respect of Application Number

33511 was sealed and granted on the

6th November, 1974. On the 15th