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potential lessee of the premises. He

must make a valuation without

taking into account the effect on the

rent of the competition from this

particular adjoining occupier because

in effect the adjoining occupier is not

in the market for the lessee's interest.

The same conclusion would result

for another related reason namely

that Maceys had agreed (in the lease)

to give up possession of the premises

for 21 years provided certain

conditions were complied with, had

agreed to a rent review at a time

when they precluded themselves from

taking possession of the demised

premises and must therefore be taken

as having agreed that in considering

the demand for the premises from

potential lessees the valuer should not

take them into account as they were

not in a position lawfully to take

possession of the premises.

Mncey limited

v.

Tylers limited —

Case stated — High Court (Costdlo

J.) — Unreported — 25 April, 1978.

SALE OF LAND — Option to

Purchase "month" meant hmar

month.

The Supreme Court (per Henchy

H.) upheld the High Court decision

of Costdlo J. (Gazette Jan./Feb.

1978) that in the absence of any

admissible evidence that a calendar

month was intended the word

"month" in an instrument such as a

lease meant a lunar month. The

Court was unable to accede to the

proposition that the rule was

outmoded or was unworthy of

recognition or application in the

Courts because die acceptance of

such a proposition would involve the

retroactive abrogation of the rule in

its application to existing situations.

Note:

The Court indicated that it

thought

statutory

amendment

affecting instruments made or

coming into operation after the

operation of the Act would be

welcomed by lawyer and layman

alike.

Vone Securities

v.

Gerard Cooke —

Supreme Court (Henchy J, with

O'Higgins CJ., and Kenny J.) —

Unreported — 24 July, 1978.

STATUTE INTERPRETATION —

HOUSING ACT 1969

Obligation of Corporate Body

Established under Statute to seek

Permission for Change of Use of

Habitable House.

University College, Cork, applied

to Cork Corporation, the Planning

Authority for the County Borough of

Cork, for temporary planning

permission for a period of seven

years in respect of the change of use

of premises No. 4 Brighton Villas,

and 1, Lucan Place, Cork. It was the

stated intention of University

College, Cork to utilize the property

for an interim period for academic

uses until a satisfactory land unit had

been consolidated for a major

building development. Following a

report by the acting planning officer

that in his opinion permission was

required under Section 2 of the

Housing Act 1969 for the use

otherwise than for human habitation

of a habitable house, the City

Manager made an Order under

Section 10 (a) of the Housing Act

1969 that the application should not

be decided until an application under

Section 3 of the Housing Act 1969

had been fully determined, and this

decision was conveyed by the

Planning Authority to University

College, Cork.

University

College,

Cork

considered that they were not obliged

to apply for permission by virtue of

the terms of Section 9 (1) (b) of the

Housing Act 1969 which provided

(inter alia) that the Act was not to

apply to the use otherwise for human

habitation of a habitable house where

the change of use was required or

authorised under or in pursuance of

any enactment or for any statutory

purpose. The powers of University

College, Cork were those granted by

the Charter granted to it on the 19

November 1911 under the provisions

of the Irish Universities Act 1908

subject to certain minor amending

acts and it was provided in the

Charter that University College,

Cork "shall remain and continue to

be one body corporate, with a

perpetual succession and a common

seal and with power, without any

further licence in mortmain, to take,

purchase, and hold, and also to sell,

grant,

exchange

demise

and

otherwise dispose of real and

personal property and shall be

subject to all the provisions of the

Irish Universities Act 1908".

Held

(per Hamilton J) that the change of

use was required by University

College, Cork to fulfil the obligations

placed on the College by the Charter

and the provisions of the Universities

Act 1908 "and consequently was in

pursuance of such enactment and for

such statutory purpose. Accordingly

there was no obligation on the

College to obtain permission' in

respect of the change of user under

the Housing Act 1969.

University College, Cork v. Cork

Corporation

High

Court

(Hamilton J.) — Unreported — 23

June, 1978.

STATUTORY RULES

— Whether the Rules for the

Government of Prisons 1976 Invalid

as bring In excess of powers given by

Sections 12 and 13 of General

Prisons (Ireland) Act 1877 —

whether the Minister for Justice can

in the interests of the security of the

State direct a Prison Governor to

prohibit or restrict certain persons

from bring admitted to a prison.

The Plaintiff sought a declaration

that the Rules for the Government of

Prisons 1976 (S.I. No. 30 of 1976)

("the 1976 Rules") were invalid as

being in excess of the powers in that

behalf given by Sections 12 and 13 of

the General Prisons (Ireland) Act

1877 ("the Act of 1877") and as

being repugnant to the provisions of

the Constitution.

The 1976 Rules were expressed to

have been made in exercise of the

powers conferred on the Minister by

Sections 12 and 13 of the Act of

1877 and adapted. Rule 2 of the

1976 Rules provided that the

Minister "may, where he considers it

necessary in the interests of the

security of the prison or of the State

and for reasons related to the

particular person, direct that a person

(including a prisoner's legal adviser)

— (a) shall not be admitted to a

specified prison, or (b) may be

admitted to a specified prison only on

such conditions or in such

circumstances as the Minister may

specify, and any such direction shall

be complied with by the Governor of

the prison concerned". Rule 3 of the

1976 Rules provided that the powers

conferred by Rule 2 "shall not be so

exercised as to prohibit or restrict the

visits from so many members of the

legal profession as to deny to a

prisoner a reasonable choice of legal