JANUARY, 1910]
The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.
dismissed, and that no collusion had been
proved. Taking the whole of the evidence
together, he could not say that the defendant
had done anything from which the inference
could be drawn that he was a party to a
proceeding which he knew would be likely to
deprive the plaintiff's Solicitor of his costs.
Giving the widest meaning
to
the word
" collusion," there was nothing to show that
the defendant had any intention to deprive
the plaintiff's Solicitor of his costs. He said,
further, that not only was there no evidence
from which to draw the conclusion that there
had been collusion, but when he came to see
what. had happened after the settlement
between the parties, how the defendant had
given notice to the plaintiff's Solicitor, and
had drawn the cheque in such a way that it
would have been perfectly easy for
the
Solicitor to enforce his lien upon it, he drew
the conclusion, under those circumstances,
that
the defendant did not
intend
the
plaintiff's Solicitor to lose his costs, but
rather that .he should get them.
In this
connection he only wished to read the passage
in the case of " The Hope "'(8 P. D., 144),
where Lord Justice Lindley said this, on
page 146 :—" There is no rule that the parties
may not .compromise an action without the
intervention of their Solicitors. They must,
however, do so honestly, and not intend to
cheat the Solicitors of their proper charges."
The evidence in this case did not satisfy him
that the defendant knew that the plaintiff
would never pay his Solicitor's costs.
In his
judgment, therefore, the appeal failed.
Lord Justice Buckley and Lord Justice
Kennedy delivered Judgments, arriving at
the same conclusion.
(Reported
The Times Law Reports,
Vol.
xxvi., p. 104).
HOUSE OF LORDS.
(Before Lord Loreburn, C., Lord Atkinson,
Lord Gorell, and Lord Shaw).
Attorney-General v. Till.
Dec. 8,
1909.—
'income Tax—Statement of
Income—Incorrect statement—Penalty
—
Income Tax Act,
1842 (5
and
6
Vie.,
c.
35), s. 55.
A PERSON who has delivered a statement of
his income chargeable with income tax which,
through negligence or carelessness, although
without fraud, is incorrect, is liable to the
penalty of
.{50, under Section 55 of
the
Income Tax Act, 1842.
Decision of the Court of Appeal (25
The
Times L. R.,
342;
[19091
1
K.B., 694;
78
L.
/., K.B., 708) reversed.
(See GAZETTE
of April, 1909, p. 116).
This was an appeal from an order of the
Court of Appeal (the Master of the Rolls and
Lords Justices Moulton and Buckley) dated
February 17 last, which allowed the appeal
of the respondent from the judgment of the
Lord Chief Justice dated July 8, 1908. The
question was, whether
a
person who
negligently delivers an incorrect statement
of his profits and gains renders himself liable
to the penalties imposed by the Income Tax
Act, 1842, s. 55. The short facts were that
by a deed of assignment made in June, 1899,
between Annie Coombs and the respondent,.
the goodwill of a Solicitor's practice, which
had been carried on at Dorchester by Thomas
Coombs, now dead, the husband of Annie
Coombs, was assigned to the respondent in
consideration of an annuity of £200, to be
paid by the respondent to Mrs. Coombs for
15 years.
In June, 1901,
the respondent
married Mrs. Coombs, and thenceforward
ceased
to pay
the annuity. Before his
marriage Mr. Till deducted the annuity from
his return for income tax, but as Mrs. Coombs
paid
the
tax on
the £200 no
loss was
sustained by the Revenue!
For the years
1901-2 and 1902-3 the respondent again
deducted the annuity, but it was added by
the Commissioners.
For the years 1903-4
and 1904-5 and 1905-6 the respondent again
deducted
the annuity
from his profits.
Inquiries were instituted by the local Sur
veyor of Taxes, to which Mr. Till replied that
he had made a deduction " For interest on
capital. An annuity of £200 to Mrs. Till,
my wife, on which income tax is assessed and
paid by her." •
This was
incorrect. The
Lord Chief Justice gave judgment for the
Crown for £50 and costs. The Court of
Appeal gave judgment for the respondent
with costs. The Lord Chief Justice followed
a Scottish decision, which the Court of Appeal
declined to follow, holding that the penal
Section only applied to non-delivery and not
to inaccuracy in a statement.
The Lord Chancellor.—I hold that this
appeal should be allowed, and in view of the