324 / 350
VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ
CYIL 4 ȍ2013Ȏ
terrorism” does not constitute a real obstacle because this lack can be filled by reference to
the universal and regional international norms on terrorism”
(p. 83). Yet, as hardly any
of those instruments contains explicit references to, let alone definitions of, victims
of terrorism, such a claim would merit a more detailed explanation. The suggestion
that
“it is possible to affirm the existence of a general concept of victim from the definitions
contained in the international norms in force related to the different categories of victims”
(p. 70) does not provide an adequate answer.
Even a cursory survey of international instruments, including those dealing
specifically with victims of terrorism, indicates a cleavage between a more extensive
universal (UN) and narrower European (Council of Europe) understanding of the
concept of victim. While under the latter the circle of victims is limited to persons
having suffered direct harm and their close relatives, under the former it expands to
cover other groups (indirect victims, first responders etc.) as well. The tension between
these two approaches should be acknowledged in the book, with the consequences
drawn from it both for the concept of victims of terrorism and that of victims in
general. In the light of this tension, the author’s conclusion that
“in international law
there does not exist a unique definition of victim /…/ but this lack does not constitute
a problem”
(p. 89), because the definitions of various categories of victims are allegedly
identical and all draw inspiration from the UN General Assembly Resolution 40/34,
2
would need to be reassessed or, at least, rephrased in more cautious and conditional
terms.
Having discussed the concept of victim in Part One of the book, the author moves
on to analyse the legal status of, and rights accorded to, such victims in Part Two,
entitled
The Rights Recognized to Victims by International Norms.
It is praiseworthy that,
in addition to proposing a catalogue of concrete rights, the book also deals with some
relevant, and often difficult, theoretical questions relating to the legal nature of the rights
of victims. More specifically, the extent to which these rights are binding under current
international law is discussed, in reflection of the fact that most of the international
instruments relating to victims are of soft-law nature (resolutions of the UN General
Assembly and of other international bodies). The author engages in a rather lengthy
debate focusing primarily on the relationship between the UN General Assembly and
customary law. He suggests a complicated classification of such resolutions and puts
forward criteria that should allow us to determine the legal effects of what is somewhat
ambiguously called “institutional norms”.
Based on these criteria – which more or less overlap with the classical methods
of interpretation, taking into account the text, the context, the procedure, etc. – the
author concludes that the rights of victims exhibit three characteristics. First, the
majority of these rights are already recognized under the
lex lata
of international
law or, more specifically, of human rights law, as they are simply fundamental rights
applying to any human being, including victims (the right to life, the prohibition
2
UN Doc. A/40/34,
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
29 November 1985.