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THE JUDGE AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM

Racke

Judgement (1998) it fully proclaimed that “the Community must adhere to

the rules of international customary law” and that these rules “bind the institutions

of the Community and create a part of the Community legal order”. In so far as

the identification of customary rules is concerned, the EU Court of Justice is rather

cautious and seldom enters into affirming the existence and content of such rules.

In the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice, of course, there exist two

contradictory tendencies, which it is possible to designate as openness and self-restraint

with respect to international custom. In the first case the Court of Justice applied

customary rules in the sphere of jurisdictional immunity of a state (

Mahamadia

, 2012),

laws of international treaties (

Brita

, 2010), or immunity of a head of state (

Hungary/

Slovak Republic

, 2012). In other cases the Court of Justice agreed with the goals and

values of the EU and excluded the application of customary international law, for

example in the matter of

Apostolides

(2009) or

Kadi

(2008). I must acknowledge that

I am among those who, in spite of contentment with the protection of fundamental

rights, warned against the risk of a dualistic approach in the relation of European and

international law for the coherence of the international legal order.

Another perspective touches on the approach of the European Court of Human

Rights to international customary law. Ineta Ziemele focused on whether the ECHR

has a special method in its approach to customary rules of international law. The

Court has always declared that it interprets the Convention in accordance with the

rules of interpretation of treaties anchored in the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties. In the case

Demir and Bakayra

(2008) the Court had the opportunity to

explain its understanding of the concepts “other rules” and “applicable between the

parties” (Art. 31 para. 3(c) VCLT). It stated that when it looks for a common basis

among norms of international law it has never distinguished between the sources of

law. And, while qualifying the meaning of concepts contained in the Convention,

the Court is able to and must take into consideration elements of international law

other than the Convention. She demonstrated this in two main scenarios used in the

practice of the ECHR. The first case deals with confirming a customary rule,

e.g.

of

the sphere of state immunity, when the Court commented on its existence on the

basis of criteria accepted by the International Court of Justice and codified proposals

of the Commission on International Law (

e.g. Cudak

, 2010). In the second case of

the ECHR, on the basis of the analysis of laws and the practice of member states,

the Court investigates whether a European consensus was achieved in the approach

to a specific question.

Andreas Paulus

, in his very interesting contribution, concentrated on the role

of internal state courts, in particular the German Federal Constitutional Court,

in relation to the application and development of customary international law.

According to Art. 25 of the German Constitution general rules of international law

are a part of federal law and have precedence over statutes (over ordinary laws, debate

on precedence over the constitution is considered to be rather theoretical). Even

though it was not always clear whether an individual is able to invoke customary