207 / 338
A taxpayer declared £18 6s. interest on his Post
Office Savings Bank account and was assessed to tax
on that amount. Later the Crown discovered his
true income from that source was £51 55. 9d. and
raised a new first assessment of £14 55., and claimed
a penalty of £20 plus three times the total tax which
ought to have been assessed. Held, that the date at
which any penalty incurred was to be ascertained,
was the date when the offence was committed ;
that on the true construction of s. 25 (3)
(a)
" the
tax which he ought to be charged under this Act "
meant the whole tax chargeable for the relevant year :
"I.R.C.
v.
Hinchy (1960) 2 W.L.R. 448 ;
104 S.J.
188 ;
(1960) i All E.R. 505, H.L. (reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeal (1959) 6 C.L. 173.
Practice
Affidavits — admissibility — interlocutory
proceedings.
(R.S.C., Ord.
38,
rr.
3, n.)
An application for leave
to take a ward of court out of the jurisdiction is not an
interlocutory proceeding within Ord.
38,
r.
3,
and accord
ingly hearsay evidence is not admissible. But the court has a
complete discretion whether or not to strike such evidence
out of an affidavit.
A mother's application for leave to take a ward of
court out of the jurisdiction contained (by reference
to an exhibited statement) hearsay evidence. Held,
that the hearsay evidence should not be struck out
as this was not necessary to allow the application
to be properly heard: Re J. (An Infant) (1960)
i W.L.R. 253 ;
104 S.J. 232 ;
(1960) i All E.R. 603,
Cross J.
Hearsay. (R.S.C., Ord.
38,
rr.
3, n.)
Proceedings in a
divorce petition concerning access to
the children of the
marriage made after the divorce are not interlocutory
proceedings within Ord.
38, /-. 3,
and accordingly hearsay
evidence is not admissible in the affidavits.
On an application made some years after their
divorce the father of the child of the dissolved
marriage applied for the suspension of the mother's
right of access. Two affidavits filed on the father's
behalf consisted to a large extent of scandalous
hearsay evidence and was held inadmissible under
Ord. 38, r. 3, and in the circumstances the whole of
the affidavits
should be removed :
Rossage
v.
Rossage (1960) i W.L.R. 249 ;
104 S.J. 231 ;
(1960)
i All E.R. 600, C.A.
Contract—-frustration—prohibition of use of normal route.
In Tsakiroglou & Co.
v.
Noblee Thorl (March 28,
1960) the board of appeal to the Incorporated Oil
Seed Association held that sellers were in default
in
failing
to ship groundnuts
from Sudan
to
Hambourg under
a
c.i.f.
contract November/
December, 1956, although the Suez Canal was
blocked from November 2, 1956.
There was a
finding that the performance of the contract by
shipping the goods on an alternative route via the
Cape was not commercially or
fundamentally
different from its being performed by shipping the
goods on a vessel routed via the Suez Canal. The
Court of Appeal (Sellers, Ormerod and Harman JJ.)
held, dismissing an appeal from Diplock J. and
upholding the award of the board, that the contract
had not been frustrated by the blocking of the Suez
Canal. (D.C.) See also
The Times,
March 29, 1960.
Murder—uncontrollable impulse—evidence of insanity.
In Attorney-General for South Australia
v.
Brown
(March 9, 1960) that respondent was convicted of
murder, the sole defence being insanity within the
second branch of the M'Naughten Rules.
The
Australian High Court allowed his appeal on the
ground that evidence of an uncontrollable impulse
must be put before the jury as evidence of such
insanity. The Judicial Committee (Viscount Simonds,
Lords Radcllffe, Tucker, Jenkins and Morris),
allowing the Crown's appeal, held that the law did
not recognise such an impulse as evidence of insanity
and that, if the defence contended that it was, it was
a matter for evidence.
(D.C.)
See also (1960)
2 W.L.R. 588.
Secret report—admissibility.
In re B. (An Infant) (March 24, 1960) Roxburgh J.
dismissing an appeal by the proposed adopters of a
boy aged five, against the refusal of Liverpool
justices to make an adoption order in respsct of
the boy, observed that it was monstrous that a
secret report should be treated as evidence in a
matter of this sort. In the present case, although
the justices had come to the right conclusion in the
event though for wrong reasons, a secret report
was read out after the parents' evidence was closed.
That report was not on oath and was not admissible
evidence. (J. A. G.) See also
The Times,
March 25,
1960.
Discovery—Crown privilege—entries in a detective's diary.
In Auten
v.
Rayner (No. 2) (February 25, 1960),
Glyn-Jones J. held (i) that a claim for Crown
privilege in respect of entries in a detective's diary
(which had been sealed by an order of the Home
Secretary) was a claim made, not in respect of a class
of documents, but in respect of each and every
sealed entry, and that the court had no power to
go behind the certificate of the Home Secretary ;
(2) that such a claim for Crown privilege could be
made in the face of the court, and that it was un-
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