252 / 338
Educational Co. of Ireland
v.
Fits^patrick—%th April,
1960.
Granting of interlocutory injunction by Teevan, J.
affirmed by Supreme Court (Lavery, KingsmiU-
Moor, O'Dalaigh and Maguire, JJ. Maguire, C.J.
dissenting).
This injunction restrains the defendant from picket
ing plaintiff's premises until substantial questions of
law are decided in the plenary action :—
(1) Whether "White
v.
Riley " (1921. i Ch. i)
and similar English decisions are valid decisions in
Ireland. Here it was held that the mere statement
to an employer by a number of workmen that they
will not work with another workman, and that, if
that workman is retained in the employer's service,
they will strike, even where they have knowledge
that he cannot dispense with their service, does not,
of itself constitute an unlawful threat, and is there
fore not of itself, actionable; but it is a trade
dispute, and is, in the absence of threats, protected
by section 3 of Trade Dispute Act, 1906.
(2) Whether some sections of the Trade Disputes
Act, 1906 are in accordance with the Irish Constitu
tion of 1937.
The property of any adjudicated bankrupt who
has
property in his shop over which he has power of disposing,
even though the disposingpower may be somewhat restricted
as it was in this case,
nevertheless forms part of the
Bankrupt's property.
The facts are as follows :
The bankrupt was adjudicated on
the
i8th
August, 1958 and on that date had in his possession
four ladies' bicycles which the Hercules Cycle &
Motor Co. (Ireland), Ltd. contended were held by
him as the property of the Company and the invoice
issued in respect of the bicycles was so endorsed,
viz.
" notwithstanding
the
furnishing of
this
invoice the bicycles, the serial numbers of which
appear thereon, are held by the consignee as a
Stockist and is the property of The Hercules Cycle
& Motor Co. (Ireland), Ltd. and may not be sold
otherwise than on a Credit Sales Agreement through
the Hercules Cycle & Motor Company (Ireland) Ltd."
The Official Assignee contended that these bicycles
were within the disposition of the bankrupt and
accordingly came within the scope of section 313 of
the Ireland Bankruptcy Insolvency Act of 1857 and
claimed the bicycles on behalf of
the ordinary
creditors.
In August, 19.58 an application was made to the
managing
director of
the Hercules Company
(Ireland), Ltd. notifying him that the bicycles were
within the disposition of the bankrupt pursuant to
the aforementioned section and it was intended to
apply to the Court for a sale of the bicycles. No
reply was received and a notice of motion was
served on the Hercules Company (Ireland), Limited,
in which a request was made for an order for the
sale or disposal under section 313 of the Act of 1857
of the four
ladies' bicycles manufactured and
distributed by the Hercules Company. The affidavit
of the Official Assignee merely avered that the
bicycles were within the order and disposition of
the bankrupt and the Court messenger averred that
he was in the bankrupt's shop and that the bicycles
were displayed in a prominent position as merchan
dise for sale.
The case came on for hearing before Mr. Justice
Budd on the 3ist day of July, 1959 and there was no
appearance for the Hercules Company. The Court
held that the bankrupt at the time he became a
bankrupt had, by the consent and permission of the
true owner thereof, in his possession, order or
disposition four ladies' bicycles manufactured or
distributed by the Hercules Company whereof the
said bankrupt was the reputed owner, and ordered
that the said four ladies' bicycles be sold and
disposed of by the Official Assignee for the benefit
of the creditors under the bankruptcy.
In Re :
O'Callaghan, a Bankrupt—Unreported
judgement of Budd, J., 3ist July, 1959.
Sale of land—solicitor stakeholder.
A question of considerable interest to solicitors
arose before Haugh, J., recently in the case of
Sheppard
v.
Callaghan. This was a specific perfor
mance action brought by the purchaser of a property
which was held by the vendor as to portion thereof
as full owner but as to the greater part as tenant for
life under a settlement.
The purchase price was
£15,500 and a deposit of £3,875 was paid to the
vendor's solicitor, who was named and described
in the conditions of sale as the vendor's solicitor,
but it was not stated that he was to receive the
deposit " as agent for the vendor " or " as stake
holder ".
The purchaser having got a decree for specific
performance, it appeared that the vendor's solicitor
had in hand only £1,750 or thereabouts of the
deposit, having paid out to the vendor or applied
to his use the balance of over £2,120. The interest
of the vendor in the property was subject to prior
charges and the plaintiff had been awarded costs
against the vendor, so that there was not enough
money available out of the balance of the purchase
money (and the £1,750 which the solicitor had
lodged in Court pursuant to an Order to that effect)
to pay to the trustees for the purposes of the Settled
Land Acts of the settled part of the property the
40