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damnified by the non-attendance of the plaintiff in

Court; his Lordship stated, on the other hand, that

it might be harmful to the defendants' interest to

have the plaintiff in Court, however expressly the

jury were told that they must ignore the plaintiff's

distress and depression and deal only with the

monetary loss sustained by him as a result of his

wife's death.

In those circumstances, Murnaghan,

J., held that, in the interest of both parties, the

proper course for him to pursue was to order that

the plaintiff's evidence be taken on commission.

(Irish ~Lcm> Times,

Vol. 94, p. 146, i8th June, 1960.)

Injunction ignored.

The case of Fitzgerald

v.

Noone, a Circuit Appeal

decided by Mr. Justice Walsh at the end of last

term, was a salutary illustration of the truth that it

does not pay to disregard other peoples' rights or

the exact terms of Court Orders. The plaintiff was

the tenant of the hall flat in a large house owned by

the defendant, a builder. The defendant proposed to

take down the upper portion of four large chimney

stacks on the house and to recap them at a lower

level, and had arranged to get a grant for this work.

His foreman told one of the plaintiff's children to

tell his mother not to light fires in the flat, but

apart from this no warning of the work was given

to the tenant, several of whose rooms were suddenly

covered with soot resulting from the work on the

chimneys and whose family was exposed to danger

from stones and material dropped from the roof to

the ground in front of the house.

The plaintiff

obtained an injunction and damages in the Dublin

Circuit Court, the injunction providing that the

defendant might continue the work only upon

certain conditions, one being that he should not

touch a kitchen chimney until he had completely

reinstated the sittingroom chimney. The defendant

learned that the plaintiff and his wife would be away

from the flat for the following week, and thought

that it would be empty and that there was, therefore,

no need to observe this condition, which he accord

ingly ignored.

The plaintiff returned during the

progress of the work to find all the chimneys out of

commission and issued a notice calling on the

defendant to show cause why he should not be

committed for contempt of Court.

In the Circuit Court the defendant was committed

to prison for two months for contempt. On appeal

this was reduced to seven days to run from the date

of the original committal order (during which time

the defendant was out on bail). The High Court

affirmed the original decree for £130 damages with

costs in both Courts, so that the defendant must have

had an expensive lesson.

(Irish ~Law Times,

Vol. 94, p. 171, July, 1960.)

Frustration—prohibition of use of normal route.

The

existence of a possibility, appreciated by both parties at

the time of making a contract, that a certain event may

occur, does not necessarily prevent the frustration of the

contract by that event when it does occur.

By a charterparty, dated i8th October, 1956, a

vessel was chartered to proceed to Masulipatan,

India, and there load a cargo of iron ore for carriage

to Genoa. It was provided by the charterparty that

the captain was to telegraph the charterers at Genoa

" on passing Suez Canal".

At the date of the

charterparty the parties knew that owing to hostilities

in the Canal Zone the canal, which was the customary

route, might be closed to shipping. In November,

1956, the canal was blocked to shipping. The ship

owners claimed that the contract was frustrated.

Held that, it was an implied term of the contract

that the vessel was to go by the Suez Canal; that

a voyage by the Cape would have been a funda

mentally different voyage and, accordingly,

the

contract was frustrated ; Societe Franco Tunisicnne

D'Armement

v.

Sidermar S.P.A. (1960) 2 All E.R.

529, Pearson, J. (distinguishing Carapanayoti & Co.

v.

E. T. Green (1958) C.L.Y. 560 ; Tsakiroglou &

Co.

v.

Noblee Thort G.m.b.H. (1960) 5 C.L. 28).

Defamation—privilege—letters to Ear Council.

In Lincoln

v.

Daniel (June 24, 1960) the defendant

sent two letters to the Secretary of the General

Council of the Bar alleging professional misconduct

against the plaintiff, who was Queen's Counsel.

Salmon J. held, in the plaintiff's libel action, that

the letters were the subject of qualified and not

absolute privilege, since the Bar Council had no

judicial or quasi-judicial function;

and on the

verdict of the jury that the contents of the letters

were untrue, entered judgement for the plaintiff for

£7,500. (D.C.) See also

The Times,

June 25, 1960.

Practice—contempt—newspaper—influence onjudge.

In R.

v.

Duffy, ex p. Nash (June 21, 1960) the

applicant for a writ of attachment for contempt

against the editor of, and journalists employed by a

newspaper was convicted of causing grievous bodily

harm after a

trial which attracted considerable

publicity, and forthwith announced to the press his

intention of appealing. The newspaper published

the next day, an article describing him as an obscure

thug and a small-time hooligan with big ideas

although it was said on his behalf in court, he bore

a good character.

The Divisional Court (Lord

Parker, Hilbery, Cassels, Donovan and Edmund

Davies J.J. held, dismissing the application that the

case had been

subjudice

at the time of the publication,

but that even had a judge seen the article, it was