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GAZE1TE
DECEMBER 1977
to direct the insertion of a Rent
Review Clause in the Lease that he
can now legally fix a rent in this case;
(2) If he can, when fixing the
rent to be reserved by the new Lease,
is he legally entitled by increasing the
rent which he would consider to be
appropriate to present conditions, to
endeavour, in so far as is possible, to
provide an aggregate amount of rent
over the term of 21 years equal to the
total of the rents a willing Landlord
would obtain by granting a Lease for
21 years with a Clause providing for
periodic rent reviews.
The facts were that the Tenant had
been held to be entitled to a new
Lease under Part III of the Landlord
& Tenant Act, 1931, the parties had
not been able to agree upon a rent,
the Circuit Court had fixed a rent of
£ 10 per week for the entire of the 21
year term of the new Lease and the
Landlord had appealed to the High
Court.
The Supreme Court
held
(Kenny
and Parke JJ.) that the Circuit Court
had no power under the Act of 1931
to insert a Rent Review Clause in any
Lease which it orders to be given.
The answer to the first question asked
was "yes" and the answer to the
second question was "that the Judge
was legally entitled to increase the
rent to the amount which he
considers appropriate in certain
conditions to endeavour, in so far as
is possible, to provide an aggregate
amount of rent over the term of 21
years, equal to the total of rents
which a willing Landlord would
obtain by granting a Lease for that
period with a Clause providing for
periodic rent reviews, provided that
there is evidence to support his
finding".
In a dissenting judgment Griffin J.
agreed that the Courts could not
insert a Rent Review Clause in a new
Lease granted under the Act, but
doubted whether in fact it was
possible to endeavour to estimate
what rent a willing Landlord would
be likely to obtain over the next 21
years under a Lease which contained
a Clause providing for periodic rent
reviews.
Joan Byrne v John Loftus —
Supreme Court (Griffith, Kenny and
Park JJ.) — unreported — 28 July,
1977.
Landlord and Tenant — Right of
Unincorporated Club to New Lease,
Compliance with Terms of Act.
Applicants were tenants from year to
year of a field with a Sports Pavilion
(erected by the Applicants or their
predecessors in title) as Trustees for
Belgrove Football Club following on
the expiry of a Lease for a term of 10
years from 1953 granted by a Lease
of 1951. The Lease had originally
been granted to a Company which
had assigned its interest in the Lease
to the then Trustees of the Club in
1957. The Trustees had been
specifically elected by the members of
the Club to take the Assignment. One
of them had retired and been replaced
by a new Trustee, but no Assignment
of the interest to the new Trustee had
ever taken place.
The Applicants applied to the
Landlord for a Sporting Lease under
Section 3 of the Landlord & Tenant
(Amendment) Act, 1971. In response
the Landlord served a Notice to Quit
on 5 July, 1973, expressed to
expire on 9 September, 1974.
The Club had expended more than
£1,200.00 on the buildings now on
the field. The Club's Application was
dismissed in the Circuit Court and on
Appeal to the High Court the Judge
stated two questions for the Supreme
Court to answer.
(1) Where the Sports Club or
Organisation within die meaning of
Section 2 (1) of the Landlord 8c
Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1971, is
unincorporated can such a Club or
Organisation avail of the provisions
of the said Section?
(2) Is it a condition of
entitlement to a sporting Lease under
Section 2 (2) (i) (sic) of the Landlord
& Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1971,
that the lands must have been held
for the purpose of carrying on a sport
under the Lease for a term of not less
than 21 years"?
The Supreme Court
held
that the
answer to the first question was
"yes". Few Clubs are incorporated
and the effect of the contention that a
Club with its fluctuating membership
not being a legal person was not
capable of requiring or holding an
estate in land would be to exclude
about 98% of the Clubs in the
Republic of Ireland from the benefits
of the Act of 1971. The property of
the Club is invariably held by
Trustees to hold in Trust for the
members for the time being of the
Club. Statute Law has already
allowed the Club despite its
fluctuating membership to be
registered under the Registration of
Clubs (Ireland) Act of 1904. The
meaning of Section 2 of the Act of
1971 is that a Club has become
entitled to the beneficial interest in the
term of years created by the Lease to
be granted even when the legal estate
is vested in trustees. This concept
already known to our law gives effect
to the main purpose of the Act of
1971 and so should be adopted.
The answer to the second question
depends on the exact wording of Sub-
Section (2) of Section 2 of the Act of
1971, which is:
"2. (2) The following are the
conditions to be complied with:
(a) that—
(i) the land is held for the purpose
of carrying on the sport under a
lease for a term of not less than
twenty one years,
(ii) the land has been continuously
occupied by the sports club for
that purpose for the period of
not less than twenty one years
immediately preceding the date
of the application for a sporting
lease, or
(iii) the land has been continuously
in the possession of the sports
club for that purpose for the
period of not less that twenty
one years immediately preceding
the date of the application for a
sporting lease".
The omission of "or" at the end of
Sub-Clause (i) is a matter of style.
The meaning of the whole sub-section
is that compliance with any one of the
three sub-clauses is sufficient to
entitle the applicant to a Sporting
Lease. The answer to the second
question should be "not necessarily
so". It is sufficient if the Applicant
complies with any one of the three
conditions set out in Section 2. (2)
(a).
Thomas P. Corley, Raymond
McLonghlin and Albert D. Camranl
v. John GDI — Supreme Court —
Judgment of Kenny J. — unreported
— 21 July, 1977.
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