GAZETTE
DECEMBER
1995
With regard to (1) it was pointed out
that the Trustees were given the
widest powers in relation to the
residuary Estate in the Will of X.
In relation to (2) the Revenue
Commissioners opinion was that the
21 March 1991 (the date of issue of
the Grant of Probate) was the earliest
upon which the Trustees were entitled
1
to retain the lands for the benefit of
the successor. However, the dictum of
Lord Fleming in the
Lord Advocate -
v- Wotherspoons Trustees
1930 SLT
82 states clearly that "retainer is
J
something of an analogous character
to actual delivery or payment" and as
j
the Estate of the deceased had not
i been administered in March 1991 then I
I it was not possible for the residue of
!
the Estate to be in existence at that
j
date. Accordingly the valuation date
j
selected was not in the circumstances
j
of the administration inappropriate.
i
, In relation to (3) the spouse of Y, Mr.
Y had a domicile of origin in New
Í York, while Mrs. Y had a domicile of
origin in a domicile area of England
and Wales. After some time abroad
j
and subsequent to their marriage in
1968 they returned in 1970 to England
j
and set up home. Mr. Y accordingly
; acquired a domicile of choice in
England and Wales.
I Section (1) (2) of the Domicile and
!
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
provides that where immediately
before the Section came into force (1
January 1974) a woman who was
married and then had her husband's
domicile by dependence was to be
treated as retaining that domicile as a
domicile of choice if it is not also her
j
domicile of origin, unless and until it
is changed by acquisition or revival of
I another domicile either on or after the
j coming into force of the Section of the
! Act. As already mentioned Mrs. Y
j
took up permanent residence in
I Ireland on 1 July 1992 with the
I
intention of establishing a permanent
j
i home here and accordingly acquired a
domicile of choice in this country.
i
í
! The UK case of
IRC
-v-
Duchess of
! Portland
(1982)
1 All ER 784
\
\ considered the effect of Section 1(2)
!
of the 1973 Act mentioned above. The
i
Section operated to deem the Duchess
as retaining her husband's English
domicile unless or until she changed
that domicile by the acquisition or
revival of another domicile after the
coming into force of Section 1(1).
Nourse J.
was of the view that she
could only free herself from the
shackles of dependency by choosing
to leave her husband for permanent
residence in another country". He
rejected the notion that spending
1 0 - 1 2 weeks annually in Quebec
amounted to permanent residence
and that she did not abandon her
domicile of choice in England and
Wales imposed on her by the Act of
1973. The same tests apply to
the facts in the Mrs. Y case but
she
did
take up permanent residence in
Ireland and acquired a domicile of
choice here.
With regard to the concept of domicile
of dependency the Irish Domicile and
Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act
1986 provides in Section 1 that:
"The domicile of a married woman
shall be an independent domicile and
shall be determined by reference to
the same factors as in the case of any
other person capable of having an
independent domicile and accordingly
the rule of law whereby upon
marriage a woman acquires the
domicile of her husband and is during
the subsistence of the marriage
incapable of having any other
domicile is hereby abolished".
The Section states further that Section
1 above applies to the parties of every
marriage irrespective of where and
under what law the marriage has taken
place and irrespective of the domicile
of the parties at the time of the
marriage. Furthermore the Supreme
Court held forcefully that the concept
of the domicile of a married woman
being the same as that of her husband
did not survive the enactment of the
Constitution and was specifically
contrary to Article 40 (1) per
O'Hanlon J.
in
W.V.W.
[1993] ILRM
294; [1993] 2 IR 476. Accordingly the
two tests required to establish a
domicile of choice namely Animus
and Factum were satisfied by Mrs. Y
on 15 September 1992. However, her
husband Mr. Y retains his domicile of
choice in England and Wales.
i
Finally in Spring 1995 as a result of
Mrs. Y having acquired at the
valuation date:
A. A domicile of choice in Ireland and
B. having converted non-agricultural
property to agricultural property,
Mrs. Y qualified for Section 19
i
relief as £ 150,000 (i.e. £300,000 -
50%) now dropped out of charge at
J
55%, thereby saving £82,500.
*Eamonn O'Connor is a solicitor
with S.S. & E. Reeves, Solicitors,
Dublin, and is a member of the Law
Society's Taxation Committee.
•
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