134 / 364
indemnity and rendered him liable on the counter
claim.
(Liverpool Corporation
v.
T. & H. R. Roberts
(A Firm) and Another, Garthwaite, Third Party
(1965) i W.L.R. 938.)
Trade Dispute
At a factory, some 40 pickets, acting under orders
of the appellant, who was the chairman of the strike
committee, began to move in a continuous circle
outside the main entrance to the premises. This
action took place on land forming part of the high
way and across the route in and out of the premises.
Although the intended procedure was to open the
circle for vehicles seeking access to the factory, the
practical effect would be to bring approaching
vehicles temporarily to a halt, and to cause foot
passengers either to thread their way through the
circle or to find a way round it. The strike was well
conducted and there was never any risk of violence
either to vehicles or human beings.
A police
constable on duty outside the premises informed the
appellant that in his view the circling constituted an
obstruction and an intimidation, and asked him to
stop it. He refused to do so and was arrested and
subsequently convicted of wilfully obstructing the
constable in the execution of his duty.
HELD
(inter alia)
that the power of the police to
interfere with picketing in the course of a trade
dispute was not restricted to cases where a breach of
peace was anticipated. Dictum of Lord Parker, C. J.
in Piddington
v.
Bates ((1960) 3 All E.R. 660, 663)
applied. Furthermore the circling was not justified
by section 2 (i) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, as
the number of pickets was far in excess of that
required for the purposes of that enactment (viz.
peacefully obtaining or communicating information
or peacefully persuading people to abstain from
working) and the circling hindered, rather than
facilitated,
the obtaining or communicating of
information and its power of persuasion was nil.
(Tynan
v.
Chief Constable of Liverpool
(The Lan>
Times,
August 6th, 1965, Vol. 236, p. 444).)
Agency
In cases in which the principal not only puts an
agent in possession of the goods and indicia of title
but also expressly authorises him to sell as principal,
the question whether the agent sold in the ordinary
course of business is relevant only in so far as it
throws light on the bona fides of the buyer : Lloyds
and Scottish Finance Limited
v.
Williamson ((1965)
i All E
.R. 641) (C.A.—Harman, Danckwerts and
Salmon
L.JJ.)
Air agents are in the same position as shipping,
agents.
If they arrange for the shipment or air
passage, even although they disclose that they are
doing so for a principal, even for a named principal,
they incur a personal liability to
the shipping
company for the freight: Perishable Transport
Company Limited
v.
N. Spyropoulos (London)
Limited ((1964) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 379) (Salmon L.J.,
sitting as an additional judge of the Queen's Bench
Division).
Extract taken from the
Law Times
of Friday,
August 6th, 1965.
Road traffic—negligence—skid
Between 10.30 p.m. and n p.m. on 2jth Novem
ber, 1962, two cars were approaching each other,
going in opposite directions, each on its proper side
of a main road, which was some 25 feet wide. It was
wet, but there was no other reason for the road to
be slippery. When only a short distance separated
them the defendant's car skidded across the road
into the path of the car driven by the third party,
and ended up on its wrong side facing in the opposite
direction. The third party's car collided with the
back of the defendant's car. The defendant gave no
explanation of why the car skidded, but stated in
evidence that the car had skidded across the road
on an occasion two years earlier, for which also he
was unable to give a reason. The third party gave
no acceptable explanation of the collision.
HELD—The defendant had failed to prove that
the skid happened without his fault and an unex
plained and violent skid was itself evidence of
negligence ;
in the circumstances the defendant had
not satisfied the court that the third party had
contributed to the collision by negligent driving.
(Richley
v.
Faull (Richley, Third Party) (1965)
3 All E.R. 109.)
Evidence
—
duty ofprosecution
R. was attacked at n p.m. in a passage leading
from a street into a club in Soho. The prosecution's
case depended on the evidence of three girls,
hostesses at the club. According to their evidence
the appellant and another man had jumped on R.,
kicking and hitting him. H., a doorman at the club,
was called to the scene. R. and H. made statements
to the police. At the committal proceedings R.
initially gave evidence in accordance, substantially,
with the girls' evidence. He said that it was the
appellant who kicked him.
The committal pro
ceedings were adjourned before they were concluded.
In the interval R. made a declaration to a solicitor
that his statement and evidence had been untrue and
that the appellant had not participated in the attack.
On the day before the adjourned hearing of the
committal proceedings H. similarly made a declara
tion to a solicitor that the appellant had not attacked