252 / 364
Contract—Injunction against Procuring Breach
The main contractors for
the building of a
large power station employed the plaintiff com
pany as sub-contractors to erect the brickworks on
a "labour only" basis, i.e., they were to supply
the labour for the work and the main contractors
the materials. The defendants were three officers
of a trade union which strongly objected to this
form of contract, although
it was authorised
(subject to safeguards) by National Working Rule
8 of the National Joint Council, and this rule,
being agreed by a majority on both sides, became
binding on the industry. The union threatened the
main contractors on May 18, 1965, union mem
bers would be advised not work on the site, and
there was an official stoppage of work as from
that day. After unsuccessful discussions the union
officials further threatened to withdraw all brick
layers employed by the main contractors, declared
the job "black" and picketed the entrance gates.
Many men left their work without proper notice.
The plaintiffs appealed against refusal of an inter
locutory injunction restraining the defendants from
attempting to bring about the termination of the
"labour only" contract.
Held by the Court of Appeal that "labour only"
contract was not a "contract of employment," so
that the defendants were not protected from lia
bility by the Trade Disputes Act 1906, s. 3. There
was no defence that the defendants were ignorant
of the precise terms of that contract. An injunction
was granted to the plaintiffs.
(Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v Lowthian
and Others (1966) 1 All E.R. 1013).
Vendor and Purchaser
A contract for sale of a sub-underlease (wrongly
described as an underlease) provided that "the
vendor's title which has been accepted by
the
purchaser shall commence with an underlease
dated December 28, 1963, and the purchaser shall
raise no requisition or objection thereon." Com
pletion was fixed for December 23, 1964, but
the purchaser took possession on October 26, the
purchase-money being deposited in the joint names
ol the vendor and purchaser. On October 28 the
purchaser's solicitors were informed by the re-
versioner on the underlease of breaches of coven
ants to pay rent, not to underlet without consent,
and not to make unauthorised alterations. Could
the purchaser rescind?
The Court of Appeal held that in the circum
stances the purchaser could rescind the contract.
The special condition restricting objections was
not a bar to rescission where the purchaser dis
covered from other sources defects which were
liable
to make her
title worthless, unless
the
vendor disclosed defects of which he knew or
ought to have known. The vendor was entitled
to compensation for use and occupation of the
flat, but could not rely on the purchaser's re
maining in possession as affirming the contract
as he had not pleaded this and the purchaser
had had no opportunity to explain the reason for
her remaining in possession.
(Becker v Partbidge (1966) 2 All E.R. 266).
Damage for Breach of Option
An option to purchase land was granted by
the defendant to the plaintiff, to be exercised as
soon as
reasonably possible after
the plaintiff
should have obtained planning permission and
modification of a tree-preservation order to enable
him to carry out development. The defendant, in
breach of the option agreement, sold the land
to a third party shortly after the plaintiff had
already obtained agreement in principle to plan
ning permission and modification of
the
tree-
preservation order. Should the damages recover-
ably by the plaintiff be assessed by reference to
the profits
the plaintiff would have made by
carrying out his porposed development?
Elwes J., applying Diamond v Compbell-Jones
(1961) Ch. 22 decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendant knew
the plaintiff intended
to
develop the land for profit, and therefore special
circumstances were established which entitled the
plaintiff to have damages assessed by reference to
the profits which both parties contemplated he
would make.
(Cottrill v Steyning and Littlehampton Build
ing Society (1966) 2 All E.R. 295).
Dangerous Driving
—
Absolute Offence
The defendants, who were civilian drivers for
the Territorial Army, appealed against their con
victions, under S.
1
(1) of the Road Traffic Act
1960,
in the case of Ball, of causing death by
dangerous driving, and in the case of Loughlin,
of aiding and abetting that offence. On the oc
casion on which the offences were comitted Ball
was at the controls of a Ferret scout car. Because
a driver's vision is restricted to the rear and at the
sides while driving a vehicle of
this
type, an
observer, standing in the turret, gives directions
to the driver by intercom. The defendant, Loughlin,
was acting as observer on
the occasion which
gave rise to the offences charged. Ball, the driver,
halted the scout car at a cross-roads, coming out
of a minor road into a major road, and Loughlin
34