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14.

If extra copies of a letter are required, this

desire

should be

indicated after

"Yours

sincerely", or overleaf so as to ensure that

it is the last thing the typist will see when

the letter is completed.

15.

If a typist is making a tricky alteration re

quiring concentration and precision, always

stand over her and breathe down her neck

while she does it.

CORRESPONDENCE

Re: Succession Act 1965

Dear Sir,

I do not know if attention has been called to some

of the anomalies which may arise from a strict inter

pretation of Section 115

(4) of

the above Act limiting

the period

for election by

the spouse as between a

devise or bequest

in

the will and his

(or her)

legal

right.

The right of election may be exercised within six

months of the spouse

receiving notice

of his right from

the personal representative, or within one year from the

date of the issue of the Grant of Probate

whichever is

I he

later.

I wish

to emphasise the importance of the

words "whichever shall be later" as creating the crux

which, as I see it, rightly or wrongly, the Section may

give rise to in practice.

Although it is declared to be the duty of the personal

representative to give the notice to the spouse of his

right of election, there is nothing in the Section which

specifies

when

he is obliged to give the notice. He may

give

the notice a year after the

issue of

the Grant,

or two years after, or in fact at any time, and whenever

it may be that the spouse receives the notice (unless he

has already taken it on himself to elect) the provision

giving him six months from the date of the notice to

exercise his right of election comes automatically into

force. As I will point out, the consequence of this could

lie far-reaching.

It is necessary first of all to make clear that, although

a hasty reading of the Section 115

(4) might give the

impression that, in the absence of notice being served

on the spouse by the personal representative, the right

to elect would then be governed by the date of the

Grant and would automatically lapse on the expiration

of one year from that date, this

is not so;

the year

after the Grant has to be the "later" date provided for

in the Section, before it can be the limiting date and

there is no way of determining whether it is in fact that

"later" date so

long as

there

is a possibility of

the

notice being served on the spouse by the representative.

Furthermore, a

simple calculation shows

that

if

the

words "whichever is

the later" are to have the effect

(which of course they are inteded to have) of making

the expiration of the six months period following the

notice a

possible

"later" date the words can only operate

to have such effect if the notice by the representative

is served more than six months

after

tthe issue of the

Grant. That being

so

it

is

clear

that

the Section

contemplates and therefore authorises the service of the

notice at least

more

than six months after the Grant

if it is

to have any meaning, and if six months, why

not twelve months, or a year, or two years, since, as

stated, there is no time limit in the Section for service of

the notice? An instance will show what I mean:

The deceased dies, say on January 1st, 1967.

The Grant of Probate issues on January 1st, 1968.

Subject to a possible service of

the notice by

the

representative therefore the spouse has a right of election

up to the 1st of January, 1969 (a year after the Grant).

If the notice by the representative is served

earlier

than the 1st of July,1968 then the 1st of January, 1969

will still be the "later" date.

It follows therefore that the only case in which the

notice can operate

to create a "later" date for the

election will be if it is served

after

the 1st of July, 1968

—if, say, it is served on the 1st of August, 1968, then

the period of election will be extended for one month

after the period of a year determined by the issue of

the Grant.

It does not cure the position to say that in practice

the solicitor for the representative will of course advise

him on the necessity of giving the notice to the spouse

as soon as possible so as to put a definite period of

his right of election. The solicitor may fail to do so,

through oversight, or negligence or even ignorance. The

solicitor might for instance, through a misinterpretation

of the Section, assume that on the expiration of a year

from the date of the Grant the right of election has

lapsed and that no notice to the spouse was necessary.

Be that as it may, that would not deprive the spouse of

his right of election, should the representative take it

into his head at some indefinite date later to give him

notice of that right. The spouse would then have six

months within which to exercise his right, although the

estate might in the meantime have been administered

and distributed on

the assumption

that the right of

election has

lapsed. It is not necessary to point out

the serious situation which would be created in such an

eventuality and the confusion and litigation to which

it would give rise. Requisitions on title in future will

certainly have to take care of this point.

These undesirable results would of course be avoided

if

the Section were amended by providing that the

right of election would have to be exercised within a

year from the Grant or within six months form the

notice whichever date is the

earlier—

and not whichever

is the later. Such a provision however might cause in

justice in so far as it could deprive the spouse of his

right to make a choice between the bequest and his

legal right through his not being made aware of his

right of election by notice before the expiration of the

year from the date of the Grant, nor would such a

provision avoid this injustie even if it was coupled with

a condition making it obligatory on the representative

to give the notice in time to enable the spouse to make

his choice, since it would make him dependent on the

representative performing his duty and at the best leave

the spouse with nothing but a right of action against

him for his failure to do so.

There may be other ways of attaining the desired

object of securing to the spouse his right of election,

whilst at the same time definitely limiting the period

when it has to be exercised, but it occurs to me that one

way would be to provide that the notice to the spouse

should be served on him by the Probate Registrar im

mediately on the issue of the Grant, informing him of

his right of election and naming a definite period within

which it would have to be exercised.

Kildare.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN J. DUNNE,

38