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District Court that the upper limit for the new

jurisdiction, i.e., £500, be adopted and for the

following reasons :—

1.

The District Court meets a public need for

inexpensive litigation.

2.

It meets a public need for speedy litigation.

3.

It has, since increased jurisdiction was con

ferred upon it by the Courts of Justice Act,

1953, functioned well and smoothly and

is

completely up-to-date

in

its business.

No

arrears of any kind have accumulated.

4. The fall

in

the value of money and

the

general increase of the amount of money in

circulation have raised the practical ceiling of

jurisdiction enormously.

5.

The District Court sits throughout the year

and this continuity makes for rapidity in the

disposal of legal business.

Of particular note are

the observations of

Mr. Justice Kenny in his dissenting report in

which he states

(inter alia) :

'Our system of Government and all our funda

mental rights are based on the administration

of justice according to law and not according

to the views held by the person hearing the

case as to what the law should be. An indi

vidual who brings a claim for £100 has the

same right to have his case decided according

to law as has the individual who brings a

claim

for £10,000. Speedy,

summary or

rough justice is usually injustice.'

ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 1961

The Department of Local Government made

a statement as of October, 1966 which covers

the position as at 15th October, 1966 on

this

subject and supersedes all previous statements

issued by the Department on

the subject. The

paper refers to the extent to which the Road

Traffic Act 1961

is enforced, particulars of the

orders, regulations, bye-laws and rules made there

under, and particulars of orders, etc., made under

the Road Traffic Act 1933 which have not been

revoked. For members engaged in Court Practice

this document should prove a very useful reference

for road traffic cases.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL 1966

This Bill was introduced by the Minister for

Local Government and ordered by Dail Eireann

to be printed on 21st June, 1966.

It is now

available from the Government Publication Sales

Office, G.P.O. Arcade, Dublin 1, price 2/6. An

explanatory memorandum to the Bill states that

the main objects of the Bill are as follows :—

(a) to ensure a higher standard of roadworthiness

or vehicles and their equipment and to im

prove the effectiveness of enactments pro

tecting public roads from damage (Part II);

(b) to secure better standards of driving and

driving instruction and to modify the existing

provisions

relating

to disqualifications

for

driving (Part III);

(c) to extend and amend the law relating to

speed limits (Part IV);

(d) to modify the law in relation to serious driv

ing offences and, in particular, to recast the

law on driving while under the influence of

drink or a drug so as to make it an offence to

drive or be

in charge of a vehicle while

there is present in the body a quantity of

alcohol such that the concentration of alcohol

in the blood,

then or within three hours,

will exceed 125 milligrammes per 100 milli-

litres (Part V);

(e) to amend in certain respects

the law on

compulsory motor insurance (Part VI); and

(f)

to amend in certain respects the law relating

to the control and operation of public ser

vice vehicles and the regulations of traffic

(Parts VII, VIII and IX).

LEGAL AID ACT WORKS OUT AS DEAD

LETTER

An act, passed two years ago, to enable success

ful opponents of legally aided litigants to recover

costs from the legal aid fund has worked out in

practice as almost a dead letter.

Despite the generous intention expressed in the

title to the Act, its provisions are so restrictive

and its interpretation by the courts had been so

unbending, that only a few litigants are deriving

any benefit.

The purpose of the Legal Aid Act, 1964, says

the title, is "to provide for the payment out of

the legal aid funds of costs incurred by successful

opponents of legally aided litigants."

Yet Section

I of the Act declares

that no

order shall be made for costs incurred in a court

of first instance, such as a County Court or the

High Court, unless the unassisted party can show

that he would suffer "severe financial hardship."

An indication of how effective the Act has been

in curing the injustice of the successful opponent

having to pay the costs of defending an action

brought against him because of the facilities of

legal aid can be seen from an examination of

claims so far.

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