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£48,000 Provided—only £56 paid
The Law Society, which administers the legal
aid fund, set aside £48,000 for claims in 1964.
Although the Act came into operation halfway
through the financial year for legal aid accounts,
only £56 was paid out.
The Law Society, expecting claims to gather
momentum
as
the Act became more widely
known, retained the estimate for 1965-67 at about
£48,000. Successful claims for that year reached
less than £300.
In all, about 30 people have made claims under
the Act, and only eight have been successful.
Total payments since the Act came into force in
October, 1964, are still less than £500.
Yet it
is estimated that about 8,400 parties
are successful each year
in defending actions
brought against them by legally-aided litigants.
Insurance Firms—pressure to settle
Although it
is arguable that insurance com
panies, firms, and other similar bodies do not
suffer hardship in paying costs, it is equally argu
able that they should not be under pressure to
settle an action because they know there in no hope
of recovering costs.
In a case decided by the Court of Appeal last
year, a husband who successfully defended a
divorce petition by his legally-aided wife, applied
for costs under the Act.
These were refused on the grounds that it was
not the practice of divorce courts before legal aid
to award costs to a husband, and that the hus
band had had two Continental holidays and had
bought a car.
It was argued that he had not suffered severe
financial hardship and that it was not "just and
equitable"
in
the circumstances
to order costs
from public funds.
It was also held that in deciding what was
"just and equitable," a court should consider what
contribution to costs the respondent would have
had to make if his income was lower and he had
received legal aid.
A person with a disposable income ol not more
than £700 a year is entitled to claim legal aid,
and the maximum contribution under the scheme
is £150.
So where costs are not more than £150, it is said
that the unassisted party cannot have suffered as
he would have had to make this contribution to
the legal aid fund anyway.
Somewhat ironically, the courts have now also
decided that where an unsuccessful but assisted
litigant takes his case to appeal the unassisted
party can recover the costs of the appeal from
the legal aid fund under the Act without show
ing "severe financial hardship."
The Law Society has been well aware of the
deficiencies of the Act since it came into force.
But it recognises that it is a matter for Parlia
ment to put right.
As the
New Law Journal
commented recently,
the title to the 1964 Act could well be amended
at present to read : "An Act to provide exception
ally for the occasional payment out of the legal
aid fund of .
.
."
—
(Terence Shaw, Daily Telegraph Legal Cor
respondent, The Daily Telegraph, Monday,
November
21, 1966).
CASES OF THE MONTH
Bog of Technicality
This was a simple case of libel. It took 15
days to try; the summing-up lasted a day; the
jury returned 13 special verdicts; the notice of
appeal
set out
7
separate grounds why
the
appeal should be allowed and 10 more why a
new trial should be granted—the latter being
split up into over 14 sub-grounds. The respon
dents' cross-notice contained 15 separate grounds.
The costs must be enormous. Lawyers should be
ashamed that they had allowed the law of de
famation to become bogged down in such a mass
of technicalities that this should be possible.
Diplock L. J. (Boston v. W. S. Bagshaw and
Sons).
Planning Permission — Notice to Applicant
The appellants applied for planning permis
sion to enable them to erect a building on their
land in connection with the processing of chem
icals. Planning permission was
refused by
the
local authority and on appeal the refusal for
permission was confirmed by the Minister. The
company appealed against the Minister's decision.
It was held (Q.B.D.; Megaw J. May
5,
1966)
that the letter giving the Minister's decision was
so obscure and would leave in the mind of an
informed reader such real and substantial doubt
as to the reasons for that decision and as to the
matters the Minister did and did not take into
account that it did not comply with Rule I (II)
of
the Town and Country Planning Appeals
(Enquiries Procedure) Rules, 1962 which requires
the Minister to notify an appellant,
inter alias,
of his decision and the reasons for it.
(Givaudan & Co. Ltd., v. Minister of Housing
and Local Government and Another).
Negligence — Defective Tool
A workman was injured in the eye by a splinter
of steel from a hardened chisel that had been
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