340 / 364
ants, two young solicitors, set up in practice in
the West End of London, the same area as the
plaintiff's practice under the firm name of 'David
Leigh & Co.' On 26th January, 1967, the plain
tiff issued a writ claiming an injunction to re
strain the defendants from continuing to practise
under that style, or under any other style or name
which included the names 'David Leigh' or 'David
Lee' or so nearly resembled the same as lo be
calculated to deceive the public or induce the
belief that the practice carried on by the defend
ants was
the same as
that carried on by the
plaintiff, or was in any way connected therewith.
By this motion the plaintiff sought an interim
injunction in similar terms. The defendants, in
their affidavits, stated,
inter alia,
that they had
originally
contemplated using
their
respective
Christian names, adopting the style 'David Loon
& Co.', but had finally decided against it, because
they felt that the style was 'more suggestive of a
ladies' hairdressing salon than of a firm of solic
itors' and
that
before
registering
the name
which they eventually chose they had checked
inter alia,
the 'Law List' and had concluded that
the name chosen could not be confused with
other firms, but that they had not checked the
names of individual solicitors in practice.
Ungoed-Thomas, J., said that there seemed to
be no overwhelming urgency, and therefore de
spite the strong
prima jade
case made out, on
balance of convenience it was not right to grant
an interim injunction, but every facility should
be given for a speedy trial. Order accordingly.
By consent the motion was treated as the trail
of the action, the action being dismissed on the
defendants' undertaking to change their name to
'Leigh David & Co.' or such other name as the
plaintiff should agree so as not to be likely to
deceive.
(Lee v Popeck and Another—
The Solicitors'
Journal,
Vol. Ill, p. 114.
Restraint of Trade
The council of a society founded by royal
charter, the objects of which included maintaining
the honour and safeguarding and promoting the
interests of the members 'in exercise of the pro
fession of pharmacy,' proposed by motion
in
special general meeting a new rule binding on
members as part of their code of ethics. The
effect of the rule would be that, except with the
approval of the council, new pharmacies would
have to be situated in physically distinct premises
and their trading activities confined to pharma
ceutical and traditional goods as defined by the
council; and that existing pharmacies selling 'non-
traditional' goods, as defined, would not be able
to extend the range of those goods. Registered
pharmacists had to be members of the society
under Acts of Parliament the disciplinary body was
a statutory committee with power to strike off
the register any member guilty of 'misconduct';
and in considering misconduct the committee had
regard to the code of ethics laid down by the
society. There were 29,000 members, but only
6,000 attended
the meeting which passed
the
motion by 5,026 to 1,346. The plaintiff, a mem
ber of the society, brought an action against the
society and its president asking for a declaration
that
the proposed new rule was outside
the
society's powers and would operate as a restraint
of trade contrary to public interests. The society
claimed that the matter was not justiciable in
the courts save on appeal by a member from a
decision of the statutory committees and that the
rule was within the society's objects. They did not
plead that if a restraint of trade the rule would
be reasonalbe as between the parties. Pennycuick,
J., held that though the rule was within the society's
powers it would operate as an unreasonable re
straint of trade; and he granted the plaintiff an
injunction. The Society and President appealed.
The Court of Appeal consisted of Denning,
M.R., and Danckwerts, and Sachs, J. J. The
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
(Dickson v Pharmaceutical Society of Great
Britain and Another—
Solicitor's Journal
(Vol.
Ill), p. 116).
Hire Purchase Option Clause 'An Absolute Trap'
A waterman who put down a deposit of £219
on a Jaguar car he was buying on hire purchase
and then took it back after less than two months
when he could not pay the first instalment be
cause of a dockers' strike, was held not to be
liable to the finance company for an additional
£709-10-8 under the minimum payment clause
in the agreement. The court held that a hirer
could not exercise an option which had the result
of making him liable for a tremendous additional
payment unless he knew what the option involved.
The Master of the Rolls said it was another
case of a minimum payment clause in a hire
purchase agreement, providing for a two-thirds
payment by way of "agreed compensation for
depreciation." The County Court Judge had de
cided that the finance company were entitled to
sue on the clause.
Lord Justice Salmon concurring with Denning
M.R., and Mr. Justice Harman, siad that the
option clause purported to confer a benefit on
the hirer. It was a snare and a delusion, for if
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