The Gazette 1964/67

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be safe in such a case is to furnish separate bills
because the provisions of the various rules differ.
In the case of Land Registry business the Land
Registration (Solicitors' Costs) Rules 1962 provide
that the date of expiration of the time for requiring
a detailed bill is one month after payment or twelve
months after delivery of the Bill whichever date
shall be the later (not earlier as provided by S.R.G.O.
1960). Neither the Solicitors' Remuneration General
Orders nor the Land Registration Solicitors Costs
Rules have any application to that portion of a bill
of costs in an administration matter which relates
to the extraction of the grant of probate or adminis
tration. The costs for this work are regulated by the
Rules of the Superior Courts 1962 as amended and
appendix W.
CASES OF THE MONTH
Costs—counsel's fees
The defendant was charged with criminal offences
in connection with a play produced by the defendant.
At the taking of depositions in the District Court
certain police witnesses claimed privilege for reports
made by them and instructions given to them. This
claim was challenged on behalf of the defendant and
the district justice at the request ofthe attorneygeneral
who stated a case for the High Court. The High
Court found in favour of the attorney general and
ruled that the documents were privileged. The
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and the
court held that the district justice had no jurisdiction
to grant the case stated. The order of the High Court
was accordingly reversed and costs were awarded
to the defendant. The amounts claimed in the
defendant's bill of costs for senior counsel's fee
was £105 on the brief and £42 refresher and the fees
of junior counsel were the appropriate amounts.
The taxing master allowed reduced fees of £42 to
senior counsel on the brief and -£2.6 53. od. refresher
with the appropriate fees to junior counsel. He stated
that in following this course that he had had regard
to the importance of the case to the defendant and to
the fact that the substantive point of law argued in the
High Court and Supreme Court had been argued in
the District Court already and that counsel's work
had been accordingly reduced.
HELD (O'Daly and McLoughlin JJ., Maguire C.J.
dissenting) reversing Murnaghan J.
1. The case must be looked at from the point of
view of both parties in order to correctly assess its
magnitude.
2. If the case is observed from the point of view
of one party only a distorted and incorrect picture
may be presented.
The taxingmasterwas thereforewrong in principle,
in having regard only to the importance of the case
from the point of view of the defendant. He also
erred in principle by having regard to the fact that the
substantial point of law had already been argued in
the District Court.
The defendant's bill of costs was accordingly
remitted to the taxing master for reconsideration.
(The Attorney General v. Simpson, J.L.T.R.
Vol. XCVIII, p. 182.)
Costs—common fund basis
The plaintiff, a graduate with a third class honours
degree in physics, brought an action against his
university college for an order of mandamus for the
grant to him of a first-class degree, claiming damages
for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation
of his examination results, and professional negli
gence in lacking the necessary skill, or failing to
exercise sufficient care and attention to his needs.
The action failed, and the defendants applied, under
the Supreme Court Costs Rules 1959, r. 28 ($), for an
order that costs be taxed on the common fund basis,
contending that, although there was little authority,
such an order was justified in this case in view of the
plaintiff's scandalous and unwarranted allegations
and conduct.
Marshall, J., said that, assuming the action to have
been put forward by a person who appreciated fully
what was happening, the defendants' submission
would be a strong one. Since, however, the matter
had become an obsession with the plaintiff, and the
making of an order was discretionary, an order for
only usual costs would be made, and the application
for an order of taxation on the common fund basis
would not be granted. Application refused.
(Sammy v. Birkbeck College, Solicitors' Journal,
Friday, November f}th, 1964 (Vol. 108, p. 897).
Trusts—inspection of documents—rights of beneficiaries
In re Londonderry's Settlement: P . Walsh,
Harman L.J. (Danckwerts and Salmon . deliver
ing concurring judgments), said that ourt had
to resolve the apparent conflict between two prin
ciples ; the first, that trustees exercising a discretion
were not bound to disclose to beneficiaries the reasons
actuating them in coming to a decision and the
second, that documents coming into existence and in
the possession of trustees for trust purposes were
trust documents and so open to inspection by
beneficiaries as a proprietary right. Though it was
irregular that the trustees, protected as they were
(in this case) by an order of the court, should have
brought this appeal, thereby putting on the court the
difficult task of trying to define, as it were in the air
and without any concrete instances to help them, the
obligations of trustees, the court had decided to
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