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UNREPORTED IRISH CASES
Resolution assigning State grants to defendants and
subsequent assignment on foot of debts due valid.
An order had been made by the Supreme Court on 16th
March 1962 declaring that the defendants, builders
providers in Athlone, were creditors of the plaintiff
Society in the sum of £8,615 under an oral agreement
of December 1951 and that the plaintiffs did validly
assign to the defendants the Society's right to specified
housing grants by the Department of Local Govern-
ment, but Lavery J. and Kingsmill-Moore J. only gave
reasons for this decision, nearly three years later, on
19th February 1965.
The plaintiffs were in voluntary liquidation, and Mr.
Haughey, and subsequently Mr. Boland (accountant)
were appointed liquidators. The liquidator issued a
summons for the determination of certain questions,
and Budd J. directed an issue by order of 14th January
1957. Lysters accordingly claimed a declaration that
they were creditors of the Society in the sum of £8,615,
and that the Society had validly assigned their rights
to payment of housing grants due on the Arcadia
Housing Scheme in Athlone. The plaintiff Society
arranged to build many houses in Athlone, and made
contracts with two contractors, Murrays and Waldrons.
The defendants supplied large quantities of goods to
the contractors for the building works and continued
to do so after the contractors had defaulted in payment.
The Court found, that in consideration of Lysters
continuing to supply the materials, there was an under-
taking by the plaintiff to pay for the materials supplied,
and to assign the requisite housing grants in part pay-
ment.
The defence of the plaintiffs was that the Society
was an incorporated association and cannot conse-
quently be made liable for engagements undertaken by
their officers which were not formally authorised by the
Court. Budd J. had rejected Lysters' claim, but the
Supreme Court allowed the appeal on this point.
At the end of 1951, the two contractors were in finan-
cial difficulties and unable to pay for further materials.
Waldrons owed Lysters £2,235, and Murrays owed
£189. In November 1951 the Society had agreed to
assign the housing grants to the defendants. In May
1953 the Department of Local Government required
formal authority for payment of these grants to the
defendants. The Secretary of the Society sent a letter to
the Department of Local Government stating that the
Committee had passed a resolution authorising these
payments, but Budd J. had found that no such resolu-
tion was passed; all outward factors tend to show that
the resolution had been passed. In fact the Department
acknowledged this letter on May 19th. The defendants,
in a letter to the plaintiffs in January 1952 wrote that
the contractors owed them £9,000 and requesting an
initial payment of £5,000. In June 1952 the plaintiffs
paid a first instalment of £1,600. The Court finds that
there was an agreement plainly stated in the documents
and confirmed by the course of conduct between the
parties. Whether it was an express or an implied agree-
ment, the parties were
ad idem,
and each performed
their part until the liquidation proceedings.
The liquidator submitted that, because there was no
resolution passed at a meeting of directors authorising
the contract, it was unenforceable. A representation,
however, had been made that such a resolution had
passed. The principle of the Rule in Turquands Case has
been well stated in Gower's
Company Law.
Duplock J.'s
judgment in
Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park
(Mangal) Ltd.
(1964) 1 A.E.R. 630, was approved. It
folows that the representations and undertakings made
by the secretary established that such a contract was
binding upon the Society and that there had been a
valid equitable assignment of the grants. It followed
that the plaintiffs had agreed to pay for the materials
supplied. Appeal allowed.
[The State Officials Housing Society v P. Lyster &
Sons Ltd.; unreported; Supreme Court (Lavery, Kings-
mill-Moore and Haugh J.J.); 19th February 1965.]
Declaration made that plaintiff is entitled to join the
union of his choice.
The National Union of Vehicle Builders (N.U.V.B.) a
British-based trade union, is the holder of a negotiation
licence under the Trade Union Act, and became affili-
ated to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (I.C.T.U.)-
Plaintiff became a member of the N.U.V.B. in 1956;
and worked for Motor Manufacturers Ltd. Plaintiff
became dissatisfied with N.U.V.B. in 1970, although
this union represented practically all workmen in the
motor assembly. However, the plaintiff and 111 other
workers applied to the Marine Port and General Work-
ers Union (M.P.G.W.U.) for membership. This union
wrote to N.U.V.B. in April 1970 asking whether they
objected to the transfer, and the answer was affirmative.
In May 1970 the plaintiff and 145 others applied for a
transfer to the Irish Transport and General Workers
Union (I.T.G.W.U.), and N.U.V.B. still objected. There
was a lengthy correspondence, but the plaintiff and the
others alleged they wished to join an Irish-based union-
Finally N.U.V.B. asked I.C.T.U. to intervene in June
1970, which referred the matter to its Disputes Com-
mittee, which duly declared that it was contrary to good
tradp union practice for the I.T.G.W.U. to enrol work-
ers against an objection by N.U.V.B. In November
1970 the I.T.G.W.U. wrote to N.U.V.B. requesting that
they should take back the transferred members and
N.U.V.B. replied that no member employed by Motor
Manufacturers will be released to join any other union-
The plaintiff was still anxious to transfer to I.T.G.W.U-
but N.U.V.B. officials objected to it in present circum-
stances. The plaintiff contended that the N.U.V.B-
were wrongfully preventing him from joining I.T.G.W.L-
The defendants contended that the plaintiff undertook
to abide by the rules and that he had surrendered his
constitutional right to join another union. It was held
that a person over age may agree to surrender or to
waive all or part of his constitutional right under Article
40 (6) (3) of the Constitution, but the plaintiff would
require to be acquainted with the Constitution oi
I.G.T.U. which he was not. It is the objection by
N.U.V.B. which activates and supports all that has
followed upon it, and which now prevents the plaintiff
from joining
I.T.G.W.U. It was held that the
plaintiff
did not at any time either expressly or impliedly agree
with the N.U.V.B. that in the circumstances giving rise
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