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UNREPORTED IRISH CASES

Judgment mortgage not defective because of errors in

the description of lands unless misleading, and is

deemed suiiiciendy verified on oath.

Ashtown Car Sales Ltd. borrowed money from Credit

Finance, the plaintiffs, and on 31st March 1968 gave

a debenture charged on their assets to secure its repay-

ment. As additional security. Credit Finance got a

guarantee dated 26th April 1969 by three persons in-

cluding the defendant by which each of them guaran-

teed the repayment to the plaintiffs of the amount due

by Ashtown Car Sales Ltd. When there was £5,977.50

due, proceedings on the guarantee were brought by the

plaintiffs against three guarantors. The plaintiffs first

got judgment for this sum and costs against one of the

signatories on 27th October 1970 and on 16th November

1970 they got judgment and costs against the defendant.

The judgment was obtained by default. An affidavit

under the Judgment Mortgage Act, 1850, was filed in

the Central Office on 22nd December 1970 and in the

Registry of Deeds on December 23rd. The plaintiffs

have now brought this action to raise the amount due

to them which is secured by the judgment mortgage.

The defendant contends firstly that the affidavit is not

sufficiently specific as to whether the mortgage is against

5 Howth Road or 578 Howth Road, but it was held

that the property was identified with sufficient clarity.

It was secondly contended that the description of the

property was not verified on oath, but it was held

without citing authority that the description of the

property was sufficiently verified. Judgment for the full

amount claimed and costs was accordingly awarded to

the plaintiffs.

[Credit Finance Ltd. v Michael Grace; Kenny J.;

unreported; 29th May 1972.]

Applicant, convicted of murder in 1956, entitled to

habeas corpus.

(1) The applicant was convicted of murder at the

Central Criminal Court before Teevan J. and a jury on

the 19th April 1956. As the applicant was under 17

years of age, he could not be sentenced to death. The

sentence passed was that "The applicant was to be

detained until the pleasure of the Government be made

known concerning him."

(2) The subsequent warrant directed that the

;

appli-

cant should be detained in Marlborough House.

(3) On the 2nd May 1956, the applicant having

attained 17 years of age, he was directed to be removed

to Mountjoy Prison. On the 15th May 1956, the appli-

cant was directed to be removed to St. Patrick's Mental

Institution, Clonmel, on the 14th August 1956 the

applicant was directed to be removed to the Modified

Borstal class at Mountjoy.

(4) In July 1957 the applicant was directed to be

removed to the Central Mental Hospital, Dundrum, as

two doctors certified he was insane.

(5) On the 29th January 1968 the applicant wrote

to the High Court from the Central Mental Hospital

that his detention was not in accordance with law, and

applying for a

habeas corpus.

The President, having

obtained the relevant documents, came to the conclu-

sion that the order should be refused, and an order

made on the 15th February 1968 confirmed this.

(6) On the 17th December 1968 the applicant ap-

peared in person before the Court of Criminal Appeal

for an application for an enlargement of time within

which to give notice of an application for leave to

appeal against conviction and sentence imposed in

April 1956. The Court refused the application.

(7) As a result of further correspondence, the Presi-

dent informed the applicant on the 16th June 1969 that

no new grounds had been disclosed for granting a

habeas corpus.

(8) By letter of the 17th June 1969 the applicant

made a further application to the High Court which

was inquired into and refused by Murnaghan J. on

July 15th. The applicant was informed that his atten-

dance in Court was not necessary.

(9) The applicant appealed from Murnaghan J's

refusal to grant a

habeas corpus

to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, by order of the 15th December

1969, directed the Governor of the Central Mental

Hospital to produce the body of the applicant before

the High Court on the same day. The applicant was

duly produced before the President of the High Court

who ordered that the proceedings should stand over for

argument.

(10) The case came on for full hearing in April 1970

and, on the 27th April 1970 the President adjudged

that the applicant's detention was insufficient, and

ordered the immediate release of the applicant. The

grounds were that the sentence imposed was to entrust

to the Government the power to select the punishment

which was to be visited on him, and that, following

Deaton

(1963) I.R., this was inconsistent with the Con-

stitution.

(11) The State then appealed to the Supreme Court

against the granting of

habeas corpus

by the President.

(12) Walsh J. stated that the decision of the Court

turns upon the effect of Section 103 of the Children's

Act, 1908. The section provides that, in the event of a

conviction, the Court should sentence the young person

to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure, and then

shall be liable to be detained in legal custody in such

place as the Chief Secretary shall direct. This means in

effect that a question of punishment was contemplated.

If the section purports to rest an authority in the

Executive, then, following

Deaton,

such a provision is

inconsistent with the Constitution. By virtue of Section

11 of the Adaptation of Enactments Act, 1972, the

power of the Chief Secretary to determine where the

accused is to be detained is now vested in the Minister

for Justice. But the term "during His Majesty's pleasure"

does not vest this power in the Executive as the Presi-

dent found. In Deaton's case, it was stated that the

selection of punishment was an integral part of the

administration of justice, and therefore falls exclusively

within the judicial sphere. An examination of English

constitutional law would show that the King had exer-

cised powers of a judicial nature in mediaeval times,

such as the prerogative of mercy and the right to com-

mute sentences. Article 2 of the Constitution of 1922

states that all powers of government and all authority,

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