20
MINING FOR CLOSURE
improved access to land resources from gov-
ernments;
improved access to capital from reputable
lending institutions;
the potential for reduced cost of capital and li-
ability insurance;
continual feedback upon the manner in which
community expectations are being achieved.
As is discussed in essentially all informed sources, it
is in the best interest of business for such activities
to take place at the right phase of mine life in order
to minimise such expenditures. As mine decom-
missioning usually occurs at a point in the life of an
operation where the economic recovery of minerals
has ceased, and cash flows are minimal or non-exist-
ent, then this is not the time to be undertaking the
bulk of rehabilitation operations. The overall mine
decommissioning process should be integrated
with the overall mine operation planning process.
Further, if decommissioning and closure are not un-
dertaken in a planned and effective manner, chances
are that the results will also be sub-optimal.
2.2.2
the governmental case
Traditionally, good governments have had a principal
accountability for considering environmental and
social externalities while the focus of mining com-
panies has been on internal efficiency concerns.
At first glance – and especially for environmentally
aware stakeholders – the case for governments
pursuing the implementation of
best environmental
practice mining
and/or
Mining for Closure
, would
appear clear. If miners do not internalise the costs
of mine site rehabilitation and other social and/or
environmental impacts related to closure, then
Governments will have to do so on behalf of soci-
ety. Such works would have to be paid for from the
public purse. Further, for reasons mirroring those
outlined in Section 2.2.1, their conduct is likely to
be
less
efficient and less effective than if performed
by the miner.
However, there are arguments that the imposition
of costs on the industry can have detrimental ef-
fects, principally as a barrier to investment and
development.
35
This said, mining legacies could
be deemed to be the result of past and present
governance failure that is shared by essentially all
mining countries. Herein lies the arguments for
governments to pursue
Mining for Closure
– if regu-
latory frameworks ensuring efficient prevention of
mining legacies, and the rehabilitation of existing
legacies, are not put in place, then future national
tax-payers will have to pay much more for the work
and present stakeholders will have to endure the
environmental and social nuisances in the mean-
time.
The following citation from the Assistant Deputy
Minister for the Province of Ontario’s Ministry of
Northern Development and Mines (MNDM) (Gam-
mon, 2002) underlines the position that Govern-
ments around the world are faced with as a result
of poor governance and industrial environmental
practice in the past:
36
In coming to grips with the problem Ontario first
felt a need to classify and inventory these site lo-
cations. An initial commissioned survey of paper
records indicated that there would be on the order
of 600 individual features to be dealt with at an
estimated total cost of Cdn$500 million. It was
further estimated that some 40% of these sites re-
mained in private ownership while 60% had re-
verted to the Crown and formed a liability for the
Ontario taxpayer.
The Ontario government has reluctantly recog-
nized that it is not practically possible to apply
the “polluter pays” principle in dealing with this
legacy. The original operators have long disap-
peared, the commodities produced have been con-
sumed and the taxes paid have been incorporated
in general revenues. The current industry consists
of totally different players behaving in accordance
with the regulatory framework that the govern-
ment now has in place. There appears to be no
real alternative than to allocate public funds to
deal with the worst sites.
While there are other advantages defining the gov-
ernmental case for pursuit of
Mining for Closure
, it
suffices to summarise them within the following
broad categories:
the prevention of harmful environmental and
social impacts,
lower risk of non-compliances,
greater acceptance/less resistance from key
stakeholders (in particular local communities
and land owners),
35. These are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, refer also to
Miller (1998; 2005).
36. Detail references to, and the contents of Canadian work in this
area are addressed in Sections 4.2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3.
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