

210
The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.
[APRIL, 1911
Cozens-Hardy, M.R., in giving judgment,
said :—In my opinion the proceedings in the
action have been futile, and the costs
incurred by the plaintiff have been absolutely
thrown away by reason of the appearance
entered by Mr. Dunn for a non-existing
corporation. A Solicitor must be held to
warrant the authority which he claims as
representing his client.
Youge v. Toynbce
(1910, 1 K. B. 215) is a recent illustration of
this well established principle. I do not
think this is seriously contested, but it is
sought to escape by arguing that Mr. Dunn
had some persons for whom he was authorised
to act, though, strange to say, he even now
declines to say who were his clients. If A..
B. and C. publish a newspaper under the
style of the X. Company (Limited), the rules
contain provisions that they may be sued
under that style, but they must appear in
their own names. The whole proceedings
in the present action are inconsistent with
the theory now set up. In my opinion the
judgment is not available against Mr. Dunn's
unknown clients, and I fail to see that the
plaintiff, by signing judgment in the only
way in which it could be signed, viz., against
Liberal Opinion (Limited),
has in any way
altered the position. I think we have
jurisdiction to order Mr. Dunn to pay the
plaintiff's costs of the action (less £150 which
has been received from a co-defendant
against whom the action had been dis
continued on terms), and that we ought to
exercise this jurisdiction. The appeal must
be allowed, with costs both here and below.
Fletcher Moulton and Buckley
L.JJ.,
delivered judgment to the same effect.
(Reported 46
L. J.
135 ;
55 S. /. 315 ;
27
T. L. R.
278 [1911J,
W. N.
52).
PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY
DIVISION (ENGLAND).
(Before Evans, P.)
Jinks,
v.
Jinks.
.March
13, 1911.—
Divorce—Judicial Separa
tion—Wife
petitioner—Change
of
Solicitors for petitioner—First Solicitor's
costs.
IN a suit for judicial separation at the
instance of the wife, notice was given, on
December 21, 1910, of a change of Solicitors
by the petitioner. Thereafter the parties
resumed cohabitation, and the respondent
applied to have the petition dismissed.
Held,
that the application should be
refused until security was given for, or actual
payment of, the costs incurred on behalf of
the wife by her first Solicitor.
The President, in giving judgment, said :—
This is in form an application on the part of
the respondent for an order dismissing the
petition of his wife for a judicial separation
from him on the ground of his cruelty. The
question that arises is whether or not the
petition ought to be dismissed without
security being given for, or actual payment
made of, costs incurred on behalf of the wife
by her first Solicitor, she having changed her
Solicitors
duringthecour.seof the proceedings.
If properly instructed, and if his action has
been reasonable, a Solicitor can get his costs
if properly incurred. I have to decide in
this case whether the determination of the
matter rests with the officials of this Court,
or whether the petition should be dismissed
and the Solicitor be left to recover his costs
by an action at common law. I do not
think the solution presents any great
difficulties.
The petition was filed in
September, 1910, and is still on the file, and
therefore the suit is still alive.
Mr.
Grazebrook (Counsel for the respondent) says
that the suit practically ended in November,
1910, but I do not agree with this view. The
Court minutes say, that between October 26
and December 19 of that year five or six
orders were made relating to custody,
alimony, and other matters. On December
21, 1910, notice was given of a change of
Solicitors by the petitioner. Mr. Whitehead
ceased to be the petitioner's solicitor on the
record, she being now represented by Messrs.
Newton and Co. After the petition was filed
the parties resumed cohabitation. There was,
however, another separation later, and on
December 21 the parties were still living
separate and apart. After this there were
various negotiations, which resulted in
another resumption of cohabitation. I have
considered the steps which Mr. Whitehead
took to recover his costs, and the dates on
which he took them, and I consider that
there was no unreasonable delay on his part ;
but, on the contrary, that it might be laid
to the charge of the other side. Mr.
Glazebrook does not contend that a change