257 / 462
GAZETTE
JULY/AUGUST 1992
number of listed buildings. The
Secretary of State was obliged to
give "reasons" for his decisions in
terms almost identical to the
equivalent Irish provisions and he
purported to do so in a decision
letter which incorporated the
Inspector's report and set out the
Secretary's own thinking in some
detail, going on to grant the
planning permission sought and
imposing a number of conditions on
the grant. The reasons given were
challenged as being inadequate and
it was argued that the decision was
thereby invalidated. Having cited the
Judgment of Megaw j in
Re Poyser
and Mills Arbitration
(1964) and the
three criteria set out therein - that
reasons be proper, intelligible and
adequate - Lord Bridge ( delivering
the leading judgment) refused to
proffer a general statement of the
degree of particularity required by an
obligation to give reasons. He went
on to reject any attempt to set an
abstract standard of adequacy by the
Court:
"The alleged deficiency will only
afford a ground for quashing the
decison if the court is satisfied that
the interests of the applicant have
been substantially prejudiced by it....
the adequacy of reasons is not to be
judged by reference to some abstract
standard. There are in truth not two
separate questions: (1) were the
reasons adequate? (2) if not, were the
interests of the applicant substantially
prejudiced thereby? The single
indivisible question, in my opinion,
which the Court must ask itself
whenever a planning decision is
challenged on the ground of a failure
to give reasons, is whether the
interests of the applicant have been
substantially prejudiced by the
deficiency of the reasons given".
49
The burden was on the applicant to
establish such prejudice whether by
establishing that the stated reasons
did not disclose how a necessary
issue of law was resolved or how a
disputed issue of fact was decided.
In general, continued Lord Bridge:
"It is for the applicant to satisfy
the Court that the lacuna in the
stated reasons is such as to raise a
substantial doubt as to whether the
decision was based on relevant
grounds and was otherwise free from
any flaw in the decision making
process which would afford a ground
for quashing the decision".
In the event, the House unanimously
held that the Secretary of State had
adequately explained his decision,
though only after examining his
decision letter in great detail and
closely comparing and contrasting it
with the inspector's report, scrutiny
notably absent from the Supreme
Court's decision in
O'Keefe
where
the inspector had recommended
against
the granting of planning
permission for an equally
controversial development.
Reasons under review
Once an obligation to give reasons is
recognised in respect of any given
decision - whether derived from
statute or from the common law -
what will be the consequences of a
failure to comply or to comply
adequately with that obligation?
Where no reasons are given, the
decision cannot stand as given. Such
a complete failure to give reasons led
in
The State (Creedon)
-v-
The
Criminal Injuries
Compensation
Tribunal
(1988) and
State (Daly)
-v-
The Minister for Agriculture
(1987)
to the challenged decisions being
quashed. In contrast, in
International
Fishing Vessels Ltd
-v-
The Minister for the Marine
(1989)
Blayney J, though clearly of the
opinion that he had jurisdiction to
quash the respondent's decision for
refusal to give reasons, instead gave
a declaration to the effect that the
Minister was obliged to give his
reasons. This, Blayney J held, was in
the circumstances a better
alternative:
"particularly as the Minister has
indicated through his Counsel that he
is prepared to give his reasons if
directed by the Court to do so. If I
were to quash the existing decision,
the practical result would be that
the Minister would have to consider
the application again and would
no doubt once more refuse to grant
the licences, this time giving
reasons for his decision, and if the
applicant wished to attack that
decision, new proceedings would be
necessary."
50
Similarly in
C.W. Shipping Co. Ltd. -
v-
Limerick Harbour
Commissioners
(1989), if the matter had fallen for
decision on the failure to give
reasons point, it would have been
referred back to the respondent for
further consideration.
51
In
Anheuser
Busch Inc.
-v-
The Controller
of
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks
(1987), mandamus was granted to the
applicant directing the respondent to
state in writing the grounds of his
decision. The Court, therefore, has a
number of options open to it where
it finds that a decision has not been
explained or adequately explained.
Even where it quashes the decision
in question, since the adoption of
the 1986 Rules of the Superior
Courts, it may remit the matter back
to the deciding tribunal with a
direction to reconsider it and reach a
decision in accordance with the
findings of the court, by virtue of
0.84 r.26 (4).
Where reasons are inadequate or
where some, but not all, of the
stated reasons are " b a d" in law the
consequences are less clear. There is
a line of British authority
characterising a failure to give
adequate reasons as an error of law
per se,
thus leading to the quashing
of the decisions concerned, see
Alexander
Machinery
(Dudley) Ltd. -
v-
Cabtree
(1974).
53
A contrary view
is that inadequacy of reasoning will
invalidate the decision concerned if,
and only if, the inadequacy
manifests such an error of law; a
view finding powerful expression in
R.
-v-
Immigration
Appeal
Tribunal
ex parte Khan
(1983).
54
Such an
error of law will be manifested
where, for example, the given reasons
are so inadequate or threadbare as to
suggest that the decision was
irrational or where they make clear
that a tribunal has considered an
entirely irrelevant factor or suggest
that a relevant factor has been
ignored by it. The decision and
reasoning of Barron J in
State
(Daly)
-v-
The Minister
for
Agriculture
(1987) is closer to the
second view, inferring as it does a
lack of good reason from the
Minister's silence and quashing his
decision on that ground. The
Supreme Court decision in
Creedon
233