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11

Chemical Technology • July 2015

Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)

Layer of protection analysis is a simplified form of risk

assessment that evaluates the risk of an individual

hazard scenario. It only considers safeguards which

are independent layers of protection. The purpose of

this is to assist in avoiding the addition of excessive

protection incurring high costs, ie, over protection. It

uses an order of magnitude technique to evaluate the

adequacy of existing or proposed layers of protection

against known hazards.

In order to carry out a LOPA the following information

must be available:

• A hazardous event must have been identified, eg, fire,

explosion, toxic release, pollution, etc.

• The causes of the event.

• The consequences of an event, eg, fatalities, injuries,

damage, spoilt environment, etc.

• Existing safeguards.

The above information is often readily available from a

Hazard and Operability study (Hazop) and, therefore, a

LOPA can be done as part of such a study. Alternatively,

a separate LOPA can be done where the above informa-

tion is generated.

Setting tolerance criteria

Some criteria or target of tolerance or acceptability is

required to enable one to decide how much protection is

enough. In the following simple example a typical scale of

risk has been established. Risks can be classed as follows:

• Class I - Intolerable risk, not acceptable

• Class II - Undesirable risk, which is tolerable only if risk

reduction is impractical or the cost is disproportionate

to the improvement gained

• Class III - Tolerable risk if the costs of reduction exceeds

the improvement gained

• Class IV - Negligible risk.

It is normal to design hazardous processes or operations

to meet a Class III risk. A target risk table may be drawn

up for a particular industry or organisation. A hypothetical

example is shown below in Table 1. Note this matrix is not

an industry standard, see HSE (2001).

For example, if a particular hazardous event, eg, over-

filling of a tank, could lead to an irreversible health effect,

long term environment damage or a R50-m financial loss,

then this should not happen more than once in a 1 000

years, to meet the Class III risk criteria, that would make

the risk tolerable. Alternatively, this can be expressed as

PLANT MAINTENANCE, SAFETY,

HEALTH & QUALITY