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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1979

O'Higgins CJ. at p. 5 of his judgment.

"I thoroughly approve of the practice adopted by [the President] of

hearing the applicant in the absence of the adopting parents, whose

counsel are present and hearing them in the absence of the applicant

but in the presence of counsel"

per

Kenny J. at p. 4 of his judgement.

2. The adoption society made available to the Court their file of cor-

respondence and documents, and with the permission of the President,

took no further part in the proceedings.

3. The aspiring adoptive parents had had the custody of the child

for the previous nine months.

4. Section 6 (4) of the

Guardianship of Infants 1964

provides as

follows:

"The mother of an illegitimate infant shall be the guardian of the

infant".

Section 10 provides as follows:

"(1) Every guardian under this Act shall be a guardian of the

person and of the estate of the infant unless, in the case of a

guardian appointed by deed, will or order of the court, the terms

of his appointment otherwise provide.

(2) Subject to the terms of any such deed, will or order, a

guardian under this Act—

(a) as guardian of the person, shall, as against every person not

being, jointly with him, a guardian of the person, be entitled

to the custody of the infant and shall be entitled to take pro-

ceedings for the restoration of his custody of the infant

against any persons who wrongfully takes away or detains

the infant and for the recovery, for the benefit of the infant,

of damages for any injury to or trespass against the person

of the infant; . . . "

Section 14 provides as follows:

"Where a parent of an infant applies to the court for an order for

the production of the infant and the court is of opinion that that

parent has abandoned or deserted the infant or that he has other-

wise so conducted himself that the court should refuse to enforce

his right to the custody of the infant, the court may in its

discretion decline to make the order".

Section 16 provides as follows:

"Where a parent has—

(a) abandoned or deserted an infant, or

(b) allowed an infant to be brought up by another person at that

person's expense, or to be provided with assistance by a

health authority under section 55 of the Health Act, 1953,

for such a length of time and under such circumstances as

to satisfy the court that the parent was unmindful of his

parental duties,

the court shall not make an order for the delivery of the infant to

the parent unless the parent has satisfied the court that he is a fit

person to have custody of the infant".

Section 3 provides as follows:

"Where in any proceedings before any court the custody,

guardianship or upbringing of an infant . . . is in question, the

court shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and para-

mount consideration".

Section 2,

inter alia,

defines "welfare" "in relation to an infant, as

comprising the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social

welfare of the infant".

5.

Per

Finlky P. at pp. 18 and 19 of his judgment.

6. A. Shatter,

Family Law in the Republic of Ireland,

162-182,

170. However, in the opinion of the present writer such a proposal

would involve the exercise of judicial powers and would be in violation

of the Constitution. See the argument of Walsh J. in

G. v. An Bord

Uchtála

where he remarked that "adoption in our law is essentially a

consent or voluntary arrangement" (27). See Margaret L. Egginton

and Richard E. Hibbs, "Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption

Cases: Focusing on the Child" (1975-76) 14 Univ. of Louisville

Journal of Family Law 547 in which the authors demonstrate how

certain states in the United States have given courts the power to

dispense with the consent of a parentis) in the . best interests of the

child.

7. [ 1966] I.R. 567, 644. See M. Staines, "The Concept of "The

Family', under the Irish Constitution" (1976) 11

Irish Jurist

22.

8. In the Supreme Court Henchy J. expressly reserved his opinion

on this question. The right of bodily integrity was first recognised in

Ryan v. Attorney General

119651 I.R. 294, 313.

9.

Per

Finlay P. at p. 21 of his judgment.

10. Sections 14 and 16 of the 1964 Act.

11. Section 10 of the 1964 Act read in conjunction with s. 6 (4)

which provides that "]t]he mother of an illegitimate infant shall be

guardian of the infant".

208

12.

Per

Finlay P. at pp. 21 and 22 of his judgment.

13.

Per

Finlay P. at p. 26.

14.

Per

Finlay P. at pp. 26, 27.

15. The President was "clearly satisfied . . . that the welfare of

[the] child [did] not in any sense overwhelmingly require that she

should remain in the custody of her present custodians and not be

returned to the custody of her mother" (p. 30). One commentator has

noted that the courts will award custody "only in exceptional cases" to

third parties over married persons but that custody awards in favour of

third parties "have been far less exceptional in the case of unmarried

parents". See W. R. Duncan, "Supporting the Institution of Marriage

in Ireland" (a paper which was presented at the Third World

Conference of the International Society on Family Law in Uppsala,

Sweden, on 6 June 1979).

16.

Per

Henchy J. at p. 1 of his written judgment.

17. "[T]he plaintiff is a mother and as such she has rights which

derive from the fact of motherhood and from nature itself. These rights

are among her personal rights as a human being which the State is

bound under article 40.3.1 of the Constitution to respect and defend

and vindicate"

per

O'Higgins CJ. at p. 8. See pp. 7-9.

18.

Per

O'Higgins CJ at p. 15.

19. It should be noted that the Chief Justice was of the opinion that

Mr. Justice Finlay might have come to the same conclusion had he

used the test of what was "in the best interests of the child". However,

Mr. Justice Finlay had at p. 29 of his judgment indicated that

"li]f the issue in this case was analogous to that arising where

contending parties who have separated are each seeking the

custody of a child of a marriage then I would be forced to the

conclusion that the welfare of the child would be marginally

better fitted by remaining with her present custodians in the event

of their obtaining an Adoption Order concerning her than it

would be by being returned to the custody of her mother and into

the family home consisting of her grandmother, her grandfather

and her aunt".

20. The judgment of Parke J. is unclear at p. 6 where he remarks

that "there is no decision at first instance on the point".

21.

Per

Parke J. at p. 1 of his judgment.

22.

Per

Parke J. at p. 2 of his judgment.

23.

Per

Parke J. at pp. 4 and 5 of his judgment.

24. "The child, of course, has personal rights, which are recognised

by article 40 of the Constitution to life, to be fed, to be protected,

reared and educated in a proper way, but in my view a child has no

constitutional right to have these obligations discharged by his or her

natural parent, and that if there are other persons able and willing to

satisfy such requirements, then a child's constitutional rights are

sufficiently defended and vindicated",

per

Parke J. at p. 5 of his

judgment. See also O'Higgins CJ. at pp. 9 and 10. "In relation to

illegitimate children and certain others the State has by the Adoption

Acts endeavoured to discharge [the] obligation to defend and vindicate

their natural rights in its laws",

per

O'Higgins CJ. at p. 11 of his

judgment.

Since the decision of Gavan Duffy P. in

In re M., an Irtfant

11946]

I.R. 334 it is clear that the illegitimate child possesses the same

"natural and imprescriptible rights" that are recognised as reposing in

legitimate children under Article 42 of the Constitution. This was re-

asserted on a number of occasions by members of the Supreme Court

acting either in a judicial or extra-judicial capacity. For examples of

the former, see the judgments of Walsh J. in

State (Nicolaou)

v.

An

Bord Uchtála

[ 1966] I.R. 567 at 642 and of Henchy J. in the

G. case

at p. 11. The Chief Justice remarked recently at a public lecture that

there is no concept of

Jilius nullius

in Irish law — the illegitimate child

being possessed of the fundamental rights of children under the 1937

Constitution. Remarks made at a lecture delivered by Professor Spiros

Semitis on "The Rights of the Child in European Countries" at St.

Patrick's, Drumcondra, 15th November, 1979.

25. In

The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála

[1966] I.R. 567

Mr. Justice Walsh observed (at p. 644) that the mother's right to the

custody and care of her child was given constitutional protection by

article 40.3 of the Constitution. The President of the High Court

followed the decision and, accordingly, held that the plaintiff had a

"constitutional right to the custody and to the control of the

upbringing of her daughter". Mr. Justice Henchy and Mr. Justice

Kenny did not share this view, stating that they were not part of the

ratio decidendi

of the case (as in that case the alleged rights of the father

of an illegitimate child were in issue). In Mr. Kenny's opinion the mother

of an illegitimate child had a statutory right under the Guardianship of

Infants Act 1964 to the custody of her child but not a constitutional

one."

26.

Per

Henchy J. at p. 16 of his judgment. The Chief Justice and